|
on Innovation |
| By: | Alan Hughes |
| Abstract: | This paper questions the current emphases in innovation policy on a particular interpretation of US performance which emphasises R&D intensive high technology producing sectors, spin-offs from the science base and private sector venture capital. Whilst recognizing the important role they may play it is argued that it has been greatly exaggerated to the neglect of other key factors. One is the importance of the diffusion and use of ICT as a general purpose technology beyond the ICT and other R&D intensive high-tech producing sectors. A second is the dominant role which performance transformation in existing firms plays in driving industry level productivity compared with the direct role of new entrants. A third is the diversified role played by universities in knowledge exchange which extends beyond a narrow focus on spin offs and licensing to encompass the creation of human capital and a wide range of formal and informal business interactions. Finally there is the major role that public R&D procurement policy has played in the US in the effective provision of public rather than private sector venture capital. The paper provides a broad overview of evidence on each of these factors and considers some broad implications for innovation policy which might be drawn on the basis of that review. In particular it concludes by arguing that the crafting of innovation policy in the context of any specific national innovation system requires a careful consideration of the structural features of that context and the particular opportunities and challenges facing policy practitioners in it. An imperfect interpretation of the experience of one country's system is unlikely to be an appropriate guide to innovation system failure or success elsewhere. |
| Keywords: | Innovation Policy, University-Industry Links, Productivity Growth |
| JEL: | O31 O33 O38 |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp348&r=ino |
| By: | Uwe Cantner (School of Business and Economics, Friedrich-Schiller University Jena, Germany); Maximilian Goethner (School of Business and Economics, Friedrich-Schiller University Jena, Germany); Andreas Meder (School of Business and Economics, Friedrich-Schiller University Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This paper is concerned with the relationship between innovative success of entrepreneurs and their prior knowledge at the stage of firm formation. We distinguish between different kinds of experience an entrepreneur can possess and find evidence that the innovative success subsequent to firm formation is enhanced by entrepreneur's prior technological knowledge but not by prior market and organizational knowledge. Moreover we find that prior technological knowledge gathered through embeddedness within a research community has an additionally positive influence on post start-up innovative success. This is a first hint towards the importance of collective innovation activities. |
| Keywords: | Entrepreneurship, Networks, Prior knowledge |
| JEL: | L25 O31 Z13 |
| Date: | 2007–08–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-052&r=ino |
| By: | Lukach, R.; Kort, P.M.; Plasmans, J.E.J. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | It is shown that asymmetry in R&D efficiency between firms is an important factor determining feasibility of the preemption and attrition scenarios in competitive R&D with time to build. Scenarios of attrition and preemption games are most likely to occur when competitors have similar R&D efficiencies. In case of largely asymmetric firms the games of attrition and preemption are very unlikely, thus the R&D duration choices of firms are determined by the actual trade-off between the benefits of earlier innovation and the costs of faster R&D project completion. |
| Keywords: | R&D Investment;Competition;Preemption;Attrition. |
| JEL: | C72 D21 O31 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200738&r=ino |
| By: | Marcus Wagner |
| Abstract: | Innovation activities in the semiconductor industry provide considerable challenges for technology and innovation management. In particular, firms frequently face make-or-buy decisions and such decisions have considerable management implications. The semiconductor industry has a long history of radical innovations which are taking place through distinct industry cycles of high and low demand. The paper investigates these issues for the Electronic Design Automation industry which is a specific sub-segment of the semiconductor industry. Based on database searches and structured interviews, the paper analyses empirically the reasons for make or buy decisions with regard to innovation and the level of acquisition activities of innovative small firms in the Electronic Design Automation industry. This analysis is supported by an analysis of the SEC filings of large firms in the Electronic Design Automation industry. |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2007-28&r=ino |
| By: | Akkermans, Dirk; Castaldi, Carolina; Los, Bart (Groningen University) |
| Abstract: | In their influential book Varieties of Capitalism; The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Peter A. Hall and David Soskice argue that the technological specialization patterns of developed countries are largely determined by the ?varieties of capitalism? prevailing in these countries. They hypothesize that ?liberal market economies? (LMEs) specialize in radical innovation, while ?coordinated market economies? (CMEs) focus more on incremental innovation. We argue that Hall and Soskice?s empirical test of this hypothesis is fundamentally flawed and propose a more appropriate and rigorous test of their conjecture, based on patent citation data. The manufacturingwide industry-level results indicate that the hypothesis does not survive further scrutiny. |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:rugggd:gd-91&r=ino |
| By: | Ahmed S. Rahman (United States Naval Academy) |
| Abstract: | This paper attempts to ascertain if skill-biased technologies developed in R&D-active countries diffuse to the rest of the world. First, using a model of international trade, I show the effects of skill-bias knowledge diffusion. The theory suggests that skill-biased technological diffusion need not increase skill premia, as sectoral biases can exert countervailing forces. Second, I test implications from the theory using United Nations industry data. Skill-biased knowledge diffusion tends to be associated with rising local skill-premia more in skill-intensive industries than unskill-intensive ones. Thus sectoral biases can help us see the extent of such technological spillovers. |
| Date: | 2007–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usn:usnawp:18&r=ino |
| By: | Ying Xie (Department of Economics, University of Victoria); David E. Giles (Department of Economics, University of Victoria) |
| Abstract: | We model the length of time that it takes for a patent application to be granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, conditional on the patent actually being awarded eventually. Survival analysis is applied and both the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier and parametric accelerated failure time models are used to analyze the data. We find that the number of claims a patent makes, the number of citations a patent makes, the patent’s technological category, and the type of applicant all have significant effects on the duration that a patent is under consideration. A log-normal survival model is the preferred parametric specification, and the results suggest that the hazard function is non-monotonic over time. |
| Keywords: | Patents, research and development, survival analysis, hazard function |
| JEL: | C16 C29 C46 L10 |
| Date: | 2007–08–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vic:vicewp:0707&r=ino |
| By: | Andrew Atkeson; Ariel Burstein |
| Date: | 2007–08–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001423&r=ino |
| By: | GRIMAUD André (LERNA, TSE); LAFFORGUE Gilles (LERNA, TSE); MAGNE Bertrand |
| Date: | 2007–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ler:wpaper:07.12.233&r=ino |
| By: | E. VAN DE VELDE; B. CLARYSSE; M. WRIGHT; G. RAYP; J. BRUNEEL |
| Abstract: | Corporate entrepreneurship and corporate spin-offs have gained importance over the last decades. Corporate spin-offs play an increasingly important role in the development and growth of emerging, high-technology industries, thereby contributing to economic growth. While previous studies on corporate spin-offs have taken the established firm as a point of departure, a central issue concerns the locus of entrepreneurs. We adopt a bottom-up approach by considering those spin-offs that are created by employees, based upon an opportunity spotted while working for the parent company. Based upon the knowledge-based theory of the firm and the literature on opportunity identification, we develop a typology of corporate spin-offs. We identified three types of corporate spin-offs: Assisted spin-outs, Restructuring-driven spin-outs and Entrepreneurial Spin-offs. These types of corporate spin-offs differ from each other in terms of nature and formality of knowledge transfer; detection and implementation of opportunity identification; and performance. Based upon an in-depth analysis of 41 corporate spin-offs in Flanders, we found that Entrepreneurial Spin-offs outperform both Assisted and Restructuring-driven spin-outs on all four performance indicators. Our findings imply that parent companies often miss possibilities to capture value from opportunities that were originally developed in the parent company. |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:07/472&r=ino |
| By: | Scott Baker; Pak Yee Lee; Claudio Mezzetti |
| Abstract: | This paper models the disclosure of knowledge as a "threat", useful in ensuring firms keep their commitments. We show that firms holding knowledge are better able to enforce agreements than firms that don’t. In markets requiring innovation to make a product, disclosure is a more powerful threat than entry by the punishing firm alone. Occasionally, the punishing firm won’t be able to innovate, making it impossible for it to enter the cheating firm’s market and punish. The punishing firm, however, can through disclosure credibly ensure that one, if not many, firms enter the cheating firm’s market. In the model, firms contract explicitly to exchange knowledge and tacitly to coordinate the introduction of innovations to the marketplace. We find conditions under which firms can self-enforce both agreements. The enforcement conditions are weaker when (1) firms possess knowledge and (2) knowledge is easily transferable to other firms. The disclosure threat has implication for antitrust law generally, which are considered. |
| Date: | 2007–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:07/8&r=ino |
| By: | AMIGUES Jean-Pierre (LERNA, TSE); MOREAUX Michel (LERNA, TSE); RICCI Francesco (LERNA, TSE) |
| Date: | 2007–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ler:wpaper:07.15.236&r=ino |
| By: | Junfu Zhang (Clark University and IZA) |
| Abstract: | Academic entrepreneurship has become an increasingly important channel through which universities contribute to economic development. This paper studies academic entrepreneurs using a comprehensive venture capital database. I find that about two-thirds of the academic entrepreneurs locate their businesses in the same state as their universities. National academy membership and number of faculty awards, measures of a university’s research quality, are the most significant variables in explaining the number of academic entrepreneurs from a university. In contrast, the abundance of venture capital near the university has no significant effect on academic entrepreneurship. |
| Keywords: | academic entrepreneur, university spin-off, venture capital |
| JEL: | M13 |
| Date: | 2007–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2992&r=ino |
| By: | Jan Kranich (Leuphana Universität Lüneburg) |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses a model of vertical an horizontal product differentiation within the Dixit-Stiglitz framework of monopolistic competition. Firns coompete not only in prices and horizontal attributes of their products, but also in the quality that can be controlled by R&D activities. Based upon te results of a general equilibrium model, intra-sectoral trade and the welfare implications of public intervention in terms of research promotion are considered. The analysis involves a numerical application to ten basic European industries. |
| Keywords: | R&D, Monopolisitc Competition, Product Differentiation |
| JEL: | D43 F12 L13 L16 |
| Date: | 2007–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lue:wpaper:59&r=ino |
| By: | AMIGUES Jean-Pierre (LERNA, University of Toulouse); MOREAUX Michel (LERNA, University of Toulouse); RICCI Francesco (LERNA, University of Toulouse) |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ler:wpaper:06.22.215&r=ino |
| By: | Dijkema, J.; Dijk, J. van; Strijker, D. (Groningen University) |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:rugurs:312&r=ino |
| By: | Rubin, Raphael |
| Abstract: | Let us follow Romer’s framework (1990) for the intermediate goods sector. We assume the following. A North operated multinational firm is implanted in the North and the South. The North designs and makes the higher quality products. In the South, its manufacturing divisions produce intermediate and final goods of lower quality competing against the South locals. The multinational is constrained by the South government to transfer a certain amount of knowhow Hns and technology xns. It also benefits from the large pool of cheaper labor, and leads the efforts of innovation in the South. Final goods and intermediate goods are tradable, although some restrictions may apply on the part which is technologically advanced. The countries, independently of the multinational and of its South competitor, still produce non tradable goods, to which quality rankings do not apply, because they depend on local taste. The workers in the North and the South thereby benefit from both types of goods, tradable and non tradable. Competitors in the South reverse-engineer the goods produced in the South and compete with the North on the final goods market which may be tariff protected, selling back to the North operated multinational firm, or on the intermediate goods market in the South. To the difference of Currie et al (1999, 1996), but similarly to our first model’s assumption that the rate of absorption of the North’s human capital is endogenous to the importance of foreign capital investment, the present model inspired by Ahmid Datta’s model illustrates the mechanism of endogenous absorption through reverse-engineering of foreign designed goods. Conclusions of the original Ahmid Datta’s 2005 model were that a threshold of accumulated human capital knowledge must exists, before the local human capital and imported technology become substitutes from being complements. We clearly reach to the same conclusion here. This finding is consistent with the role given to human capital by Keller 1996. We here strive to demonstrate our first model hypothesis by analyzing: The effect of the multinational’s decision of foreign investment on the threshold (imitation to innovation state). 6 The effect of international migration of qualified workers on the threshold. The effect of Northern consumer’s bias for local made products, on the threshold. How does the constraint imposed on the multinational to transfer technology and know-how, translate on its profits, on its market share in the South? |
| Keywords: | North; South; Grossman; Helpman; Labor; Migration; Bias; Innovation |
| JEL: | O33 O34 O3 O31 |
| Date: | 2007–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:4602&r=ino |
| By: | Vassilis Hajivassiliou; Frédérique Savignac |
| Abstract: | The paper analyzes the existence and impact of financing constraints as a possibly serious obstacle to innovation by .rms. Direct measures of financing constraints are employed using survey data collected by the Banque de France and the European Commission, which overcomes the problems with the traditional approach of trying to deduce the existence and impact of financing constraints through the significance of firm wealth variables. The econometric framework employed for this study is the simultaneous bivariate probit with mutual endogeneity. The paper discusses the important identification issue of coherency conditions in such LDV models with endogeneity and flexible temporal and contemporaneous correlations in the unobservable error terms. Conditions for coherency as discussed in the existing literature are reviewed and shown to be rather esoteric. Two novel methods for establishing coherency conditions are presented, which have intuitive interpretations. Finally, the paper presents alternative approaches for achieving coherency in models hitherto classified as incoherent through the use of prior sign restrictions on model parameters. This allows us to obtain estimates of the interaction between financing constraints and a firm’s decision and ability to innovate without forcing the econometric models to be recursive. Thus, direct as well as reverse interaction effects are obtained for the first time.Keywords: Limited Dependent Variable Models, Coherency ConditionsJEL Classifications: C51, C52, C15 |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp594&r=ino |
| By: | Peer Zumbansen |
| Abstract: | Research in corporate governance and in labour law has been characterized by a disjuncture in the way that scholars in each field are addressing organizational questions related to the business enterprise. While labour has eventually begun to shift perspectives from aspirations to direct employee involvement in firm management, as has been the case in Germany, to a combination of 'exit' and 'voice' strategies involving pension fund management and securities litigation, it remains to be seen whether this new stream will unfold as a viable challenge to an otherwise exclusionary shareholder value paradigm. At the same time, recent suggestions made by Delaware Chancery Court Vice Chancellor Strine, to dare think about potentially shared commitments between management and labour - and UCLA's Stephen Bainbridge's response - underline the viability - and, the contestedness - of attempts at moving the corporate governance debate beyond the confines of corporate law proper. While such a wider view had already famously been encouraged by Dean Clarke in his 1986 treatise on Corporate Law (p. 32), mainstream corporate law does not seem to have endorsed this perspective. This paper takes the questionable divide between management and labour within the framework of a limiting corporate governance concept as starting point to explore the institutional dynamics of the corporation, hereby building on the theory of the innovative enterprise, as developed by management theorists Mary O'Sullivan and William Lazonick. Largely due to the sustained distance between corporate and labour law scholars, neither group has effectively addressed their common blind spot: a better understanding of the business enterprise itself. In midst of an unceasing flow of affirmations of the finance paradigm of the corporation on the one hand and 'voice' strategies by labour on the other, it seems to fall to management theorists to draw lessons from the continuing co-existence of different forms of market organization, in which companies appear to thrive. Exploring the conundrum of 'risky' business decisions within the firm, management theorists have been arguing for the need to adopt a more sophisticated organizational perspective on companies operating on locally, regionally and transnationally shaped, often highly volatile market segments. Research by comparative political economists has revealed a high degree of connectivity between corporate governance and economic performance without, however, arriving at such favourable results only for shareholder value regimes. Such findings support the view that corporate governance regimes are embedded in differently shaped regulatory frameworks, characterized by distinct institutions, both formal and informal, and enforcement processes. As a result of these findings, arguments to disassociate issues of corporate governance from those of the firm's (social) responsibility [CSR] have been losing ground. Instead, CSR can be taken to be an essential part of understanding a particular business enterprise. It is the merging of a comparative political economy perspective on the corporation with one on the organizational features, structures and processes of the corporation, which can help us better understand the distribution of power and knowledge within the 'learning firm'. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Governance, organizational theory, innovative enterprise, learning firm, employee involvement, corporate social responsibility, European/German corporate governance |
| JEL: | G23 K22 |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp347&r=ino |
| By: | LAFFORGUE Gilles (LERNA, University of Toulouse); ; |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ler:wpaper:06.02.195&r=ino |