nep-ino New Economics Papers
on Innovation
Issue of 2009‒03‒22
seven papers chosen by
Steffen Lippert
Massey University Department of Commerce

  1. Patent Scope and Technology Choice By Färnstrand Damsgaard, Erika
  2. Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation By Jos Jansen
  3. Public Knowledge, Private Knowledge: The Intellectual Capital of Entrepreneurs By Albert Link; Christopher Ruhm
  4. Globalization and Innovation in Emerging Markets By Yuriy Gorodnichenko; Jan Svejnar; Katherine Terrell
  5. Towards Demand Based Innovation Policy? The Introduction of SHOKs as Innovation Policy Instrument By Tuomo Nikulainen; Antti-Jussi Tahvanainen
  6. First-to-invent versus first-to-file, Invention, and international patent law harmonization By Kaz Miyagiwa
  7. Academic Patenting in Japan: Illustration from a Leading Japanese University. By Makiko Takahashi; René Carraz

  1. By: Färnstrand Damsgaard, Erika (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of an increase in patent scope on R&D and innovation. It presents a model where patent scope affects an entrant firm's technology choice and thereby creates a trade-off between R&D investments and wasteful duplication of R&D. The model predicts that an increase in patent scope can increase the probability of innovation if the incumbent’s profit increase from innovation is large and the patented technology has a small advantage over the alternative technology. However, when the model is extended to Stackelberg competition or licensing, the benefit of a broad patent scope to a large extent disappears.
    Keywords: Innovation; Patents; Patent policy; Licensing
    JEL: K20 L51
    Date: 2009–03–03
  2. By: Jos Jansen (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)
    Abstract: The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free-rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms.profits and the probability of innovation.
    Keywords: R&D competition, innovation, spillovers, information disclosure, strategic substitutes, free-rider effect, externality
    JEL: D82 D83 L23 O31 O32
    Date: 2009–02
  3. By: Albert Link; Christopher Ruhm
    Abstract: This paper focuses on the innovative actions of entrepreneurs, namely their tendency to reveal the intellectual capital that results from their research efforts either in the form of public knowledge (publications) or private knowledge (patents). Using data collected by the National Research Council within the U.S. National Academies from their survey of firm’s that received National Institutes of Health Phase II Small Business Innovation Research awards between 1992 and 2001, we find that entrepreneurs with academic backgrounds are more likely to publish their intellectual capital compared to entrepreneurs with business backgrounds, who are more likely to patent their intellectual capital. We also find that when universities are research partners, their presence complements the tendencies of academic entrepreneurs but does not offset those of business entrepreneurs.
    JEL: M14 O31
    Date: 2009–03
  4. By: Yuriy Gorodnichenko (University of Michigan); Jan Svejnar (University of Michigan); Katherine Terrell (University of Michigan)
    Abstract: Globalization brings opportunities and pressures for domestic firms in emerging markets to innovate and improve their competitive position. Using data on firms in 27 transition economies, we test for the effects of globalization through the impact of increased competition and foreign direct investment on domestic firms' efforts to raise their capability (innovate) by upgrading their technology or the quality of their product/service, taking into account firm heterogeneity. We find competition has a negative effect on innovation, especially for firms further from the frontier, and that the supply chain of multinational enterprises and international trade are important channels for domestic firm innovation. We do not find support for the inverted U effect of competition on innovation. There is weak evidence that firms in a more pro-business environment invest more in innovation and are more likely to display the inverted U relationship between competition and innovation.
    Keywords: emerging markets, globalization, innovation
    Date: 2008–04
  5. By: Tuomo Nikulainen; Antti-Jussi Tahvanainen
    Abstract: ABSTRACT : This paper aims to provide an overview of the recently introduced demand based innovation policy instrument in Finland - the Strategic Centers for Science, Technology and Innovation (in Finnish - SHOKs). SHOKs are formed to support the innovative activities of existing industries in Finland with emphasis on industrial renewal through innovation. The focus in this paper is on the current state of SHOKs, the role of different actors in their formation process, the organization of SHOKs, the development of strategic long-term research agendas and short-term research programs, the challenges related to intellectual property rights, and co-operation between different SHOKs. The paper compares these dimensions across SHOKs and tries to highlight some potential threats and opportunities that might arise. The underlying interview data shows that, while SHOKs are fairly similar in most of the dimensions, there are differences in partner selection, industry specificity, and formulation of research areas. It should be noted that individual SHOKs are in very different stages of development as some have existed for two years and others are still to be established.
    Keywords: SHOK, demand-based innovation policy, policy instruments, national systems of innovation
    JEL: O31 O32 O33 O34 O38
    Date: 2009–03–13
  6. By: Kaz Miyagiwa
    Abstract: The U.S. has been under pressure to abandon the unique first-to-invent feature of its patent law for awarding patents. The opposition to reform argues that switching to a first-to-file rule, the international norm, will undermine innovation. We evaluate this argument in a dynamic stochastic model of a patent race that captures the key features of the U.S. patent system. The model also explains the puzzle why there is much filing activity in the U.S., when in first-toinvent the inventor never has to file for a patent unless he must sue.
    Date: 2009–03
  7. By: Makiko Takahashi; René Carraz
    Abstract: In April 2004, the Japanese government incorporated the national universities as “independent administrative entities”. This important change in Japan’s research culture has allowed its universities to gain higher control and oversight over their strategic development trajectories. In this paper, we will present an analysis centered on the legislative changes concerning intellectual property and their impact on Japanese universities. We will particularly focus our attention on a leading Japanese research institution: Tohoku University. We will analyze the different mechanisms that have been put in place to foster the use of patents by faculty members. In that respect, we introduce a differentiation between university-owned and university-invented patents, and put emphasis on the difference in patenting behaviors among scientific disciplines. Finally, we argue that contractual research is a major channel for the technology transfer of Japanese universities’ knowledge and findings.
    Keywords: science policy, academic research, academic patenting, Japan.
    JEL: O31 O53
    Date: 2009

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