nep-ino New Economics Papers
on Innovation
Issue of 2008‒07‒05
five papers chosen by
Steffen Lippert
Massey University Department of Commerce

  1. On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion By Jo Seldeslachts; Tomaso Duso; Enrico Pennings
  2. Natural concentration in industrial research collaboration By Bastian Westbrock
  3. Competencies and Institutions Fostering High-growth Firms By Henrekson, Magnus; Johansson, Dan
  4. Perceived technology clusters and ownership of related technologies: the case of consumer electronics By Frank J. van Rijnsoever; Carolina Castaldi
  5. The Bright and Dark Side of Cooperation for Regional Innovation Performance By Tom Broekel; Andreas Meder

  1. By: Jo Seldeslachts (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany;; Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany;; Enrico Pennings (Dept. of Applied Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands, E-mail:
    Abstract: Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint venture RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we show that large RJVs in concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collusion.
    Keywords: Research Joint Ventures, Product Market Collusion, Empirical Test
    JEL: L24 L44 L52
    Date: 2008–03
  2. By: Bastian Westbrock
    Abstract: Empirical work suggests that the network of research and development alliances is asymmetric, with a small number of firms involved in the majority of partnerships. This paper relates the structure of the collaboration network to a fundamental characteristic of the demand for research output: the benefits of knowledge accumulation create private and social incentives for a concentration of collaborative activities. I theoretically investigate the formation of bilateral collaborative links in two different industry settings, one socially managed, the other oligopolistic. I find that in both cases a concentrated network is the typical equilibrium structure as well as the socially efficient structure.
    Keywords: R&D collaboration, market structure, networks
    JEL: D43 D85 L13
    Date: 2008–06
  3. By: Henrekson, Magnus (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Johansson, Dan (Ratio)
    Abstract: High-growth firms (HGFs) are critical for net job creation and economic growth. We analyze HGFs using the theory of competence blocs, linking firm growth to property rights and the interaction of complementary expertise. Specifically, we discuss how the institutional framework affects the prevalence and performance of HGFs. Firm growth is viewed as resulting from the perpetual discovery and use of productive knowledge. A key element in this process is the competence bloc, a nexus of economic actors with complementary competencies that are vital in order to generate and commercialize novel ideas. The institutional framework determines the incentives for these individuals to acquire and utilize knowledge. We identify a number of institutions that foster the emergence of competence blocs and the creation of HGFs. In particular, our analysis points to the pivotal roles played by tax structures, labor market regulation, and the contestability of currently closed service markets. Finally, we characterize institutions beneficial for sclerotic or dynamic capitalism, respectively, depending on whether they provide a favorable environment for the emergence of competence blocs and the creation of HGFs.
    Keywords: Competence Bloc; Dynamic Capitalism; Entrepreneurship; Flyers; Gazelles; High-growth Firms; Industrial Policy; Innovation; Institutions; Labor Security; Product Market Regulations; Property Rights; Sclerotic Capitalism; Self-employment; Tax Policy
    JEL: H32 L25 L50 M13 O31 P14
    Date: 2008–06–24
  4. By: Frank J. van Rijnsoever; Carolina Castaldi
    Abstract: We contribute to the understanding of how technologies may be perceived to be part of technology clusters. The value added of the paper is both at a theoretical and empirical level. We add to the theoretical understanding of technology clusters by distinguishing between clusters in perceptions and clusters in ownership and by proposing a mechanism to explain the existence of clusters. Our empirical analysis combines qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate clusters of consumer electronics for a sample of Dutch consumers. We find that perceived clusters in consumer electronics are mostly determined by functional linkages and that perceived technology clusters are good predictors of ownership clusters, but only for less widely diffused products.
    Keywords: Technology clusters, consumer electronics, innovation
    Date: 2008–06
  5. By: Tom Broekel (Department of Economic Geography, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University, The Netherlands); Andreas Meder (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany)
    Abstract: Studies analyzing the importance of intra- and inter-regional cooperation for regional innovation performance are mainly of qualitative nature and focus strongly on the positive effects that high levels of cooperation can yield. For the case of the German labor market regions and the Electrics + Electronics industry the paper provides a quantitative-empirical analysis taking into account the possibility of negative effects related to regional lock-in, lock-out, and cooperation overload situations. Using conditional nonparametric frontier techniques and cooperation behavior measures we ï¬nd positive as well as substantial negative effects of cooperation with the latter being induced by excessive and unbalanced cooperation behavior.
    Keywords: regional innovation performance, cooperation, lock-out, lock-in, cooperation overload
    JEL: R12 O18 O31
    Date: 2008–06–26

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