nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2013‒11‒29
eight papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games By Sergio Currarini; Marco A. Marini
  2. Downstream mode of competition with upstream market power By Manasakis, Constantine; Vlassis, Minas
  3. Price Guarantees, Consumer Search, and Hassle Costs By Pio Baake; Ulrich Schwalbe
  4. Competition in bank-provided payment services By Wilko Bolt; David Humphrey
  5. Price and Quality Dispersion in an Offshoring Market: Evidence from Semiconductor Production Services By David Byrne; Brian K. Kovak; Ryan Michaels
  6. Optimal patent length and patent breadth in an R&D driven market with evolving consumer preferences: An evolutionary multi-agent based modelling approach By Cevikarslan, Salih
  7. Doing R&D in a closed or open mode: Dynamics and impacts on productivity By Rosa, Julio Miguel; Mohnen, Pierre
  8. How do ICT firms in Turkey manage innovation? Diversity in expertise versus diversity in markets. By Akçomakn Semih; Akdeve, Erdal; Findik, Derya

  1. By: Sergio Currarini (University of Leicester, Universita' di Venezia and Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change); Marco A. Marini (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza")
    Abstract: In this paper we review a number of coalitional solution concepts for the analysis of cartel and merger stability in oligopoly. We show that, although so far the industrial organization and the cooperative game-theoretic literature have proceeded somehow independently on this topic, the two approaches are highly inter-connected. We first consider the basic problem of the stability of the whole industry association of firms under oligopoly and, for this purpose, we introduce the concept of core in oligopoly games. We show that different assumptions on the behaviour as well as on the timing of the coalitions of firms yield very different results on the set of allocations which are core-stable. We then consider the stability of associations of firms organized in coalition structures different from the grand coalition. To this end, various coalition formation games recently introduced by the so called endogenous coalition formation literature are critically reviewed. Again, different assumptions concerning the timing and the behaviour of firms are shown to yield a wide range of different results. We conclude by reviewing some recent extensions of the coalitional analysis to oligopolistic markets with heterogeneous firms and incomplete information.
    Keywords: Cooperative Games, Coalitions, Mergers, Cartels, Core, Games with Ex- ternalities, Endogenous Coalition Formation
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aeg:report:2013-15&r=ind
  2. By: Manasakis, Constantine; Vlassis, Minas
    Abstract: In a two-tier oligopoly, where the downstream firms are locked in pair-wise exclusive relationships with their upstream input suppliers, the equilibrium mode of competition in the downstream market is endogenously determined as a renegotiation-proof contract signed between each downstream firm and its exclusive upstream input supplier. We find that the upstream-downstream exclusive relationships credibly sustain the Cournot (Bertrand) mode of competition in the downstream market, when the goods are substitutes (complements). In contrast to previous studies, this result holds irrespectively of the degree of product differentiation and the distribution of bargaining power between the upstream and the downstream firm, over the pairspecific input price. --
    Keywords: Oligopoly,Vertical relations,Wholesale prices,Equilibrium mode of competition
    JEL: D43 L13 L42
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:118&r=ind
  3. By: Pio Baake; Ulrich Schwalbe
    Abstract: The paper deals with the competitive effects of price guarantees in a spatial duopoly where consumers can search for lower prices but have to incur hassle costs if they want to claim a price guarantee. It is shown that symmetric equilibria with and without price guarantees exist but price guarantees will have no effect on prices if search costs are low, hassle costs are high and the number of uninformed consumers is small. However, when both firms use price guarantees, there also exist payoff-dominant equilibria where both firms use mixed pricing strategies in the form of "high-low" pricing schemes, provided that the search costs are sufficiently high.
    Keywords: Price Matching Guarantees, Search Costs, Oligopoly Pricing
    JEL: L11 L13 L15 L41
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1335&r=ind
  4. By: Wilko Bolt; David Humphrey
    Abstract: Banks supply payment services that underpin the smooth operation of the economy. To ensure an efficient payment system, it is important to maintain competition among payment service providers but data available to gauge the degree of competition are quite limited. We propose and implement a frontierbased method to assess relative competition in bank-provided payment services. Billion dollar banks account for around ninety percent of assets in the US and those with around $4 to $7 billion in assets turn out to be both the most and the least competitive in payment services, not the very largest banks.
    Keywords: Payments; competition; banks; frontier analysis
    JEL: G21 L80 L00
    Date: 2013–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:401&r=ind
  5. By: David Byrne; Brian K. Kovak; Ryan Michaels
    Abstract: This paper studies price and quality differences across international intermediate input suppliers. We develop price measures that account for (i) differences in product characteristics, (ii) unobserved quality differences, and (iii) pure (frictional) price dispersion across suppliers. Using uniquely detailed transaction- level data from the semiconductor industry, we document large average price differences across suppliers for observationally identical products, and find that price differentials close over the product life cycle. We interpret this finding in a model where buyers face costs of switching suppliers. The theory demonstrates how to use the observed price dynamics to adjust prices for unobserved quality differences across suppliers. The results of this analysis reveal that pure price dispersion and unobserved quality differences are both important in this market. These two features make it difficult to construct constant-quality import price indexes, which generally assume away pure price dispersion. We document the resulting upward bias in standard price indexes, develop a quality-adjusted index for semiconductor fabrication, and propose a general method for bounding the true constant-quality price index.
    JEL: D43 L63
    Date: 2013–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19637&r=ind
  6. By: Cevikarslan, Salih (UNU-MERIT, and SBE, Maastricht University)
    Abstract: The aims of this paper are twofold. The first is to analyse the interaction between research and development (R&D) activities of firms and heterogeneous consumer preferences in structuring the evolution of an industry. The second is to explore the effects of patent life and patent breadth on market outcomes. To answer these research questions, an evolutionary, multi-agent based, sector-level cumulative innovation model is designed. The model addresses supply and demand sides of the market simultaneously with the co-evolution of heterogeneous consumer preferences, heterogeneous firm knowledge bases and technology levels at the micro level. In line with the evolutionary modelling tradition, we have a search algorithm-innovation and imitation of products by firms - a selection of algorithm-revealed preferences of the consumers - and a population of objects in which variation is expressed and on which selection operates: namely, firms (Windrum, 2004). Firms compete on quality and price of their products in an oligopolistic market whereas consumers, constrained by their computational limits, act to maximize their utility with their product choices in a boundedly rational way. There is continuous firm entry and exit depending on the competitive performance of the firms.
    Keywords: Patents, industrial dynamics, evolutionary economics, agent-based modelling
    JEL: B52 L11 O34
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2013020&r=ind
  7. By: Rosa, Julio Miguel (Industry Canada, Economic Research and Policy Analysis Branch); Mohnen, Pierre (UNU-MERIT / MGSoG, and CIRANO)
    Abstract: On the one hand, firms prefer to perform R&D in an open mode (letting R&D be performed extramurally or even selling their R&D services) to benefit from knowledge spillovers and complementarities between internal and external R&D. On the other hand, they may also like to perform R&D in a closed mode (funding and executing their R&D intramurally) to minimize outgoing externalities. We examine the dynamic process by which firms change the way of doing R&D and how these strategic choices of doing R&D affect their productivity growth. This study is based on the Statistics Canada Research and Development in Canadian Industry survey (RDCI), which collects data on R&D performed in the business sector in Canada. The paper is based on data for the period 1997 to 2006. The panel dimension of the data allows to control for unobserved characteristics of R&D performers by estimating a multinomial Logit model with unobserved heterogeneities using maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) method.
    Keywords: R&D, State Dependence, Dynamic Multinomial Logit, Panel-data, Maximum Simulated Likelihood, Open Innovation
    JEL: C35 L23
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2013060&r=ind
  8. By: Akçomakn Semih (TEKPOL, Middle East Technical University, and UNU-MERIT); Akdeve, Erdal (School of Management, Yıldırım Beyazıt University); Findik, Derya (TEKPOL, Middle East Technical University)
    Abstract: This paper provides a novel taxonomy of firms based on specialization versus diversification in production and markets. Firms may choose to specialize on few production activities or alternatively may build expertise in many activities. There is an accompanying decision when firms sell their products: whether to serve few or many markets. We argue that the location on the specialization-diversification spectrum significantly affects how firms manage innovation. For a sample of 90 innovator ICT firms in Ankara we find that cooperation structure, sources of innovation and funding of R&D display statistically significant different patterns according to the specialization-diversification taxonomy.
    Keywords: management of innovation, core competency, expertise building, R&D, ICT
    JEL: O32 L22 L86
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2013024&r=ind

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