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on International Trade |
| By: | Filip Bugarcic (University of Kragujevac, Serbia); Joern Kleinert (University of Graz, Austria) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines logistics performance's effects on international trade. A country's logistics' capacity is measured by the Logistics Performance Index (LPI), compiled by the World Bank, which gives comparable country-level data for 166 countries in six waves. We use the LPI in different gravity model approaches comparing the results from relative gravity, fixed effects models as OLS and Poisson regressions, and the HMR two-stage procedure which specifies a probit estimation in the first stage and non-linear augmented gravity in the second. We construct a bilateral trade dataset with 28, 020 bilateral trade relationships from CEPIIs trade database. In addition, we show and compare the effects for different country groups. The results of all used approaches indicate sizable and significant positive effects of logistics performance on international trade and in particular export activities. The findings give relevant policy implications and stress the need to improve the logistics system and associated performance to encourage exports. |
| Keywords: | Trade logistics, Export, Gravity modeling, Relative gravity. |
| JEL: | F14 F13 F12 |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpaper:2024-13 |
| By: | Lorenzo Rotunno; Michele Ruta |
| Abstract: | Available data show a marked increase in subsidy utilization in China and in other major economies between 2009 and 2022. In this paper, we investigate the effects that China's subsidies have on international trade flows at the product level over this period. The results indicate that the subsidies promoted Chinese exports and limited imports. These effects have been magnified by supply-chain linkages: subsidies given to upstream industries expand significantly the exports of downstream industries. Additional analysis of the price and quantity effects at the product level shows that China's subsidies lowered export prices and boosted export quantities in certain sectors such as metal products, furniture and autos, but not in others such as electrical machinery where the evidence is more consistent with quality upgrading. |
| Keywords: | China; Domestic subsidies; International trade; Spillovers; Overcapacity |
| Date: | 2024–08–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2024/180 |
| By: | Alexander Knobel (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Maria Baeva (RANEPA) |
| Abstract: | For several years, the WTO system, in particular trade dispute settlement mechanism, has been in a state of crisis. The main reasons are the following: growth of protectionism, trade wars, the COVID-19 pandemic, systemic problems, primarily, freezing of the Appellate Body (AB). According to the U.S., the AB exceeds limits of its authority, sometimes making decisions outside of the WTO law, thus, developing rights or obligations for member countries that are not provided for in the existing WTO agreements and violating time limits for appeals. The U.S. has blocked decisions on appointment of new AB members. Many WTO member countries agree on the need for reforms.2 According to experts, despite internal challenges, WTO has no alternative related to matters regulating international trade relations. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, foreign trade, WTO, trade disputes |
| JEL: | F10 F13 F19 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2024-1325 |
| By: | Ayuso Díaz, Alejandro; Tena Junguito, Antonio |
| Abstract: | This study examines the asymmetric protectionist policies of the U.S. in the Philippinemarket during the interwar period, focusing on how these policies effectivelymarginalized European powers and the emerging Japan before the Yen devaluation in1931. Using a new database on product and country-level imports from 1913 to 1940, the study concludes that competition was most intense in cotton textiles between theU.S. and Japan. The literature identifies a devalued Yen, lower transport costs, andcheaper prices of cotton manufactures as key Japanese advantages that counterbalancedU.S. protectionism in the Philippines.Regression analysis indicates that tariffs hindered cotton textile exports to thePhilippines during the interwar years, especially affecting Japanese exports before theGreat Depression. Japanese competitiveness before the 1930s relied on governmentsupportedlower freight rates. However, after the Yen devaluation in 1931, theeffectiveness of tariffs diminished, and the devaluation became the principal driver ofJapanese textile exports to the Philippines.To counter this advantage, the USA and Japan agreed to an export restraint in exchange for tariff stabilization at the start of the Commonwealth period in 1935. However, this agreement failed to reduce the value of Japanese cotton textile exports to the Philippines. A significant reduction occurred only after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric tariff policy; US colonial markets; Commercial power politics; Trade cost; Exchange rate policy; Competition in colonial markets; Import margins |
| JEL: | N75 F13 |
| Date: | 2024–08–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:whrepe:44262 |
| By: | Prema-chandra Athukorala |
| Abstract: | This paper revisits the contemporary debate on the deglobalization of merchandise trade using a new dataset that captures changes in the price structure of manufacturing trade associated with the decline in prices of information technology (IT) equipment. There is strong evidence that continued growth in world trade, both in absolute (value) terms and relative to GDP, has remained obscured by the frequent reliance on trade measured at current rather than constant prices. Continuing downward adjustment in the prices of manufactures trade within GVCs has significantly reshaped the price structure of global trade. When appropriately measured in real terms, there is strong evidence that world trade has regained its upward trend following the significant dip during the GFC owing to the dynamism of trade rooted in global production sharing. |
| JEL: | F14 F41 F60 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pas:papers:2024-8 |
| By: | Kornher, Lukas; Sakyi, Daniel; Tannor, Linus Linnaeus |
| Abstract: | Agricultural exports are especially important because of their great potential for poverty reduction among smallholder farmers. However, many African countries, such as Ghana, fail to realize their full export potential due to institutional and technical constraints. This paper examines the importance of port efficiency and service quality in complying with food trade standards in Ghana. We provide a stylized theoretical model in which exporting firms are willing to pay for improved port service quality as long as the marginal revenue derived from a reduced likelihood of (border) rejection exceeds the marginal costs for improved service quality. We test the model's predictions using primary data from 120 agri-food exporters in Ghana. Our results show that about two-thirds of exporting firms have a positive willingness-to-pay for a reduction in the handling time at the port and the risk of spoilage due to inadequate handling. These findings emphasize the importance of trade facilitation measures in improving port efficiency and service quality to accelerate agricultural exports. |
| Keywords: | Agribusiness, International Relations/Trade |
| Date: | 2024–08–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:cfcp15:344297 |
| By: | Alejandro Ayuso-Díaz (Universidad Pública de Navarra, INARBE); Antonio Tena-Junguito (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the asymmetric protectionist policies of the U.S. in the Philippine market during the interwar period, focusing on how these policies effectively marginalized European powers and the emerging Japan before the Yen devaluation in 1931. Using a new database on product and country-level imports from 1913 to 1940, the study concludes that competition was most intense in cotton textiles between the U.S. and Japan. The literature identifies a devalued Yen, lower transport costs, and cheaper prices of cotton manufactures as key Japanese advantages that counterbalanced U.S. protectionism in the Philippines. Regression analysis indicates that tariffs hindered cotton textile exports to the Philippines during the interwar years, especially affecting Japanese exports before the Great Depression. Japanese competitiveness before the 1930s relied on government-supported lower freight rates. However, after the Yen devaluation in 1931, the effectiveness of tariffs diminished, and the devaluation became the principal driver of Japanese textile exports to the Philippines. To counter this advantage, the USA and Japan agreed to an export restraint in exchange for tariff stabilization at the start of the Commonwealth period in 1935. However, this agreement failed to reduce the value of Japanese cotton textile exports to the Philippines. A significant reduction occurred only after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric tariff policy, US colonial markets, commercial power politics, trade cost, exchange rate policy, competition in colonial markets, import margins. |
| JEL: | F13 F15 N75 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hes:wpaper:0265 |
| By: | Jayjit Roy; Manan Roy; Jessica Robinson |
| Abstract: | In recent years, food insecurity has reached alarming proportions. Moreover, there has also been a growing recognition that international trade may affect the severity of the challenge. Accordingly, the effect of countries’ agricultural trade on food security is worth analyzing. However, identifying this impact is challenging due to the endogeneity of agricultural openness. Employing data across roughly 200 countries over 2000-2016 and an instrumental variables strategy, we estimate this causal effect of interest and arrive at a number of novel conclusions. First, the effect of agricultural commerce on food security differs from those of overall and non-agricultural trade. Second, the estimated impacts are often sensitive to the measure of food security employed. Finally, concerns over the endogeneity of openness are relevant. Key Words: Food Security, Agricultural Trade, Instrumental VariablesCreation-Date: 2024 |
| JEL: | C36 F63 Q17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:24-18 |
| By: | Erhardt, Katharina; Gupta, Apoorva |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to understand the pathways by which exporters become entities that sell multiple goods to multiple customers. To understand firms' export strategies, we analyse new trade flows - new seller-buyer-product combinations - of individual exporters. Our first finding highlights that these new trade flows are an important margin for firms of all size classes, accounting for approximately 62% of their overall trade flows. Classifying new trade flows into going-wide (introducing new products) and going-deep (reaching new buyers for existing products), we find that the dominant margin of export expansion depends on the size and life-cycle stage of exporters; smaller firms rely relatively more on going-wide and large firms more on going-deep. We also demonstrate that selling new products is different from selling existing products: Firms target new products to a single, often new, buyer. To rationalize these facts, we propose a conceptual framework where firms allocate scarce sales personnel between selling existing products to more buyers and matching with new buyers for introducing new products. We empirically test and confirm the model's key predictions. In particular, we use the 2015 Swiss exchange rate shock and show that going-deep is more pronounced as an export strategy when a firm's effective market size is relatively larger. The findings suggest varying scope and size for firms born in different phases of globalisation. |
| Keywords: | Export strategies, product introduction, customer accumulation, buyer-seller relationships, multi-product firms |
| JEL: | F10 F14 L25 O31 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:301154 |
| By: | Leona Shao-Zhi Li (University of Macau); Yize Liu (University of Macau); Jia Yuan (University of Macau) |
| Abstract: | Exploiting tariff variations during the U.S.–China trade war, we find that the U.S. tariff escalation is associated with a relative increase in corporate expenditure on research and development by listed Chinese manufacturing companies. Through a novel approach that infers the degree of competitive pressure from textual analyses of company annual reports, we identify an induced competition mechanism and offer evidence that is consistent with escape-competition motives. The marginal treatment effect is more pronounced for firms initially in neck-to-neck competition industries. Our findings are robust to various sensitivity tests and we consider different approaches of addressing the potential endogeneity concern. This is among the pioneering studies to examine the impact of adverse foreign trade shock on innovation responses in the source country, thus contributing with scholarly and policy implications in the face of rising protectionism. |
| Keywords: | U.S.–China trade war; tariff shocks; corporate innovation; escape-competition; textual analysis |
| JEL: | F13 F14 L60 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boa:wpaper:202418 |
| By: | Ludovic Panon (Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research, Bank of Italy); Laura Lebastard (Euro Area External Sector Division, Directorate General Economics, European Central Bank); Michele Mancini (Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research, Bank of Italy); Alessandro Borin (Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research, Bank of Italy); Peonare Caka (Analysis and Research Department, Bank of Slovenia); Gianmarco Cariola (Regional Economic Research Unit, Bologna Branch, Bank of Italy); Dennis Essers (Economics and Research Department, National Bank of Belgium); Elena Gentili (Regional Economic Research Unit, Bologna Branch, Bank of Italy); Andrea Linarello (Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research, Bank of Italy); Tullia Padellini (Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research, Bank of Italy); Francisco Requena (University of Valencia.); Jacopo Timini (Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research, Bank of Spain) |
| Abstract: | We study how disruptions to the supply of foreign critical inputs (FCIs) − that is, inputs primarily sourced from extra-EU countries with highly concentrated supply, advanced technology products, or which are key to the green transition − might affect value added at different levels of aggregation. Using firm-level customs and balance sheet data for Belgium, France, Italy, Slovenia and Spain, our framework allows us to assess how much geoeconomic fragmentation might affect European economies differently. Our baseline calibration suggests that a 50 % reduction in imports of FCIs from China and other countries with similar geopolitical orientations would result in sizable losses of value added with significant heterogeneity across firms, sectors, regions and countries, driven by the heterogeneous exposure of firms. Our findings show that the short-term costs of supply disruptions of FCIs can be substantial, especially if firms cannot easily switch away from these inputs |
| Keywords: | Geoeconomic fragmentation, global value chains, global sourcing, international trade, imported inputs. |
| JEL: | F10 F14 F50 F60 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202408-452 |
| By: | Yao Amber Li; Sichuang Xu; Stephen Yeaple; Tengyu Zhao |
| Abstract: | International transactions are costly because they require investments in logistics, contracts, and the acquisition of local institutional knowledge. We posit that a portion of the fixed costs of entering a specific export market can be used toward costs of acquiring imports from that same market, and vice versa. Using dis-aggregated transactions data for Chinese firms from 2000 to 2015, we document firm-level trading patterns that suggest such market-specific bilateral economies of scope. Using a structural model, we estimate that the simultaneous export and import in a given country reduces export and import fixed costs by over 41 and 37 percent, respectively. |
| JEL: | F1 F12 F14 F15 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32803 |
| By: | Von Arnim, Rudiger; Tröster, Bernhard; Raza, Werner |
| Abstract: | Can consumers trust that the food they buy in the supermarket, even if imported, is not harmful to their health? What would be the consequences if their trust in existing health and safety standards were to be undermined by recognizing lower foreign standards? Against the backdrop of public debates (e.g., on the merits of chlorine-washed chicken, banned in the EU, but legal under the proposed TTIP agreement with the United States), this paper discusses the close link between trust, regulation and international trade. It turns out that as local regulatory systems have evolved, they have created a "generalized trust" that promotes economic activity. Aggressive regulatory harmonization through trade agreements could jeopardize the fragile balance of trust and activity. |
| Keywords: | non-tariff barriers, TTIP, CETA, international treaties, trade agreement |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hbsfof:300717 |
| By: | Kim, Jong Duk (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Koo, Kyong Hyun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kang, Gusang (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kim, Hyuk-Hwang (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | In general, negative discussions and impressions regarding outward FDI, such as capital outflows, job losses, leakage of trade secrets, and hollowingout of domestic industries, seem to dominate. The controversy, which focused on greenfield investments in the past, seems to be widely applied to recent mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Against this backdrop, the purposeof this report is twofold: first, to improve the understanding of how the increase in Korean firms’ FDI through M&As and related innovation activities in the U.S. market affects the performance of the investing Korean firms and their domestic affiliates; and second, to provide objective long-term policy directions on outward FDI and firms’ innovation activities based on the results found using firm-level data. The following results and findings in each chapter of this report are presented as follows. On the theoretical side, based on the theoretical model developed by Akcigit, Ates, and Impullitti (2018), Chapter 2 examines the mechanisms through which FDI can affect the incentives to innovate and the financial performance of investing firms. Market integration through M&As creates a scale effect and a competitive effect. The cost of innovation also plays a role in firms’ innovation incentives and financial performance. A spillover expected from knowledge sharing resulting from access to a new market is an additional channel. Regarding the scale effect, access to large, developed markets is one of the reasons why direct investment is a rational choice for a firm’s innovation. Large markets tend to have more intermediate resources to use and a larger pool of information to share. However, access to a new market through FDI can change the competitive structure that the investing companies face. Direct access to a foreign market creates higher expected profits if an investing firm’s innovation is successful. Still, if it is not, the firm may face stiffer competition or be forced out of the market. The degree of monopoly power is indeed the main factor determining the profits of successful innovations. However, the firm’s current profit only lasts until the next innovation occurs, and if there is no subsequentinnovation that is better than that the competitor’s, the company’s profit will decrease or it will be exited from the market. To survive, companies need to continuously invest and work on innovation. The spillover of technologies and the knowledge embedded in the R&D performed or in the patents filed as part of these efforts are another channel through which companies strive for better quality and innovation. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | outward FDI; mergers and acquisitions; firms innovation activities; long term policy directions |
| Date: | 2023–12–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_022 |
| By: | Tracy Patricia Nindry Abigail Rolnmuch; Yuhana Astuti |
| Abstract: | The realization of FDI and DDI from January to December 2022 reached Rp1, 207.2 trillion. The largest FDI investment realization by sector was led by the Basic Metal, Metal Goods, Non-Machinery, and Equipment Industry sector, followed by the Mining sector and the Electricity, Gas, and Water sector. The uneven amount of FDI investment realization in each industry and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia are the main issues addressed in this study. This study aims to identify the factors that influence the entry of FDI into industries in Indonesia and measure the extent of these factors' influence on the entry of FDI. In this study, classical assumption tests and hypothesis tests are conducted to investigate whether the research model is robust enough to provide strategic options nationally. Moreover, this study uses the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The results show that the electricity factor does not influence FDI inflows in the three industries. The Human Development Index (HDI) factor has a significant negative effect on FDI in the Mining Industry and a significant positive effect on FDI in the Basic Metal, Metal Goods, Non-Machinery, and Equipment Industries. However, HDI does not influence FDI in the Electricity, Gas, and Water Industries in Indonesia. |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2408.01985 |
| By: | Thiago Christiano Silva; Paulo Victor Berri Wilhelm; Diego Raphael Amancio |
| Abstract: | This study examines the effects of deglobalization trends on international trade networks and their role in improving forecasts for economic growth. Using section-level trade data from more than 200 countries from 2010 to 2022, we identify significant shifts in the network topology driven by rising trade policy uncertainty. Our analysis highlights key global players through centrality rankings, with the United States, China, and Germany maintaining consistent dominance. Using a horse race of supervised regressors, we find that network topology descriptors evaluated from section-specific trade networks substantially enhance the quality of a country's economic growth forecast. We also find that non-linear models, such as Random Forest, eXtreme Gradient Boosting, and Light Gradient Boosting Machine, outperform traditional linear models used in the economics literature. Using SHapley Additive exPlanations values to interpret these non-linear model's predictions, we find that about half of the most important features originate from the network descriptors, underscoring their vital role in refining forecasts. Moreover, this study emphasizes the significance of recent economic performance, population growth, and the primary sector's influence in shaping economic growth predictions, offering novel insights into the intricacies of economic growth forecasting. |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcb:wpaper:597 |
| By: | Tröster, Bernhard; Von Arnim, Rudiger; Raza, Werner |
| Abstract: | Even though trade negotiations have increasingly come to focus on regulatory issues, the full impacts, that is, both social costs and benefits of regulatory changes, often remain unexamined in trade impact assessments. To bridge this gap, we scrutinize the theoretical foundations, methodologies and policymaking applications of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the context of health and safety regulations. CBA has become the main approach in economics to quantify the social costs and benefits of regulation. Gaining a thorough understanding of CBA processes, their applications and their limitations provides a valuable foundation for our upcoming research, the integration of the broader impacts of regulations into a global trade model. |
| Keywords: | non-tariff barriers, globalisation, international treaties, free-trade agreeements |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hbsfof:300714 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | The African continent is increasingly becoming a battleground in the race between superpowers for access to critical minerals needed for the 'Green Revolution', such as rare earth minerals (REE). Companies from China, the USA and Russia play a major role. In most cases, critical minerals are mined by international mining companies supported by their governments and organizing complex global value chains. So far, China has dominated supply chains and has secured mining contracts across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Currently, China produces 58% of all REEs worldwide. It is the main importer of minerals from Africa, with mineral exports from sub-Saharan Africa to China totalling USD 10 bn in 2019. Its dominance of the global rare earths market is rooted in politics, not geography. Rare earths are neither that rare nor that concentrated in China. Beijing has adopted a strategy of imports, dumping and control of rare earths that is hardly consistent with WTO rules. Therefore, in June 2022, a newly founded 'Minerals Security Partnership', consisting of the USA, the EU, Great Britain and other Western industrialized countries, invited mineral-rich African countries to counter Chinese dominance. These included resource-rich countries such as South Africa, Botswana, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The West's push became even more urgent after Beijing imposed export controls on the strategic metals gallium and germanium in July 2023, sparking global fears that China could be next to block exports of rare earth or processing technology. Because African markets are small, they are forced to rely on foreign financing. However, so far, foreign direct investment in rare earth production has confirmed the 'pollution haven' hypothesis about the environmentally harmful effects of FDI flowing into the affected countries. Although the full potential of rare earths in SSA has remained largely untapped due to low exploration, the dark side of the energy transition is becoming increasingly visible. These include pollution of soil, air and water as well as inadequate disposal of toxic residues and intensive water and energy use, occupational and environmental risks, child labour and sexual abuse as well as corruption and armed conflicts. In August 2023, Nigeria, Africa's largest economy, suspended certain illegal Chinese mining activities within its borders, including the activities of Ruitai Mining Company due to its involvement in illegal titanium ore mining. Namibia and the DR Congo followed suit. |
| Abstract: | Der afrikanische Kontinent wird immer mehr zum Schlachtfeld im Wettlauf zwischen Supermächten um den Zugang zu kritischen Mineralien, die für die ‚Grüne Revolution‘ benötigt werden, wie zum Beispiel seltene Erden (REE). Eine große Rolle spielen Unternehmen aus China, den USA und Russland. In den meisten Fällen werden kritische Mineralien von internationalen Bergbauunternehmen abgebaut, die von ihren Regierungen unterstützt werden und komplexe globale Wertschöpfungsketten organisieren. Bisher dominiert China die Lieferketten und hat sich Bergbauverträge in ganz Afrika südlich der Sahara (SSA) gesichert. Derzeit produziert China 58 % aller REEs weltweit. Es ist der Hauptimporteur von Mineralien aus Afrika, wobei sich die Mineralienexporte aus Afrika südlich der Sahara nach China im Jahr 2019 auf insgesamt $USD 10 Mrd. beliefen. Seine Dominanz auf dem globalen Markt für seltene Erden hat seine Wurzeln in der Politik, nicht in der Geographie. Seltene Erden sind weder so selten noch so stark in China konzentriert. Peking hat eine Strategie der Einfuhr, Dumpings und Kontrolle seltener Erden eingeführt, die kaum mit den Regeln der WTO übereinstimmt. Daher lud im Juni 2022 eine neu gegründete ‚Minerals Security Partnership‘, bestehend aus den USA, der EU, Großbritannien und anderen westlichen Industrieländern, mineralreiche Länder Afrikas ein, der chinesischen Dominanz entgegenzuwirken. Dazu gehörten rohstoffreiche Länder wie Südafrika, Botswana, Angola, Mosambik, Namibia, Tansania, Sambia, Uganda und die Demokratische Republik Kongo. Der Vorstoß des Westens wurde noch dringlicher, nachdem Peking im Juli 2023 Exportkontrollen für die strategischen Metalle Gallium und Germanium eingeführt hatte, was weltweit Befürchtungen weckte, dass China als nächstes den Export von Seltenen Erden oder Verarbeitungstechnologie blockieren könnte. Da die afrikanischen Märkte klein sind, sind sie gezwungen, auf ausländische Finanzmittel zurückzugreifen. Bisher haben die ausländischen Direktinvestitionen in die Produktion von Seltenen Erden jedoch die ‚Pollution haven‘ Hypothese über die umweltschädlichen Auswirkungen der in die betroffenen Länder fließenden FDI bestätigt. Obwohl das volle Potenzial der seltenen Erden in SSA aufgrund der geringen Exploration bisher weitgehend ungenutzt blieb, werden die Schattenseiten der Energiewende zunehmend sichtbar. Darunter fallen die Verschmutzung von Boden, Luft und Wasser sowie die unzureichende Entsorgung giftiger Rückstände und die intensive Wasser- und Energienutzung, Arbeits- und Umweltrisiken, Kinderarbeit und sexueller Missbrauch sowie Korruption und bewaffnete Konflikte. Im August 2023 stellte Nigeria, Afrikas größte Volkswirtschaft, bestimmte illegale chinesische Bergbauaktivitäten innerhalb seiner Grenzen ein, einschließlich der Aktivitäten der Ruitai Mining Company wegen ihrer Beteiligung am illegalen Titanerzabbau. Namibia und die DR Kongo folgten diesem Beispiel. |
| Keywords: | rare earths, energy transition, climate change, pollution, emerging markets, Sub-Saharan Africa |
| JEL: | D24 D43 D52 E23 F13 F18 F63 L61 N54 Q53 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300906 |
| By: | Subhayu Bandyopadhyay |
| Abstract: | An analysis looks at immigration levels over time, immigrants’ nations of origin, and immigrants’ educational attainment for the U.S. and selected U.S. states. |
| Keywords: | immigration; educational attainment |
| Date: | 2024–08–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:l00001:98678 |
| By: | Zong, Jian; Zhu, Maoran; Xie, Wei |
| Abstract: | Dietary shifts are key for enhancing the sustainability of current national food systems but need to account for potential human health and environmental spillover effects as well. Employing the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), we examine the direct health and environmental effects of countries adopting national recommended dietary patterns on their own health and environment, as well as spillovers through food trade. We find that when countries shift to their National food based dietary guidelines it could make great improvements in human health (e.g., changes in obesity rates) but positive and negative impacts on the environment (e.g., changes in blue water use). It will have spillover effects on the health and environment of other countries through the price-income mechanism of food trade, so that the dietary shift does not necessarily result in universally beneficial outcomes for global health and the environment. In light of these findings, we explore alternative policy solutions, such as technical assistance, to enhance the potential for win-win outcomes for both health and the environment during dietary shifts. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics and Policy, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety |
| Date: | 2024–08–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:cfcp15:344345 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) accounts for a third of the countries on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list. In the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (ML/TF) Ranking and Risk Assessment Tool, the region performed poorly in terms of resilience to ML/TF, with more than 60% of countries falling into the high-risk category. Although countries on the grey list are not subject to sanctions, inclusion on the list has a significant impact on their economies. This includes a significant reduction in capital inflows and foreign direct investment. The four main sources of illicit financial flows from SSA, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Nigeria, accounted for more than 50% of total illicit financial flows. While SSA received nearly $2 trillion in foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) between 1980 and 2018, it issued over $1 trillion in illicit financial flows. These illicitly acquired funds and diverted from the region continue to pose a development challenge. Illicit financial flows increased overall, but not concerning trade. In the 38 years from 1980 to 2018, they increased significantly in the 2000s, in parallel with the growth of African trade. Emerging and developing countries in Asia and the Middle East have become key targets. Previous initiatives to curb money laundering and improve the exchange of tax information between countries have largely failed, including the three most important: the Financial Action Task Force (founded in 1998), the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (founded in 2009) and the Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (founded in 2016). First, African countries lack the resources and capacity to address illicit financial flows. Second, many advanced economies are not sufficiently engaged in these initiatives. However, the repatriation of illegal funds is an important tool for strengthening the resource base of African countries. In 2020, for example, the United States and the self-governing British Crown Dependency of Jersey, one of the world's most notorious tax and money laundering havens, reached an agreement with Nigeria to repatriate more than $300 million stolen by Nigeria's former military dictator General Sani Abacha. |
| Abstract: | Subsahara-Afrika (SSA) macht ein Drittel der Länder auf der grauen Liste der Financial Action Task Force (FATF) aus. Im Ranking und Risikobewertungstool für Geldwäsche und Terrorismusfinanzierung (ML/TF) schnitt die Region in Bezug auf die Widerstandsfähigkeit gegenüber ML/TF schlecht ab, wobei mehr als 60 % der Länder in die Hochrisikokategorie fielen. Obwohl Länder auf der grauen Liste keinen Sanktionen unterliegen, hat die Aufnahme in die Liste erhebliche Auswirkungen auf ihre Wirtschaft. Dazu gehört eine deutliche Reduzierung der Kapitalzuflüsse und ausländischen Direktinvestitionen. Auf die vier Hauptquellen illegaler Finanzströme aus SSA, Südafrika, die Demokratische Republik Kongo, Äthiopien und Nigeria, entfielen mehr als 50 % der gesamten illegalen Finanzströme. Während SSA zwischen 1980 und 2018 fast 2 Billionen US-Dollar an ausländischen Direktinvestitionen (FDI) und offizieller Entwicklungshilfe (ODA) erhielt, emittierte es über 1 Billion US-Dollar an illegalen Finanzströmen. Diese unrechtmäßig erworbenen und aus der Region abgeleiteten Gelder stellen weiterhin eine Entwicklungsherausforderung dar. Die illegalen Finanzströme nahmen insgesamt zwar zu, nicht jedoch im Verhältnis zum Handel. In den 38 Jahren von 1980 bis 2018 stiegen sie in den 2000er Jahren deutlich an, parallel zum Wachstum des afrikanischen Handels. Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländer in Asien und im Nahen Osten sind zu Hauptzielen geworden. Die bisherigen Initiativen zur Eindämmung der Geldwäsche und zur Verbesserung des Austauschs von Steuerinformationen zwischen Ländern sind weitgehend gescheitert, darunter die drei wichtigsten: die Financial Action Task Force (gegründet 1998), das Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (gegründet 2009) und das Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (gegründet 2016). Erstens mangelt es den afrikanischen Ländern an Ressourcen und Kapazitäten, um gegen illegale Finanzströme vorzugehen. Zweitens engagieren sich viele fortgeschrittene Volkswirtschaften nicht ausreichend in diesen Initiativen. Allerdings ist die Rückführung illegaler Gelder ein wichtiges Instrument zur Stärkung der Ressourcenbasis afrikanischer Länder. Im Jahr 2020 einigten sich beispielsweise die Vereinigten Staaten und das selbstverwaltete britische Krongebiet Jersey, eines der berüchtigtsten Steuer- und Geldwäscheparadiese der Welt, mit Nigeria auf die Rückführung von mehr als 300 Millionen US-Dollar, die vom ehemaligen nigerianischen Militärdiktator General Sani Abacha gestohlen worden waren. |
| Keywords: | Money laundering, Embezzlement, Corruption, tax evasion, Terrorism financing, Informal economy, Sub-Saharan Africa |
| JEL: | D23 D25 D53 D63 D74 E21 F35 G28 O17 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300868 |
| By: | Nadezhda Volovik (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | Despite tighter monetary policy, escalating geopolitical conflicts and increased economic uncertainty, the global economy in 2023 was more resilient than expected. Economic growth exceeded expectations in several major developed and developing economies, and a sustained labor market recovery supported consumer spending. At the same time, global inflation has fallen significantly as energy and food prices have fallen, allowing central banks to slow or pause interest rate hikes. However, this semblance of resilience masks both short-term risks and structural vulnerabilities. Underlying price pressures remain elevated in many countries. Further escalation of conflicts in the Middle East poses a risk of disruption to energy markets and renewed inflationary pressures globally. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, foreign trade, terms of trade, regional pattern |
| JEL: | F10 F13 F19 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2024-1326 |
| By: | Lee, Sul-Ki (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade) |
| Abstract: | The global energy landscape is undergoing aseismic shift. As nations move to adopt low-carboneconomies, the focus of policies designedto achieve this have extended beyond climatechange mitigation: the new energy landscapehas become host to a strategic race amongnations to dominate the new energy frontier.Amid this race, South Korea, heavily reliant onimported fossil fuels and emissions-intensiveindustries, finds itself at a crossroads. Striking abalance between economic growth and aggressivedecarbonization is critical. Korea must notonly curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions butalso cultivate a domestic renewable energy industryas a new engine of economic growth. Thank you for reading this abstract of a paper by the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade! We are South Korea's premier think tank studying the nexus where trade and industry intersect. http://www.kiet.re.kr/en https://www.ssrn.com/index.cfm/en/korea- inst-industrial-econ-trade-res/ |
| Keywords: | EU; Carbon Border Adjustrment Mechanism; decarbonization; carbon neutrality; renewable energy; alternative energy; green energy; environmental economics; Korea; KIET |
| JEL: | Q40 Q42 Q43 Q48 Q56 Q58 |
| Date: | 2024–05–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieter:2024_013 |
| By: | Vera Barinova (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Margarita Gvozdeva (RANEPA); Stepan Zemtsov (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy) |
| Abstract: | The 2022 sanctions crisis has led to a number of structural changes in the Russian economy: the severance of long-standing partnerships with companies from unfriendly countries;2 destruction of supply chains; restriction of imports of materials, components and technologies, some of which have no analogues in friendly countries; complication of financial transactions, etc.3 However, already in 2023, the Russian economy demonstrated positive dynamics (growth of household incomes and investment), which contributed to the improvement of the situation in the SME sector, as the demand for their goods and services, particularly in the hospitality, trade and entertainment sectors, was growing. |
| Keywords: | Russian economy, small businesses, medium-sized enterprises, sanctions |
| JEL: | C53 E37 I18 I19 L21 L52 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gai:ppaper:ppaper-2024-1330 |
| By: | Lee, Jukwan (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Lee, Cheon-Kee (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Park, Ji Hyun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Park, Hyeri (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kim, Min-Sung (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | 이 보고서는 무임승차와 탄소 누출을 억제하기 위한 기후클럽의 등장에 주목한다. 국제사회로부터의 탄소중립과 기후클럽 참여 요청에 직면한 우리나라의 입장에서 G7 주도 기후클럽의 제안과 미국-EU 간의 철강 알루미늄 협상을 검토하였다. 또한 기후클럽 가입에 따른 경제적 영향 분석과 국내 산업계의 의견을 반영한 기후클럽 참여의 방향성을 제시하고, 무역과 기후변화의 균형을 이루면서 국제적 노력에 한국이 기여할 수 있는 대응방안을 모색하였다. South Korea faces a dilemma between responding to an invitation from a climate club advocating for rapid carbon reduction and addressing the domestic burden of decarbonization, rooted in its carbon emission-intensive industrial structure. The Korean government must strike a balance between the goals of achieving climate neutrality and sustaining economic growth. These two issues represent a kind of Gordian knot, notoriously difficult to untangle. Yet, the reality is stark, and the urgency of the climate crisis is undeniable. In this context, this paper aims to introduce the theory of the climate club. Utilizing this framework, we examine the G7-initiated climate club and the GSSA as real-world case studies. In chapter 2, we analyze the global carbon reduction effort by examining investment data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and FDI markets to analyze the investment patterns in the climate and environmental sectors at both government and private firm levels. This reveals a disparity between inward and outward investment patterns. We also observe that the main destination for investment is renewable energy, yet capital flow into fossil fuels remains substantial. This reflects the varied levels of NDC (Nationally Determined Contributions) achievements between the G7 and developing countries, which amplifies concerns over carbon leakage and the issue of competitiveness in developed countries. Based on these findings, we recognize the increasing number of new initiatives concerning climate change. Among them, due to their inclusiveness and comprehensiveness, the IDA, IFCMA, IDDA, Breakthrough Agenda, FMC, JETP are particularly noteworthy. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | climate club; decarbonization; real-world case studies; G7-initiated climate club; GSSA |
| Date: | 2023–12–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_014 |
| By: | Moon, Jiyoung (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kang, Munsu (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Park, Minsuk (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kim, Youngsun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Jeong, Minji (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | 본 보고서에서는 시진핑 정부 시기의 해외직접투자 전략 변화를 살펴보기 위하여 후진타오 정부 2기부터 시진핑 정부 2기에 이르기까지 시기별 중국의 해외직접투자 정책과 지역별 해외직접투자 현황을 분석하였다. 분석 결과 시진핑 정부에 들어서면서 해외직접투자에 대한 국가발전 전략의 투영이 본격화되기 시작했으며, 해외직접투자 규모도 분야에 따라 전략적으로 확대되었다. 이에 따라 본 보고서는 중국의 해외직접투자 전략 변화에 대응하여 한국 정부와 기업 간 협력 강화, 그린ㆍ디지털 분야 등 새로운 투자 협력 기회 창출, 한·중의 제3국 공동진출 협력 확대 등의 정책 시사점을 제시한다. This report analyzes the changes in China’s outbound direct investment (ODI) policies and approaches in response to the evolving external economic cooperation environment in China. By examining the shifts in China’s ODI strategies, the report also explores the impact of regional strategies and economic cooperation relationships during the transition from Hu Jintao’s second term to the Xi Jinping administration, using regional ODI data. Finally, based on the characteristics of China’s ODI, the report presents the risks and suggested responses for South Korea. In Chapter 2, we examined the changes in China’s ODI strategy. China’s ODI is closely related to its reform and opening-up policy. Since the reform and opening-up policy, China has pursued the simplification of regulations and the easing of restrictions on ODI. During the second term of the Hu Jintao administration, the ODI system encouraged overseas expansion, including by private enterprises, and witnessed significant regulatory simplification. The approval process shifted from a stringent examination system to an approval system, and there was a decentralization of government authority from the central government to local governments, which contributed to the easing of FDI regulations. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | China; Xi Jinping administration; regional ODI; Outbound Direct Investment; ODI strategy |
| Date: | 2024–08–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_036 |
| By: | JEONG, Young Sik (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Song, Yena (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the influence of net international investment position (IIP) on financial stability and financial internationalization. We find a strong correlation between creditor status (IIP surplus) and resilience to financial crises. Net creditor countries appear to act as buffers, with foreign assets returning to the home country during potential crises, thus preventing deterioration in external sector soundness. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that external financial assets positively affect the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of financial service. Specifically, the positive relationship between external financial assets and financial service RCA is more pronounced during periods of net IIP surplus compared to net IIP deficit periods. Our findings suggest that a net IIP surplus is beneficial for both financial stability and international competitiveness. |
| Keywords: | international investment position; Financial Stability; Internationalization; external financial assets; revealed comparative advantage |
| Date: | 2024–08–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kiepwe:2024_026 |
| By: | Tilekeyev, Kanat |
| Abstract: | Russia's war in Ukraine caused a spike in basic food costs as well as agro-input prices (fuel, seeds, and fertilizer) in 2022. Fertilizer prices rose double on average compared to 2021, reducing farmer demand and import supply to Kyrgyzstan. Fuel costs increased, while market demand remained constant. Farmers had a seasonal diesel shortage in the second half of 2022. The financial market remained stable and lending in agriculture increased due to the stable interest rates for agricultural lending. Analysis of the four key food markets in Kyrgyzstan (wheat, sugar, potato and meat) demonstrated increase in prices under the external and internal factors - increased input prices, trade restrictions imposed by supply states, increased cost of logistics and growth of domestic production factors. The overall situation demonstrates that agriculture is undergoing a severe shock as a result of rising prices, which feeds into the cascade effect of rising prices. However, the country's population's consumer ability cannot keep up with price increases, resulting in a reduction in demand for more expensive foods. |
| Keywords: | Agricultural and Food Policy, Food Security and Poverty |
| Date: | 2024–08–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:cfcp15:344314 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Since the 1960s, both the regime of Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) and, subsequently starting from 1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran, have intervened in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). While the Shah's policies were motivated by a virulent anti-communist stance, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) pursued a 'radical' policy of changing the political status of the Western world, including the Western Arab allies, who were hostile to the survival of the mullah regime. While the Shah focused on geopolitical interests, particularly in the Horn of Africa, the vital sea route to the Red Sea, and in South Africa, and ignored the interests of African Muslims, the IRI exploited increasingly radicalized Islamists to expand Iranian influence on the continent. For example, the IRI has spent billions of dollars in the region to provide Muslim schools and free social services through hospitals and orphanages supported by the Iranian Red Crescent. The IRI's strategy aimed to build grassroots support among Muslim communities rather than focusing exclusively on African governments. Tehran's expansionist policies included arms sales to state and non-state actors and the destabilization of regimes. The goal was to build partnerships that would help evade international sanctions while opening new terrain for its axis of resistance against its global and regional adversaries, particularly its arch-enemy Israel. Tehran's version of political Islam involved building up proxies, most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi rebels, most recently in Yemen, who have wreaked havoc on international shipping lanes in solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Tehran expanded its influence in the Sahel region, taking advantage of self-serving French Africa policy and the policies of other Western powers in West Africa to establish contacts with the anti-Western ASE military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Russia, China and Turkey paved the way for this new alignment. The rivalry between Iran and Israel has intensified in recent decades, with several confrontations between the two countries in the Red Sea and East Africa since the 2010s. Iran has continuously expanded its engagement throughout the region, leading to a ‘balance of deterrence’ between the two countries. |
| Abstract: | Seit den 1960er Jahren intervenieren sowohl das Regime von Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) als auch seit 1979 die Islamische Republik Iran in Subsahara-Afrika (SSA). Während die Politik des Schahs von einer virulenten antikommunistischen Haltung motiviert war, verfolgte die Islamische Republik Iran (IRI) eine ‚radikale‘ Politik der Veränderung des politischen Status der westlichen Welt, einschließlich der westlichen arabischen Verbündeten, die dem Überleben des Mullah-Regimes feindlich gegenüberstanden. Während sich der Schah auf geopolitische Interessen konzentrierte, insbesondere am Horn von Afrika, dem lebenswichtigen Seeweg zum Roten Meer, sowie in Südafrika, und die Interessen afrikanischer Muslime ignorierte, nutzte die IRI zunehmend radikalisierte Islamisten, um den iranischen Einfluss auf dem Kontinent auszuweiten. So hat die IRI beispielsweise Milliarden von Dollar in der Region ausgegeben, um muslimische Schulen und kostenlose soziale Dienste durch Krankenhäuser und Waisenhäuser bereitzustellen, die vom iranischen Roten Halbmond unterstützt wurden. Die Strategie des IRI zielte darauf ab, Unterstützung an der Basis unter muslimischen Gemeinschaften aufzubauen, anstatt sich ausschließlich auf afrikanische Regierungen zu konzentrieren. Teherans Expansionspolitik umfasste Waffenverkäufe an staatliche und nichtstaatliche Akteure sowie die Destabilisierung von Regimen. Ziel war es, Partnerschaften aufzubauen, die helfen würden, internationale Sanktionen zu umgehen und gleichzeitig neues Terrain für seine Widerstandsachse gegen seine globalen und regionalen Gegner, insbesondere seinen Erzfeind Israel, zu eröffnen. Teherans Version des politischen Islam beinhaltete den Aufbau von Stellvertretern, vor allem der Hisbollah im Libanon und den Houthi-Rebellen, zuletzt im Jemen, die aus Solidarität mit der palästinensischen Sache verheerende Schäden der internationalen Schifffahrtswege anrichteten. Teheran erweiterte seinen Einfluss in der Sahelzone und nutzte die eigennützige französische Afrikapolitik und die Politik anderer westlicher Mächte in Westafrika aus, um Kontakte zu den antiwestlichen Militärjuntas der ASE in Burkina Faso, Mali und Niger aufzubauen. Russland, China und die Türkei ebneten den Weg für diese neue Ausrichtung. Die Rivalität zwischen dem Iran und Israel hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten verschärft. Seit den 2010er Jahren kam es zwischen den beiden Ländern im Roten Meer und in Ostafrika zu mehreren Konfrontationen. Der Iran hat sein Engagement in der gesamten Region kontinuierlich ausgeweitet, was zu einem ‚Gleichgewicht der Abschreckung‘ zwischen den beiden Ländern führte. |
| Keywords: | Alliance of Sahel States, West Africa, ECOWAS, UEMOA, Sahel, Nationalism |
| JEL: | F15 F35 F52 F53 F54 N17 O17 O55 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300870 |
| By: | Mazzocco, Ilaria |
| Abstract: | Chinese firms are leading players in the production of clean energy technologies and appear set to expand further. This paper analyzes trends in Chinese clean tech manufacturing including internationalization, and the outlook for manufacturing facilities outside of China in the clean energy technology industry, including EVs, batteries, and wind turbines. Among the main findings: Chinese clean energy technology companies have been relatively quick to expand their foreign market share but production outside of China is still lagging. Europe is likely to be the preferred destination for Chinese battery, EV, and wind companies but current investments are limited to the battery industry. The production of different technologies is subject to different sets of incentives including cost and political considerations that will determine how quickly companies will internationalize production. Overall, the diversification of production would bolster the resilience of supply chains and economic development but is likely to proceed more quickly for batteries and more slowly for other technologies. |
| Keywords: | Social and Behavioral Sciences, China, renewable energy, technology, industrial policy, manufacturing |
| Date: | 2023–02–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:globco:qt19d8w4xm |