|
on Industrial Organization |
| By: | Maurice E. Stucke (University of Tennessee Winston College of Law) |
| Abstract: | Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping how companies profile individuals, create and target ads, and influence behavior—often in ways that undermine privacy, autonomy, and democracy. This article explores a critical but overlooked question: how AI affects the relationship between competition and privacy. Increased competition in the AI supply chain may seem like a solution to Big Tech's dominance, but when firms are rewarded for surveillance and manipulation, more competition can actually make things worse. Drawing on recent market trends and twenty state privacy laws, the Article shows how the existing legal frameworks-even those designed to protect privacy—fall short and may unintentionally entrench the power of few data-opolies. It argues that privacy and competition must be addressed together, not in silos, and offers specific legislative reforms to help align business incentives with public interests. Without stronger guardrails, AI risks accelerating a race to the bottom—fueled not only by powerful technologies, but by well-intentioned, but flawed policies. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust, privacy, monopolies, data, artificial intelligence |
| JEL: | K21 K24 L40 L41 L50 O33 |
| Date: | 2025–06–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:thk:wpaper:inetwp236 |
| By: | Paul S. Koh (Yonsei University) |
| Abstract: | Standard empirical tools for merger analysis assume price data, which are often unavailable. I characterize sufficient conditions for identifying the unilateral effects of mergers without price data using the first-order approach and merger simulation. Data on merging firms' revenues, margins, and revenue diversion ratios are sufficient to identify their gross upward pricing pressure indices and compensating marginal cost reductions. Standard discrete-continuous demand assumptions facilitate the identification of revenue diversion ratios as well as the feasibility of merger simulation in terms of percentage change in price. I apply the framework to the Albertsons/ Safeway (2015) and Staples/Office Depot (2016) mergers. |
| Keywords: | Merger, unilateral effect, diversion ratio, upward pricing pressure, merger simulation |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yon:wpaper:2025rwp-263 |
| By: | Esteban Jaimovich; Boryana Madzharova; Vincenzo Merella |
| Abstract: | The paper investigates firms' rollout strategies for quality-differentiated products across geographically dispersed markets. Using a theoretical framework that integrates nonhomo- thetic preferences, we show that premium goods are more likely to enter wealthier markets first, allowing firms to capture higher markups. We find that the main factors influencing the selection of follow-up markets differ by product quality: for premium goods, income levels are the primary determinant of expansion paths, whereas geographic proximity is the main driver for lower-quality products. Using micro-level data from the refrigera- tion industry, we confirm a significant positive association between market-entry order and income for higher-quality products. Furthermore, we observe that follow-up markets tend to be geographically more dispersed for premium goods, reflecting a shift away from proximity-based expansion strategies. |
| Keywords: | Market entry; Gravity; Nonhomothetic preferences; Quality differentiated products. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:749 |
| By: | Anna D’Annunzio (Tor Vergata University of Rome, CSEF and Toulouse School of Economics.); Antonio Russo (Institut Mines-Telecom Business School.) |
| Abstract: | We study the effects of taxes and fees in markets where sellers practice second-degree price discrimination, offering multiple versions of their product. Sellers distort the quantity (or quality) intended for all types of consumers, except for those with the highest marginal willingness to pay. We show that ad valorem taxes/fees can alleviate this distortion, thereby generating revenue while increasing consumer surplus and welfare, provided the tax rate increases with the size or quality of the version it applies to. We explore the implications of this result for important issues in fiscal policy (taxation of sin goods and of goods affecting labor supply). We also consider applications to the analysis of vertical relations between firms, as well as the strategy of platforms when setting prices for access and when competing with sellers. |
| Keywords: | Commodity taxation, tax incidence, price discrimination, sin goods. |
| JEL: | D4 H21 H22 L1 |
| Date: | 2025–09–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:761 |
| By: | Dubois, Pierre |
| Abstract: | We examine pharmaceutical regulations and incentives for innovation from an international perspective, highlighting the public good nature of healthcare innovation and its cross-border diffusion. We summarize the empirical evidence on how push and pull incentives shape R&D investment, innovation, and global access. We emphasize the role of strategic interdependencies and spillovers, including free-riding in R&D financing, learning-by-doing effects, drug shortages, reference pricing, and parallel trade. We then provide new evidence on the international spillovers of pull incentives on innovation, showing that international cooperation and innovative institutions are necessary to better align national regulations with the global objective of sustaining pharmaceutical innovation. |
| Keywords: | Pharmaceutical Regulation, Innovation, R&D, International Spillovers |
| JEL: | L10 L20 I10 I11 I18 |
| Date: | 2025–10–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:131002 |
| By: | Karine Brisset (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France); Emmanuel Peterlé (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France) |
| Abstract: | Leniency programs encourage corporate cooperation with antitrust authorities by offering immunity or fine reductions for reporting illegal cartels. While prior studies suggest these programs discourage collusion and destabilize existing cartels, experimental evidence in environments with unrestricted communication indicates that the effectiveness of leniency is not clear-cut. We conduct a laboratory experiment in such an environment to examine the interaction between leniency programs and follow-on private damages, proposing the use of Fair Funds to maintain victim compensation and preserve incentives for leniency application. Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that the prospect of private damages can increase cartel formation, though this effect is mitigated when our Fair Funds compensation scheme is introduced. In addition, leniency applications decline when private damages are introduced, but this decline is partially offset by the presence of Fair Funds. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust, Illegal Cartels, Leniency Programs, Private Damages |
| JEL: | C92 D03 K21 K42 L41 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2025-12 |