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on Innovation |
| By: | Thomas Fackler; Oliver Falck; Moritz Goldbeck; Fabian Hans; Annina Hering |
| Abstract: | We investigate differences in labor demand between German automotive firms specializing in green propulsion technology and those with a focus on combustion engines. To this end, we introduce a firm-level labor demand index based on the near-universe of online job postings and firms’ patent portfolios. Workforce adjustments are a crucial dimension of technology-related structural change, and labor demand as a highly reactive decision parameter is an ideal measure to detect employment adjustments. Our index enables us to distinguish labor demand by firms’ greenness in real-time, a notable advantage over survey or administrative data. In a difference-in-differences setup, we exploit the poly-crisis triggered by unexpected escalations of trade conflicts and sustained by consequences of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. We find green firms’ labor demand is significantly and persistently higher than before the outbreak of the poly-crisis, by 34 to 50 percentage points compared to firms with a focus on combustion technology. This gap widens over time and is not driven by unobserved firm heterogeneity. Green firms systematically adjust labor demand towards production and information technology jobs. |
| Keywords: | low carbon technology, firm employment decisions, sustainability, disruptive innovation |
| JEL: | C55 J23 M51 O14 O33 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11160 |
| By: | Jürgen Janger |
| Abstract: | Abstract:Interrupted supply chains in the wake of COVID-19 and Russia’s attack on Ukraine have highlighted the geopolitical risks of sourcing critical raw materials and products from a small number of authoritarian countries. The EU has initiated a flurry of activities to reduce unilateral dependencies, witnessed by trade, innovation and industrial policy instruments, such as the IPCEIs, the Chips Act and new anti-subsidy measures. This policy brief focuses on fostering technological sovereignty to insure against risks from international trade specifically in critical general purpose technologies. Bundles of innovation, industrial and trade policies enter three consistent policy mixes according to the distance to the technological frontier: for emerging technologies, the frontier policy mix emphasises an improvement in general framework conditions such as a more integrated European capital market. Technologies which lag behind the frontier benefit from coordinated support within the catch-up policy mix, while technologies at risk of losing their position at the frontier fall within the remit of the defensive policy mix. |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wsr:pbrief:y:2024:m:01:i:61 |
| By: | Bernhard Dachs |
| Abstract: | Abstract:The EU Chips Act is a new policy instrument that aims to increase Europe‘s autonomy in the area of microchips. The Chips Act includes funding for research and development, investments in new chip production capacities, and monitoring of the chip market to anticipate supply shortages. The total funding for the act is 43 billion EUR, with 11 billion EUR allocated for R&D and innovation. Most of the funds will come from member states and companies.The EU Chips Act has been criticized for its structure, its funding, and its strategic orientation. Observers argue that the funding may be insufficient for the act's ambitious goals, that it may focus on the wrong technologies, and that the goal of technological sovereignty in chips is unrealistic. Additionally, similar programs in other countries could lead to an oversupply of chips. However, given the current global tensions and the potential for disruptions to chip supply from Asia, there may be no alternative to public support for ramping up chips production in Europe. |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wsr:pbrief:y:2023:m:02:i:58 |
| By: | Robert Flynn; Britta Glennon; Raviv Murciano-Goroff; Jiusi Xiao |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of rising U.S.-China geopolitical tensions on three main dimensions of science: STEM trainee mobility between these countries, usage of scientific works between scientists in each country, and scientist productivity in each country. We examine each dimension from a “U.S.” perspective and from a “China” perspective in an effort to provide evidence around the asymmetric effects of isolationism and geopolitical tension on science. Using a differences-in-differences approach in tandem with CV and publication data, we find that between 2016 and 2019 ethnically Chinese graduate students became 16% less likely to attend a U.S.-based Ph.D. program, and that those that did became 4% less likely to stay in the U.S. after graduation. In both instances, these students became more likely to move to a non-U.S. anglophone country instead. Second, we document a sharp decline in Chinese usage of U.S. science as measured by citations, but no such decline in the propensity of U.S. scientists to cite Chinese research. Third, we find that while a decline in Chinese usage of U.S. science does not appear to affect the average productivity of China-based researchers as measured by publications, heightened anti-Chinese sentiment in the U.S. appears to reduce the productivity of ethnically Chinese scientists in the U.S. by 2-6%. Our results do not suggest any clear “winner, ” but instead indicate that increasing isolationism and geopolitical tension lead to reduced talent and knowledge flows between the U.S. and China, which are likely to be particularly damaging to international science. The effects on productivity are still small but are likely to only grow as nationalistic and isolationist policies also escalate. The results as a whole strongly suggest the presence of a “chilling effect” for ethnically Chinese scholars in the U.S., affecting both the U.S.’s ability to attract and retain talent as well as the productivity of its ethnically Chinese scientists. |
| JEL: | F22 F6 O3 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32622 |
| By: | Alexander Quispe; Rodrigo Grijalba |
| Abstract: | Advancements in Artificial Intelligence, particularly with ChatGPT, have significantly impacted software development. Utilizing novel data from GitHub Innovation Graph, we hypothesize that ChatGPT enhances software production efficiency. Utilizing natural experiments where some governments banned ChatGPT, we employ Difference-in-Differences (DID), Synthetic Control (SC), and Synthetic Difference-in-Differences (SDID) methods to estimate its effects. Our findings indicate a significant positive impact on the number of git pushes, repositories, and unique developers per 100, 000 people, particularly for high-level, general purpose, and shell scripting languages. These results suggest that AI tools like ChatGPT can substantially boost developer productivity, though further analysis is needed to address potential downsides such as low quality code and privacy concerns. |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2406.11046 |
| By: | Carlo Bottai; Jacopo Di Iorio; Martina Iori |
| Abstract: | Economic growth results from countries' accumulation of organizational and technological capabilities. The Economic and Product Complexity Indices, introduced as an attempt to measure these capabilities from a country's basket of exported products, have become popular to study economic development, the geography of innovation, and industrial policies. Despite this reception, the interpretation of these indicators proved difficult. Although the original Method of Reflections suggested a direct interconnection between country and product metrics, it has been proved that the Economic and Product Complexity Indices result from a spectral clustering algorithm that separately groups similar countries or similar products, respectively. This recent approach to economic and product complexity conflicts with the original one and treats separately countries and products. However, building on previous interpretations of the indices and the recent evolution in spectral clustering, we show that these indices simultaneously identify two co-clusters of similar countries and products. This viewpoint reconciles the spectral clustering interpretation of the indices with the original Method of Reflections interpretation. By proving the often neglected intimate relationship between country and product complexity, this approach emphasizes the role of a selected set of products in determining economic development while extending the range of applications of these indicators in economics. |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2406.16199 |
| By: | Roman Stöllinger |
| Abstract: | Abstract:The case for green industrial policy is strong and it is the obvious instrument to induce the structural transformation towards an emission-free economy. At the core of such a transformation lies the decarbonisation of the energy system. The industrial policy effort required to achieve the ambitious net zero objective in the European Green Deal (EGD) can be divided into three policy tasks: expanding renewable energy sources, raising energy efficiency across sectors and developing new technologies for industrial production processes where clean technologies are not available yet. While the first two tasks can rely on cost-competitive technologies and the required investment costs could in the long run pay for themselves, the third task constitutes formidable technological challenges that need to be tackled with a mission-oriented industrial policy. The industrial policy package employed ought to be a mix of public investments, green subsidies coupled with appropriate environmental regulations and an industrial mission for developing net zero industrial technologies. Importantly, with investment costs estimated at 1.75% of GDP per year, achieving the objectives of the EGD seems feasible also from a financial perspective. Despite this optimistic tone, the EGD is far from being a safe bet, and its success can easily be threatened by a plethora of factors, including opposition by vested interests or geopolitical confrontations. |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wsr:pbrief:y:2023:m:06:i:59 |