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on Innovation |
| By: | Arshad Ali Bhatti; M. Emranul Haque; Denise R. Osborn |
| Abstract: | This paper argues that excessive financial development in combination with high levels of technological innovation or R&D activities may lead to the former being ineffective in generating economic growth. This hypothesis is examined through a dynamic panel analysis using two measures of financial development, in conjunction with R&D expenditure, for 36 OECD and non-OECD countries. Using a range of panel data estimators, our results show that the relationship between financial development and economic growth is not straightforward; rather, it is conditional upon the level of R&D. Further, we find that a high level of R&D is associated with a weak or negative effect of financial development on economic growth. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:man:cgbcrp:188&r=ino |
| By: | Wojciech Grabowski; Krzysztof Szczygielski; M. Teoman Pamukçu; Sinan Tandogan |
| Abstract: | Mediterranean and EU member countries consider enhancing innovation and R&D an important policy objective. In order to improve economic competitiveness and increase their citizens’ welfare, these countries have been formulating and implementing innovation policies. In recent years, the volume of resources allocated to such policies has considerably increased and the number of instruments used in this framework has widened. Nevertheless, a relatively limited number of studies have been conducted to assess the effectiveness of innovation policies in these countries and formulate proposals for those aspects of policies that are in contradiction with the aims.Creation-Date: 2012-09 |
| Keywords: | Private Innovation |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sec:ebrief:0113&r=ino |
| By: | Cette, G.; Lopez, J.; Mairesse,J. |
| Abstract: | Our study aims at assessing the actual importance of the two main channels usually contemplated in the literature through which upstream sector anticompetitive regulations may impact productivity growth: business investments in R&D and in ICT. We thus precisely try to estimate what are the specific impacts of these two channels and their shares in total impact as against alternative channels of investments in other forms of intangible capital such as improvements in skills, management and organization. For this, we specify an extended production function relating productivity explicitly to R&D and ICT capital as well as to upstream regulations, and two factor demand functions relating R&D and ICT capital to upstream regulations. These relations are estimated on a panel of 14 OECD countries and 13 industries over the period 1987-2007. Our estimates confirm the results of previous similar studies finding that the impact of upstream regulations on total factor productivity can be sizeable, and they provide evidence that a good part of the total impact, though not a predominant one, goes through both investments in ICT and R&D, and particularly the latter. |
| Keywords: | Productivity, Growth, Regulations, Competition, Catch-up, R&D, ICT |
| JEL: | O43 L5 O33 O57 L16 C23 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:banfra:441&r=ino |
| By: | Richard M. H. Suen (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines quantitatively the effects of R&D subsidy and government-financed basic research on U.S. economic growth and consumer welfare. To achieve this, we develop an endogenous growth model which takes into account both public and private research investment, and the differences between basic and non-basic research. A calibrated version of the model is able to replicate some important features of the U.S. economy over the period 1953-2009. Our model suggests that government spending on basic research is an effective policy instrument to promote economic growth. Subsidizing private R&D, on the other hand, has no effect on economic growth. |
| Keywords: | Research Policy, Basic and Applied Research, R&D Spending, Endogenous Growth |
| JEL: | O31 O38 O41 |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2013-18&r=ino |
| By: | Heger, Diana; Zaby, Alexandra K. |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a theoretical and empirical investigation of the two basic effects of patenting: the positive effect of temporarily mitigating competition, and the negative effect of mandatory disclosure of a patent application. Providing empirical evidence for the presented theoretical results we find that (i) a technological lead and the propensity to patent are negatively related as opposed to common intuition, (ii) in industries with imperfect appropriability in case of secrecy the extent of the technological lead is positively associated with the propensity to patent, and that (iii) the intensity of patent protection mitigates the competitive threat a patentee faces. -- |
| Keywords: | patenting decision,disclosure requirement,patent scope,vertical product differentiation,IPC codes |
| JEL: | L13 O14 O33 O34 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13048&r=ino |
| By: | Hui-ting Hsieh (Department of Economics, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan); Ching-chong Lai (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan; Department of Economics, National Cheng Chi University, Taiwan; Institute of Economics, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Taiwan) |
| Abstract: | This paper sets up an imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model that features the strategic interaction between the patent-holding firm and licensees, and uses it to analyze the relevant macro variables under various licensing arrangements. Some main findings emerge from the analysis. First, the equilibrium aggregate output and aggregate consumption under fixed-fee and royalty licensing regimes are always greater than those under the no licensing regime. Moreover, the equilibrium aggregate output and consumption under the fixed-fee licensing regime are always greater than those under the royalty licensing regime. Second, with the higher (lower) technology level the patent-holder prefers the fixed-fee (royalty) contract. Third, welfare could be improved through technology transfer, and the level of welfare under the fixed-fee licensing regime is higher than that under the royalty licensing regime. |
| Keywords: | Imperfect competition, Macroeconomic model, Fixed-fee licensing, Royalty licensing |
| JEL: | D45 E10 L16 |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sin:wpaper:13-a007&r=ino |