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on Innovation |
| By: | Seula Kim; Jane Olmstead-Rumsey; Honghao Wang |
| Abstract: | Teams of inventors now produce over 80 percent of U.S. patents, up from just 45 percent in 1976. Over the same period, inventor employment has become increasingly concentrated in large firms, rising six times more than overall employment concentration. To explain these trends, we develop a new model of endogenous team formation within firms and embed it in a general equilibrium model of the inventor labor market. Teams increase firms’ returns to scale by increasing the likelihood of productive matches between inventors. The value of these matches rises over time, possibly driven by increasing knowledge specialization. This causes large firms to expand and small firms to shrink in equilibrium, accounting for the observed increase in inventor employment concentration. Because firms do not internalize knowledge spillovers, there is misallocation of inventors across firms. The rise of team production amplifies this misallocation by a factor of six by reallocating inventors away from small firms that generate disproportionately large knowledge spillovers. |
| Keywords: | innovation; R&D teams; inventor allocation; firm dynamics; economic growth |
| JEL: | E23 E24 O31 O32 O33 |
| Date: | 2026–09–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedpwp:103815 |
| By: | Matcham, William; Schankerman, Mark |
| Abstract: | We develop a dynamic structural model of patent screening incorporating incentives, intrinsic motivation, and multi-round negotiation. We use natural language processing to create a new measure of patent distance, which, together with detailed data on examiner decisions, enables us to estimate the model and study strategic decisions by applicants and examiners. Using the estimated model, we quantify the effectiveness of the U.S. Patent Office and evaluate counterfactual policy reforms. We find that patent screening is moderately effective, given the existing standards for patentability. Examiners exhibit substantial intrinsic motivation that strongly improves screening quality. We quantify the annual social costs of patent screening at $15.38bn, equivalent to 5% of total private sector R&D in the U.S. and show that reforms limiting the number of negotiation rounds significantly reduce social costs. |
| Keywords: | patents;innovation;incentives;screening;intrinsic motivation |
| JEL: | D73 L32 O31 O34 O38 |
| Date: | 2026–09–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:137489 |
| By: | Saverio Barabuffi; Jacopo Cricchio; Alberto Di Minin; Guido Pialli |
| Abstract: | Knowledge spillovers have largely been studied as unintended externalities diffusing through geographic proximity, while deliberate interregional networks have been examined mostly through co-inventor ties rather than the scientific layer carried by co-authored publications. This study asks whether spillovers from interregional AI-related co-publications increase regional AI patenting, and whether the ownership composition of regional R&D shapes the capacity to capitalize on them. Using a network-econometric approach across 26 Chinese provincial-level regions from 2006 to 2020, we find that co-publication spillovers foster AI patenting, but the returns concentrate almost entirely in regions where privately owned enterprises dominate R&D, reinforcing regional divergence. |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2609.26604 |
| By: | Dorfs, Wiebke; Hampel, Maximilian; Bryson, Joanna J. (Hertie School) |
| Abstract: | Technological progress plays a crucial role in international relations. In particular, innovation has long been theorized as instrumental to power transitions. It is therefore unsurprising that the return of China as a global superpower and its technological advances has triggered considerable discussion. One narrative that has emerged is that of a binary "AI Cold War" competition between China and the US, similar to the 1947-1991 competition between nuclear superpowers. Another though is that the digital and information revolutions should facilitate technology and therefore power diffusion. Here we examine the claim of a binary competition, examining the state and trajectory of global AI competition for the years 2018, 2019, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025. We use AI patents defended globally in the WIPO database and the market capitalization of the companies holding them as proxies for innovation and market power. We find that the binary narrative underestimates the strength of other actors globally, notably but not exclusively the European Union and Japan. These are comparable to China, and on the innovation metric with the US. In terms of market power, the US is a significant outlier, with an order of magnitude more capital concentration. Our research therefore indicates that any binary AI cold war narrative is not data-led. |
| Date: | 2026–09–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:nk7ja_v1 |
| By: | Nikolova, Milena (University of Groningen); Angelini, Viola (University of Groningen) |
| Abstract: | As populations age, longer working careers become more essential, and technological advancements may prolong or shorten career spans. We examine how exposure to industrial robots, information and communication technology (ICT), and artificial intelligence (AI) relate to retirement expectations among workers in 20 European countries. To this end, we link individual-level data from the European Working Conditions Survey (2005–2024) with lagged technology-exposure measures. Technology exposure shows little systematic association with preferred retirement timing. Nevertheless, robots and especially AI are linked to the perception of being able to work until age 60. These associations vary across workers and tasks, suggesting that job design and worker adaptation determine whether technology supports longer working lives. |
| Keywords: | retirement, expectations, technological change, robots, ICT, AI |
| JEL: | I31 J26 O33 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18938 |
| By: | Grillitsch, Markus (CIRCLE, Lund University); Friedrich, Jonathan (CIRCLE, Lund University); Nilsson, Fredrik (CIRCLE, Lund University); Schwaag-Serger, Sylvia (CIRCLE, Lund University); Souza, Vitor (CIRCLE, Lund University); Stihl, Linda (CIRCLE, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | The sustainability imperative calls for a sharp reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and virgin materials use. This requires the transformation of currently unsustainable global and linear value chains (GVCs) to regenerative and circular supply chains (CSCs). To deal with the complexities of such a shift, this paper suggests Arenas of Change as a theoretical perspective and methodological approach, capturing interaction spaces of actors who engage in changing how goods are produced, distributed and consumed, and how waste is recovered and reduced. Actors are conceptualised as being embedded in multi-scalar network, institutional and governance structures, which can enable or hinder change processes. We argue that the possibility of Arenas of Change to effectuate and accelerate shifts from GVCs towards CSCs depends on the realisation of synergies in four domains: i) business logics, models, and innovation; ii) consumption and user practices, iii) modes of governance, and iv) policies and discourses. Arenas of Change are thus a prism through which the interdependencies between domains, multiple scales and levels, and actors' strategies can be analysed. Thereby, Arenas of Change can contribute to theory-building about transformations from global and linear to regenerative and circular supply chains, and conditions that enable, accelerate or hinder such systemic change. Furthermore, by enhancing analytical leverage to comprehensively capture the complexity of such transformations, we propose Arenas of Change as an approach to design impactful interventions, and to evaluate their effects. |
| Keywords: | Circular economy; Global value chains; Business models; Innovation; Consumer practices; Governance; Innovation policy |
| JEL: | L21 O33 Q56 |
| Date: | 2026–09–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lucirc:2025_009 |