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on Industrial Organization |
| By: | Éric Darmon (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Thomas Le Texier (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Zhiwen Li (Southeast University [Jiangsu]); Thierry Pénard (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Antitrust authorities are concerned with the dominant market position of Tech Giants such as Google, Meta, or Amazon. These digital conglomerates are characterized by platform-based business models and multimarket contact (MMC). In traditional one-sided markets, theory and empirical evidence show that MMC tends to relax competition. In this paper, we revisit this result in the context of platform competition with competitive bottleneck and cross-market externalities, and provide new insights into the impact of MMC on platform competition. In this context, when platforms charge the two groups of users (bilateral pricing), we find that MMC always decreases the profitability of platforms regardless of the nature and magnitude of cross-market externalities. Then we consider the case in which platforms can only charge one group of users (unilateral pricing). When platforms charge the side on which they are not directly competing for users (i.e. the side that is not the competitive bottleneck), MMC may relax competition only if cross-group externalities and cross-market externalities are both sufficiently small. From a competition policy perspective, our paper provides insights into how antitrust authorities should review conglomerate mergers in digital markets and assesses the effects of the diversification strategies of digital platforms in the context of cross-market externalities and competitive bottleneck. |
| Keywords: | Two-sided markets, Platform competition, Digital markets, Multimarket contact, Cross-market externalities, Competitive bottleneck, Competition policy |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05107385 |
| By: | Jan Malek; Jo Seldeslachts; Reinhilde Veugelers |
| Abstract: | This paper provides empirical evidence on which M&A deals spur innovation, and which stifle it. To do so, we consider not only the product market position of the acquiring firm, but also the position of both target and acquirer in the technology space. Focusing on the antidiabetic drugs market, our dataset tracks the lifecycle and patenting of all individual antidiabetic projects in development between 1997 and 2017. We show that most terminations of acquired projects occur while the projects are still far from product market entry. Nevertheless, a number of these early-stage acquisitions have a positive impact on innovation. These cases arise when incumbents acquire projects close to their own projects in product markets, but only if these projects are also close in technology markets. Those deals are associated with increased subsequent patenting, which is consistent with the exploitation of technological synergies. Our results point to the crucial role of combining both product market and technology market positions in assessing the innovation effects of pharmaceutical M&As. |
| Keywords: | M&As, innovation, R&D, pharmaceutics, technology, novelty, patents |
| JEL: | L41 L65 O31 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp2128 |
| By: | Grassano Nicola; M'barek Robert (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | Pharmaceuticals and Medical Technologies (PMTs) patents represent 12.6% of the total IP5 patent families filed worldwide in the period 2010-2020. The US are the biggest player in the field, filing 25.1% of all PMTs IP5 patent families 2010-2020. The EU is second with 17.2%, followed by Japan (8.5%), South Korea (4.4%) and China (3.2%). Among EU Member States, Germany has by far the highest number of PMTs IP5 patent families filed in the observed period, accounting for 36% of all the patents filed by the EU 2010-2020. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc142609 |
| By: | Sampi, James; Vostroknutova, Ekaterina |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of two interventions by Colombia's competition authority to enforce competition in the sugar market on firm performance in downstream sectors. Using an exogenous identification strategy, the analysis finds that following the competition authority’s intervention against collusion in 2015, downstream firms expanded production but did not increase productivity or profitability margins, consistent with the removal of supply constraints imposed by cartelization. In contrast, the 2011 intervention against abuse of dominance increased the profitability margins of downstream firms, without altering production scale or labor intensity, consistent with input price reductions and stable consumer demand. Robustness checks, including propensity score matching, confirm the reliability of these findings. The results show that antitrust enforcement works through different channels, depending on the type of anti-competitive behavior. The results also highlight the importance of targeted and continuous antitrust enforcement in addressing market distortions. |
| Date: | 2025–06–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11155 |