nep-ino New Economics Papers
on Innovation
Issue of 2010‒05‒08
seven papers chosen by
Steffen Lippert
Massey University Department of Commerce

  1. Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators? By Hirshleifer, David; Low, Angie; Teoh, Siew Hong
  2. Technology transfer in a circular model By Bouguezzi, Fehmi
  3. US market entry by Spanish pharmaceutical firms By Fabrizio Cesaroni; Marco S. Giarratana; Ester Martínez-Ros
  4. Cooperation with public research institutions and success in innovation: Evidence from France and Germany By Robin, Stéphane; Schubert, Torben
  5. Competing Engines of Growth: Innovation and Standardization By Daron Acemoglu; Gino Gancia; Fabrizio Zilibotti
  6. A comparison of structural reform scenarios across the EU member states - Simulation-based analysis using the QUEST model with endogenous growth By Francesca D'Auria; Andrea Pagano; Marco Ratto; Janos Varga
  7. Market Integration and Technological Leadership in Europe By René Belderbos; Leo Sleuwaegen; Reinhilde Veugelers

  1. By: Hirshleifer, David; Low, Angie; Teoh, Siew Hong
    Abstract: Using options- and press-based proxies for CEO overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2005b, 2008), we find that over the 1993-2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development (R&D) expenditure. Overconfident managers only achieve greater innovation than non-overconfident managers in innovative industries. Overconfidence is not associated with lower sales, ROA, or Q.
    Keywords: CEO Overconfidence; Innovation; R&D; Patent
    JEL: M52 G30 M40
    Date: 2010–04–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:22425&r=ino
  2. By: Bouguezzi, Fehmi
    Abstract: This paper compares three licensing regimes in a symmetric duopoly model situated on a circular city à la Salop. One of the firms holds a patent allowing to reduce the marginal production cost and decides to license its innovation under a fixed fee or a royalty regimes or not to license. The paper shows that fixed fee licensing is better than no licensing for a non drastic innovation which contradicts the result found by Poddar and Sinha (2004) in a linear model. Results also show that, for a non drastic innovation, fixed fee licensing is better than royalty licensing and the opposite for a drastic innovation. Finally, I show that optimal licensing regime for the patent holding firm when innovation is not drastic is fixed fee and I show that for this licensing regime a Nash equilibrium exists. When innovation is drastic, patent holding firm do not license and become a monopoly.
    Keywords: Salop model; Technology transfer; Patent licensing
    JEL: O32 O31 C21 L24
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:22417&r=ino
  3. By: Fabrizio Cesaroni; Marco S. Giarratana; Ester Martínez-Ros
    Abstract: This work explores the factors that spur firms’ propensity to enter in international markets. Among the whole population of Spanish firms active in the pharmaceutical sector (over the period 1995-2004), we identify those firms that have entered the US market by assessing whether they have filed at least a trademark in the US Patents and Trademarks Office. By means of a hazard model, we empirically estimate which firm’s characteristics affect the probability of entry in the US market in a given year. Results show that technological capabilities (breadth and depth of firms’ patent base), and the firm’s cost structure explain the entry in the US market with a branded product. Moreover, our evidence shows that entry strategies based on differentiation advantage (technological diversification) and strategies based on cost advantage (scale economies) are exclusive and do not mix well each other
    Keywords: Foreign market entry, Internationalization strategies, Firm-Specific advantages, Competitive advantage, Innovation and R&D, Patents, Trademarks
    JEL: F23
    Date: 2010–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we101103&r=ino
  4. By: Robin, Stéphane; Schubert, Torben
    Abstract: We evaluate the impact of cooperation with public research institutions on firms' inno-vative activities in France and Germany, using data from the fourth Community Innova-tion Survey (CIS4). We propose an original econometric methodology, which explicitly takes into account potential estimation biases arising from self-selection and endoge-neity, and apply it to both process and product innovation. We find a positive effect of cooperation on both types of innovation. This effect is significant in both countries, but much higher in Germany than in France. Drawing on a comparison of the institutional context of cooperation across both countries, we interpret this difference as a conse-quence of the more diffusion-oriented German science policy. Finally, our robustness checks confirm the importance of controlling for selection and endogeneity. We show that these problems can be serious, and may lead to inconsistent estimates if ne-glected. --
    Keywords: Public/private research partnerships,University/industry linkages,Innova-tiveness,Heckit procedure with endogenous regressors
    JEL: O31 O33 O38
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fisidp:24&r=ino
  5. By: Daron Acemoglu; Gino Gancia; Fabrizio Zilibotti
    Abstract: We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes the form of the introduction new goods, whose production requires skilled workers. Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these new goods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlights a number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth and a potential barrier to it. As a result, growth in an inverse U-shaped function of the standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growth and welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal IPR policies affecting the cost of standardization vary with the skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that the interplay between innovation and standardization may lead to multiple equilibria. Finally, we study the implications of our model for the skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade to intellectual property rights protection.
    JEL: F43 O31 O33 O34
    Date: 2010–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15958&r=ino
  6. By: Francesca D'Auria; Andrea Pagano; Marco Ratto; Janos Varga
    Abstract: This paper calibrates the Roeger-Varga-Veld (2008) micro-founded DSGE model with endogenous growth for all EU member states using country specific structural characteristics and employs the individual country models to analyse the macroeconomic impact of various structural reforms. We analyse the costs and benefits of reforms in terms of fiscal policy instruments such as taxes, benefits, subsidies and administrative costs faced by firms. We find that less R&D intensive countries would benefit the most from R&D promoting and skill-upgrading policies. We also find that shifting from labour to consumption taxes, reducing the benefit replacement rate and relieving administrative entry barriers are the most effective measures in those countries which have high labour taxes and entry barriers.
    Keywords: Structural reforms, endogenous growth, DSGE modelling, EU member states, tax credits, tax shifts, entry barriers, human capital, D'Auria, Pagano, Ratto, Varga
    JEL: E32 E62 O30 O41
    Date: 2009–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:euf:ecopap:0392&r=ino
  7. By: René Belderbos; Leo Sleuwaegen; Reinhilde Veugelers
    Abstract: This study traces and analyses the changes in firm and industry structure due to EU market integration and the integration of the EU in the global economy. It focuses on changes in competitiveness based on innovation and technology development.
    Keywords: european union eu denmark sweden norway jonung bergman scandinavian currency union synchronisation of cycles co-movement of cycles monetary unions symnetry symmetry european business cycles
    JEL: D21 L25 L60 O33
    Date: 2010–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:euf:ecopap:0403&r=ino

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