nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2024‒01‒22
four papers chosen by



  1. Industry platforms: A new mode of coordination in the economy By Dolata, Ulrich
  2. The Effect of Antitrust Enforcement on Venture Capital Investments By Wentian Zhang
  3. Algorithmic price recommendations and collusion: Experimental evidence By Hunold, Matthias; Werner, Tobias
  4. The New Age of Collusion? An Empirical Study into Airbnb's Pricing Dynamics and Market Behavior By Richeng Piao

  1. By: Dolata, Ulrich
    Abstract: This discussion paper is a plea for an urgently needed shift in perspective: from the concentration of social science research on the ubiquitous platforms of the consumption- and communication-based internet to the investigation of the platform-oriented reorganization of industrial distribution, production and innovation processes, which has so far received far less attention. The paper focuses on two questions. Firstly, what distinguishes industrial platforms from the platforms that characterize the consumption- and- communication-based internet? Can typical peculiarities and overarching characteristics of platform-based forms of work and organization in industry be identified? And secondly, do platforms represent an independent form of organization and coordination of industrial market, production and innovation processes that is substantially different from organized networks? The paper undertakes an empirical mapping and classification of the little explored field of industrial platforms and discusses from a theoretical-conceptual perspective why platforms should be conceived of as a sui generis form of organization whose dominant mode of coordination can be described as rule-based curation.
    Abstract: Dieses Discussion Paper ist ein Plädoyer für eine dringend notwendige Perspektivverschiebung: Von der Konzentration der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung auf die im Alltagsleben allgegenwärtigen Plattformen des konsum- und kommunikationsbasierten Internets hin zur Untersuchung der weit weniger im Fokus der Aufmerksamkeit stehenden plattformorientierten Reorganisation industrieller Distributions-, Produktions- und Innovationsprozesse. Im Zentrum dieses Textes stehen zwei Fragen. Erstens: Was unterscheidet Industrieplattformen von den Plattformen, die das konsum- und kommunikationsorientierte Internet prägen? Lassen sich typische Eigenheiten und übergreifende Charakteristika plattformbasierter Arbeits- und Organisationsformen in der Industrie herausarbeiten? Und zweitens: Schält sich mit Plattformen eine eigenständige Organisations- und Koordinationsform industrieller Markt-, Produktions- und Innovationsprozesse heraus, die sich insbesondere von organisierten Netzwerken substanziell absetzt? Der Text unternimmt eine empirische Kartierung und Einordnung des noch wenig erschlossenen Feldes und erörtert in theoretisch-konzeptioneller Perspektive, warum Plattformen als eine Organisationsform sui generis begriffen werden sollten, deren dominierender Koordinationsmodus als regelbasierte Kuratierung bezeichnet werden kann.
    Date: 2024
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:stusoi:280954&r=ind
  2. By: Wentian Zhang
    Abstract: This paper studies the effect of antitrust enforcement on venture capital (VC) investments and VC-backed companies. To establish causality, I exploit the DOJ's decision to close several antitrust field offices in 2013, which reduced the antitrust enforcement in areas near the closed offices. I find that the reduction in antitrust enforcement causes a significant decrease in VC investments in startups located in the affected areas. Furthermore, these affected VC-backed startups exhibit a reduced likelihood of successful exits and diminished innovation performance. These negative results are mainly driven by startups in concentrated industries, where incumbents tend to engage in anticompetitive behaviors more frequently. To mitigate the adverse effect, startups should innovate more to differentiate their products. This paper sheds light on the importance of local antitrust enforcement in fostering competition and innovation.
    Date: 2023–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2312.13564&r=ind
  3. By: Hunold, Matthias; Werner, Tobias
    Abstract: This paper investigates the collusive and competitive effects of algorithmic price recommendations on market outcomes. These recommendations are often non-binding and common in many markets, especially on online platforms. We develop a theoretical framework and derive two algorithms that recommend collusive pricing strategies. Utilizing a laboratory experiment, we find that sellers condition their prices on the recommendation of the algorithms. The algorithm with a soft punishment strategy lowers market prices and has a pro-competitive effect. The algorithm that recommends a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy increases the range of market outcomes, including more collusive ones. Variations in economic preferences lead to heterogeneous treatment effects and explain the results.
    Keywords: Collusion, Experiment, Human-Machine Interaction, Bertrand Oligopoly
    JEL: C92 D43 L13 L41
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:280937&r=ind
  4. By: Richeng Piao
    Abstract: This study investigates the implications of algorithmic pricing in digital marketplaces, focusing on Airbnb's pricing dynamics. With the advent of Airbnb's new pricing tool, this research explores how digital tools influence hosts' pricing strategies, potentially leading to market dynamics that straddle the line between efficiency and collusion. Utilizing a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) and Propensity Score Matching (PSM), the study examines the causal effects of the pricing tool on pricing behavior among hosts with different operational strategies. The findings aim to provide insights into the evolving landscape of digital economies, examining the balance between competitive market practices and the risk of tacit collusion facilitated by algorithmic pricing. This study contributes to the discourse on digital market regulation, offering a nuanced understanding of the implications of AI-driven tools in market dynamics and antitrust analysis.
    Date: 2023–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2312.05633&r=ind

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