nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2025–06–09
five papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong, Johns Hopkins University


  1. Profit-enhancing emissions taxes in near-zero-emissions industries By Hirose, Kosuke; Ishihara, Akifumi; Matsumura, Toshihiro
  2. Platform Disintermediation with Repeated Transactions By Enache, Andreea; Rhodes, Andrew
  3. Platform Credit, Advertising, and Customer Capital By Efing, Matthias; Huang, Yi; Han, Ruobing; Sun, Qi; Xu, Daniel Yi
  4. A Double Dose of Reform: Insurance and Centralized Negotiation in Drug Markets By Panle Jia Barwick; Ashley T. Swanson; Tianli Xia
  5. Digital control and market power in the automotive sector: OEMs, gatekeeping, and the future of aftermarket regulation By Hey, Florian; Zombek, Max

  1. By: Hirose, Kosuke; Ishihara, Akifumi; Matsumura, Toshihiro
    Abstract: Motivated by the recent global trend of net-zero-emissions environmental regulations, we investigate the relationship between emissions tax rates and firm profits in oligopolies. Our result indicates that when the resulting emission levels are approximately zero, a marginal increase in the tax rate enhances firms' profits except in monopoly markets. This finding suggests that firms might not resist a further increase in environmental tax if the target emissions level is sufficiently low. Moreover, we present parametric numerical examples suggesting that the profit-enhancing range is large and not limited to near-zero emissions.
    Keywords: net-zero-emissions industries; emissions tax; oligopolies
    JEL: L13 L51 Q52
    Date: 2025–05–23
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:124825
  2. By: Enache, Andreea; Rhodes, Andrew
    Abstract: We consider a setting in which a platform matches buyers and sellers, who then wish to transact with each other multiple times. The platform charges fees for hosting transactions, but also offers convenience benefits. We consider two scenarios. In one scenario, all transactions must occur on the platform; in the other scenario, buyers and sellers can disintermediate the platform after the first transaction, and do subsequent transactions offline. We find that the platform reacts to disintermediation by using a “front-loaded” pricing scheme, whereby it charges more for earlier transactions. We also show that sometimes the platform is better off when disintermediation is possible—because it can use disintermediation to screen users’ private information about their convenience benefits. Buyers are not necessarily better off when they can disintermediate, due to the way in which the platform adjusts its fees.
    Keywords: Platforms; disintermediation; convenience benefits; repeat transactions
    Date: 2025–05
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:130557
  3. By: Efing, Matthias (HEC Paris); Huang, Yi (Bank for International Settlements (BIS)); Han, Ruobing (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen (CUHK-Shenzhen)); Sun, Qi (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics); Xu, Daniel Yi (Duke University)
    Abstract: Advertising plays a particularly crucial role in online marketplaces, where thousands of merchants offer similar products and compete for visibility and consumer attention. This study theoretically and empirically demonstrates that merchants on e-commerce platforms often engage in "underadvertising" due to financial constraints. By leveraging quasi-random variation in merchants' access to credit from a major platform lender, we establish that alleviating financial constraints leads to substantial increases in advertising expenditures, enhanced shop visibility among customers, and ultimately, accelerated sales growth. Notably, high-quality merchants with top customer ratings are especially likely to utilize platform credit to invest in advertising.
    Keywords: platform credit; platform lending; e-commerce
    JEL: G21 G23 L10 L81 M30
    Date: 2025–04–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:1542
  4. By: Panle Jia Barwick; Ashley T. Swanson; Tianli Xia
    Abstract: Making innovative drugs affordable and accessible is a pressing global challenge. Centralized negotiation is an increasingly popular policy solution, but it remains understudied despite wide variation in implementation. This paper studies China’s ongoing NRDL Reform, which combines centralized drug price negotiation with expanded insurance coverage. The reform reduced retail prices by 48% and out-of-pocket costs by 80%, and increased drug utilization by 350%. At the same time, the insurance design was regressive, and 25% of negotiations failed. Focusing on cancer drugs, we estimate a flexible demand and supply model that features heterogeneous households, bargaining with potential breakdowns, and a government objective function that depends on consumer surplus and insurance spending. We estimate that including innovative cancer drugs in the NRDL generated Y40 billion ($5.6 billion) in annual consumer surplus gains and increased survival by 900, 000 life-years among Chinese cancer patients each year. Among the counterfactual policies we examined, centralized market-access negotiation with an optimal coinsurance schedule raises social surplus by 19% relative to the observed policy and achieves 90% of the social surplus of an efficient benchmark.
    JEL: I0 L0
    Date: 2025–05
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33832
  5. By: Hey, Florian; Zombek, Max
    Abstract: The automotive industry is undergoing a fundamental transformation driven by digitization, enabling original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to exert increasing control over vehicle functions, data, and - consequently - aftersales markets. Despite high relevance for consumers, regulatory scrutiny remains limited. This paper examines whether these developments constitute digital gatekeeping in a functional sense, and whether they justify increased regulatory attention. We show that OEMs' digital strategiesreinforce their dominance in secondary markets, particularly repair and maintenance. We assess the current European regulatory framework, focusing on the European Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation (MVBER), and argue that it has not kept pace with the realities of software-defined vehicles. The planned MVBER review provides an opportunity to reassess legacy privileges and adapt competition rules to the digital age. We discuss potential reforms, including improved data access, stronger interoperability standards, and a broader definition of aftermarket components. We also examine supplementary measures such as a Right to Repair regime and self-regulation. Our analysis concludes that OEMs increasingly act as digital gatekeepers and that existing frameworks inadequately address the resulting risks. Regulatory recalibration is needed to safeguard innovation, consumer welfare, and long-term market openness.
    Keywords: aftermarket, antitrust, car data, competition policy, connected car, data governance, digital ecosystems, Digital Markets Act (DMA), extended vehicle, gatekeeping, interoperability, Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation (MVBER), non-discriminatory terms, Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), rent seeking, Right to Repair, software defined vehicle
    JEL: D72 K21 L40 L42 L50 L51 L62
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:formwp:318332

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