nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2016‒07‒09
three papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. Growing by learning: firm-level evidence on the size-productivity nexus By Enrique Moral-Benito
  2. Financial constraints and moral hazard: The case of franchising By Fan, Ying; Kühn, Kai-Uwe; Lafontaine, Francine
  3. Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade By Holger Breinlich; Volker Nocke; Nicolas Schutz

  1. By: Enrique Moral-Benito (Banco de España)
    Abstract: It is a well-known empirical regularity that small firms are less productive than large firms. However, does size cause productivity or vice versa? Using matching methods, I find that productivity shocks are followed by significant increases in size defined by employment. In contrast, size shocks are not followed by productivity gains at the firm level. This finding casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that aggregate productivity in Spain is driven by a firm size distribution biased towards small firms in comparison with other developed countries. According to my findings, low firm-level productivity might play a crucial role in shaping the Spanish firm size distribution.
    Keywords: firm-level data, productivity, size distribution
    JEL: L11 L25 D24
    Date: 2016–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bde:wpaper:1613&r=ind
  2. By: Fan, Ying; Kühn, Kai-Uwe; Lafontaine, Francine
    Abstract: Financial constraints are considered an important impediment to growth for small businesses. We study theoretically and empirically the relationship between the financial constraints of agents and the organizational decisions and growth of principals, in the context of franchising. We find that a 30 percent decrease in average collateralizable housing wealth in an area is associated with a delay in chains' entry into franchising by 0.33 years on average, or 10 percent of the average waiting time, and a reduction in chain growth and hence a reduction in franchised chain employment of about 9 percent.
    Keywords: contracting,incentives,principal-agent,empirical,collateralizable housing wealth,entry,growth
    JEL: L14 L22 D22 D82 L8
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:223&r=ind
  3. By: Holger Breinlich; Volker Nocke; Nicolas Schutz
    Abstract: In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we study the conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to benefit domestic consumers is too tough or too lenient from the viewpoint of the foreign country. Calibrating the model to match industry-level data in the U.S. and Canada, we show that at present levels of trade costs merger policy is too tough in the vast majority of sectors. We also quantify the resulting externalities and study the impact of different regimes of coordinating merger policies at varying levels of trade costs.
    Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions, Merger Policy, Trade Policy, Oligopoly, International Trade
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notgep:16/08&r=ind

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