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on Industrial Organization |
| By: | Ashfaq, M.; Toxvaerd, F.; Wei, Y. |
| Abstract: | We study collusive agreements in an infinite-horizon model in which firms invest in inventories of intermediate goods and compete in quantities of final goods. Stocks of inventories act as capacity constraints at the time of production but can be replenished for future use through investment. Input stocks simultaneously impact firms' ability to deviate from collusive agreements and their ability to punish such deviations and therefore have ambiguous effects on the sustainability of collusion. We characterize subgame perfect equilibria in grim trigger strategies in which firms potentially hold asymmetric excess inventories on the collusive path. We show that the sustainability of collusive agreements is non-monotone in inventory stocks. While holding excess capacity is costly and unproductive, the practice can improve firms' ability to sustain anticompetitive agreements. |
| Keywords: | Collusion, Cartels, Inventories, Capacity Constraints |
| JEL: | L13 L41 D25 |
| Date: | 2026–02–27 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2612 |
| By: | Martinez Cillero Maria (European Commission - JRC); Napolitano Lorenzo (European Commission - JRC); Rentocchini Francesco (European Commission - JRC); Seri Cecilia; Zaurino Elena (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | HIGHLIGHTS ‣ Technological mergers and acquisitions (M&As) increase investors' market power by around 2% beyond standard M&As, with stronger effects concentrated among top R&D investors, US-based investors, and high-tech manufacturing investors. ‣ The increase in market power seems primarily driven by the consolidation of control over existing patents, limiting knowledge diffusion and making it harder for competitors to catch up. ‣ These findings support ongoing policy discussions on updating merger review regulations, as traditional concentration metrics may not fully capture competition risks posed by large technology firms. ‣ Technological assets and innovations are often embedded and masked within larger M&A deals. Separating the technology component of patents would allow regulators to assess competition concerns related to innovation while still allowing the acquisition to proceed. ‣ The analysis draws on a newly constructed firm-level dataset to provide a more systematic picture of technological M&As and market power. |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc145729 |
| By: | Sauvé, Edwige |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a framework in which a multiproduct ecosystem competes with multiple single-product firms in both price and innovation. The ecosystem can use data from one product to improve the quality of its other products. We use the framework to study three regulatory policies aimed at leveling the playing field. Restricting the ecosystem’s cross-product data usage, or forcing it to share data with single-product firms, benefits those firms and induces them to innovate more. However, these policies also dampen the ecosystem’s incentive to collect data and innovate, potentially raising prices. Consumers are better off only when single-product firms are sufficiently good at innovating. Facilitating data exchange between single-product firms via a data cooperative can backfire and harm them, because it induces the ecosystem to price more aggressively. For both the data-sharing and data-cooperative policies, there exist data-compensation schemes such that consumers are better off compared to no regulation. |
| Keywords: | Digital ecosystems; innovation; data regulation; data cooperative |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:131492 |
| By: | Yixuan Liu; Hua Zhang; Eric Zou |
| Abstract: | Prepaid consumption is a common feature of modern consumer markets and is often presented as a mutually beneficial arrangement: consumers receive upfront discounts, and firms secure future sales. We analyze a large-scale Pay Now, Buy Later (PNBL) program in which consumers prepay for restaurant credit with bonuses, and spend the balance later. Using detailed transaction data from over 4 million consumers, we document widespread balance breakage: approximately 40% of prepaid value is never used. Because many consumers underutilize their balances, merchants recover significantly more than the bonus cost. The median firm earns roughly $5.5 in breakage profit for every $1 of bonus credit issued. While PNBL participation does lead to modest increases in consumer spending over time, firms gain substantially more from breakage than from any loyalty-driven revenue. These findings challenge the prevailing win–win narrative: PNBL schemes often result in a significant transfer from consumers to firms. We develop a stylized contract model to illustrate the misaligned incentives firms face, and show through counterfactual analysis that a simple escrow policy with an appropriately chosen deposit requirement can realign firm incentives and generate more consumer-serving outcomes. |
| JEL: | D12 D90 G23 G41 K20 L14 L81 M31 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34918 |
| By: | Haruvy, Ernan; Heinrich, Timo; Walker, Matthew J. |
| Abstract: | This paper studies hold-ups in markets where sellers may impose undisclosed surcharges. While prior work has examined price transparency’s role in market outcomes, the distinct effect of a transparency norm—separate from a fairness norm—remains unestablished. We formulate a simple model that separates these norms and characterizes their equilibrium implications across different market settings. The model shows that price competition yields higher buyer surplus than ultimatum bargaining and that this surplus increases with transparency concerns but decreases with fairness concerns because of softened competition. Compulsory surcharges cannot be higher in bargaining, as sellers prefer a higher price to a higher surcharge as long as it does not change the buyer’s probability of acceptance. Experimental results confirm the transparency norm’s influence: Total prices are lower with price competition, and surcharges are lower with ultimatum bargaining. Additionally, surcharges rise when pricing is outside of the seller’s control. Estimates of the behavioral parameters reveal that sellers weigh transparency at least as heavily as fairness. The results imply that firms fearing hold-ups should still procure goods and services in competitive market structures. |
| Keywords: | surcharge, transparent pricing, fairness, social norm, hold-up, procurement |
| JEL: | C91 D47 D82 L14 M55 |
| Date: | 2026–01–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:127601 |
| By: | Chen, Yongmin; Li, Zhuozheng; Zhang, Tianle |
| Abstract: | We study the impacts of repeat purchases on consumer search and price competition in an overlapping generations model. Search incentives are higher for “new” consumers and lower for “old” consumers in each generation, which changes price competition directly for these consumers and also indirectly through intertemporal rivalry. There exist two types of consumer loyalty, with remarkably different competitive effects. Relative to the single-purchase benchmark, equilibrium price is lower when brand preference is unlikely to persist, but higher when discount factors are relatively low. |
| Keywords: | search, repeat purchase, dynamic search incentive, price competition |
| JEL: | D8 L1 |
| Date: | 2026–02–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:127995 |
| By: | Carsten Eckel; Lisandra Flach; Ning Meng |
| Abstract: | Products produced by multiproduct firms can be linked through demand linkages (cannibalization), supply linkages (joint production), or both. We analyze how these within-firm linkages shape the propagation of shocks - such as tariffs - across products and markets and affect firm performance through changes in markups and marginal costs. Exploiting antidumping duties as firm-product-market specific shocks, we provide evidence of both types of linkages and quantify their relative importance. On average, two-thirds of within-firm linkages arise from demand linkages and one-third from supply linkages, with substantial heterogeneity across industries. We further estimate their effects on markups and marginal costs, showing that roughly 80% of the adjustment occurs through marginal costs and 20% through markups. Our findings indicate that disregarding either type of linkage can lead to sizable misestimations of markups and pass-through rates. |
| Keywords: | multiproduct firms, cannibalization effect, joint production, demand linkages, supply linkages, antidumping duties, markups, marginal costs |
| JEL: | D21 D22 D24 F12 F13 F14 L11 L25 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12530 |