|
on Industrial Organization |
|
Issue of 2013‒10‒02
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Vasiliki Bageri (Athens University of Economics and Business); Yannis Katsoulacos (Athens University of Economics and Business); Giancarlo Spagnolo (SITE-Stockholm School of Economics, Tor Vergata University and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple models to characterize their comparative static properties, and quantify them with simulations based on market data. We conclude by discussing the obvious need to depart from these distortive rules-of-thumb that appear to have the potential to substantially reduce social welfare. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust; Deterrence; Fines; Law Enforcement |
| JEL: | K21 L40 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bog:wpaper:153&r=ind |
| By: | Amnon Levy (University of Wollongong); Michael R. Caputo (University of Central Florida); Benoît Pierre Freyens (University of Canberra) |
| Abstract: | Optimal control theory is employed to characterize the socially optimal trajectory of the royalty per channel and the number of royalty-paying users of state-owned spectrum for broadcasting. The spectrum royalty is set by an omniscient public planner to maximize the sum of the discounted consumers’ utilities over an infinite planning horizon. The number of broadcasters adjusts over time to profits, while the quality of the industry’s service is determined by variety and reception. The trade-off between the benefits of greater variety and the costs of intensified interferences associated with the number of broadcasters is central to the analysis. The convergence of the socially optimal trajectory of the royalty per channel and the number of broadcasters to a steady state and the comparative statics of the steady state are analyzed. |
| Keywords: | Broadcasting; Royalties; Spectrum; Optimal Control |
| JEL: | C61 C62 D61 K23 L52 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uow:depec1:wp13-02&r=ind |
| By: | Asongu Simplice (Yaoundé/Cameroun); Antonio R. Andrés (Ifrane, Morocco) |
| Abstract: | This paper employs a recent methodological innovation on intellectual property rights (IPRs) harmonization to project global timelines for common policies against software piracy. The findings on 99 countries are premised on 15 fundamental characteristics of software piracy based on income-levels (high-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and low-income), legal-origins (English common-law, French civil-law, German civil-law and, Scandinavian civil-law) and, regional proximity (South Asia, Europe & Central Asia, East Asia & the Pacific, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean and, Sub-Saharan Africa). The results broadly show that a feasible horizon for the harmonization of blanket policies ranges from 4 to 10 years. |
| Keywords: | Software piracy; Intellectual property rights; Panel data; Convergence |
| JEL: | F42 K42 O34 O38 O57 |
| Date: | 2013–03–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:agd:wpaper:13/010&r=ind |