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on Industrial Organization |
| By: | Chongwoo Choe (Department of Economics, Monash University); Jiajia Cong (Department of Marketing, City University of Hong Kong); Noriaki Matsushima (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University); Shiva Shekhar (Tilburg School of Economics and Management (TiSEM), CESifo Research affiliate) |
| Abstract: | Privacy regulations like the General Data Protection Regulation aim to empower consumers with greater transparency and control over their personal data. In response, firms may exercise price discrimination in the form of versioning. This paper studies how these two aspects of privacy regulation—consumer empowerment and versioning—affect market outcomes and welfare. We develop a model where firms earn revenue from sales of service and data monetization, and consumers differ in their preferences for the service and privacy costs incurred when sharing data with the firm. In a monopoly, the firm is better off after regulation because its ability to price discriminate outweighs the effects of increased consumer empowerment. In a duopoly, however, greater consumer choice after regulation intensifies competition, as firms have more ways to deviate from mutually beneficial outcomes. This results in the firm with more data monetization earning smaller profit, while the firm with less data monetization earns larger profit. However, the industry profit as a whole decreases and consumer surplus increases after the regulation. Therefore, the regulation’s impact is nuanced and depends on the market structure. We also examine the regulatory impact on firms’ optimal data-driven revenue models and market entry. |
| Keywords: | privacy regulation, privacy management, versioning, monopoly, competition |
| JEL: | D18 D61 K24 L12 L51 L86 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2025-03 |
| By: | Bettina Bruggemann; Zachary L. Mahone; Thomas Palmer |
| Abstract: | Ownership changes are common across firms of all sizes, and they have meaningful impacts on firm performance. Using a panel of Canadian administrative data we document that sales are an important margin in the firm life cycle, larger than exit rates for employer firms. Applying an event-study framework, we find that (a) survival rates initially decline post sale, leveling off after three years and (b) conditional on survival, profits are permanently higher. Embedding ownership changes in a model of firm dynamics, we find that 4.5% of entrants survive due to the option value of sale and that, within ten years from birth, 13% of dispersion in firm size is attributable to realized ownership changes. Moreover, ownership changes are particularly important for high productivity firms, accounting for one quarter of revenue concentration among the top 1% of businesses. |
| Keywords: | Firm Dynamics; Ownership Changes; Firm Concentration |
| JEL: | E0 L25 D22 M13 G30 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2025-03 |
| By: | Sam Desiere (Ghent University); Tiziano Toniolo (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)); Gert Bijnens (National Bank of Belgium) |
| Abstract: | Policies supporting small businesses are popular among policymakers but often criticised by economists for their potential to distort the economy. This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of a unique policy that subsidises the first employee. Empirically, we find that the policy led to a surge in the number of firms employing exactly one employee, without a noticeable effect on the number of firms with two or more employees. A simple frictionless general equilibrium model of occupational choices predicts the empirical facts remarkably well. Leveraging our model, we show that the general equilibrium effects on wages and aggregate output are likely to be small. However, the policy is expensive. Our findings support the traditional view that size-dependent subsidies distort the optimal allocation of resources. |
| Keywords: | size-dependent policies; firm entry; small firms; wage subsidies; payroll taxes |
| JEL: | D22 H25 J08 L25 L26 |
| Date: | 2025–03–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvir:2025005 |