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on Industrial Organization |
| By: | Seda Koymen Ozer (Baskent University, Ankara, Turkey); Alessia Lo Turco (Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (UNIVPM)); Daniela Maggioni (Department of Economics, Catholic University of the Sacred) |
| Abstract: | We investigate how the import of automation impacts upgrading within firm production networks. We use comprehensive data on product mix, foreign trade, balance sheets, employment, and firm-to-firm transactions for Turkish manufacturing firms from 2009 to 2020. By employing Propensity Score Matching (PSM) alongside event study analyses and an instrumental variable (IV) approach, our research provides robust evidence that firms importing automation enhance the quality and lower quality-adjusted prices of their products. Importantly, the benefits of automation extend downstream throughout the supply chain to firms sourcing inputs from suppliers that have adopted automation. No significant effects propagate, instead, to upstream firms supplying automation adopters. |
| Keywords: | buyer-supplier links, product upgrading, manufacturing, Turkiye |
| JEL: | O14 F61 F63 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wpaper:495 |
| By: | Lu Han |
| Abstract: | Exporters frequently change their set of destination markets. This paper proposes a new approach to identifying the underlying drivers of changes in exporters’ market decisions over time. The approach exploits information on the price and quantity of the changes in firms’ continuing markets, to uncover the microshocks that drive firms’ market changes. Applying the method to customs data from China (2000-2006) and the UK (2010-2016), I find consistent results showing that most firm- and firm-product-level market changes are driven by demand-related shocks, with a nontrivial proportion of these changes being correlated across markets. |
| Keywords: | International topics; Economic models; Firm dynamics; Trade integration |
| JEL: | F14 F12 L11 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:25-11 |
| By: | Corchón, Luis C.; Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe; Moreno, Bernardo |
| Abstract: | Traditional collusion models typically assume that players coordinatetheir actions actively during the competition process to influence the outcomes.In contrast, we consider a repeated interaction setting betweentwo players where collusion occurs through well-defined strategies: theplayers take turns, with one holding monopoly power while the other eitherrefrains from participating or behaves as if absent. We provide afull characterization of when taking turns constitutes a subgame perfectNash equilibrium in repeated games. By allowing players to discount timedifferently, we uncover a novel, non-monotonic condition on the discountfactor that sustains collusion. We apply our findings to three specificcontexts: contests, duopoly, and political competition. |
| Keywords: | Collusion; Political competition; Repeated games; Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; Take-turns |
| JEL: | D43 C62 C73 D72 |
| Date: | 2025–03–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:46355 |
| By: | Thami, Prakriti (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of truth-telling preferences on aggregate consumer welfare within a priority pricing (PP) mechanism. Traditional models assume individuals always misrepresent private information to maximize payoffs, yet recent evidence suggests there may be an innate preference for truth-telling. By incorporating these preferences into a theoretical framework, I show that PP enhances welfare over uniform pricing only when the probability of non-truthful individuals surpasses a critical threshold, suggesting that PP may benefit populations with low truth-telling tendencies but reduce welfare when this tendency is high. To empirically test this, I conducted an online experiment, finding that while PP incentivized truth-telling, its impact did not vary significantly across groups with differing truth-telling tendencies. Instead, participants’ beliefs about others' truthfulness emerged as key in shaping behavior. These findings underscore that PP’s welfare-enhancing potential depends not only on incentives created by the pricing structure but also on the population's truth-telling tendencies and beliefs, offering valuable insight for designing effective pricing mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | priority pricing; consumer welfare; truth-telling behavior; incentive-compatible pricing |
| JEL: | D47 D61 D82 D90 |
| Date: | 2025–03–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2025_003 |
| By: | Oschmann, Sebastian |
| Abstract: | This article examines the price effects of gasoline stations following a retail merger in 2022. Using detailed station-level price data from 2020 to 2024, the analysis shows that fuel prices increase at both merging stations and their competitors, but with regional differences. These regional differences cannot be explained by horizontal merger effects. Instead, changes in the vertical market structure play a key role. The divestment of the station network disrupts supply chains, creating demand pressure on local refineries. The findings highlight the importance of vertical relationships in merger assessments. |
| Keywords: | Gasoline Retail Markets, Ex-Post Merger Evaluation, Competition |
| JEL: | D22 K21 L13 L41 L81 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:314431 |