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on Industrial Organization |
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Issue of 2013‒02‒03
five papers chosen by |
| By: | Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian |
| Abstract: | We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard. Remedies increase the scope for pro table and acceptable mergers, while divestitures to an entrant rm are most effective in this regard. Remedial divestitures are most attractive from a social welfare point of view, when the merging parties can extract the entire gains associated with the asset sale. We also show that the merging parties have strong incentives to search for the most efficient buyer. Finally, we identify instances so that a remedy rule induces strictly price-decreasing mergers. -- |
| Keywords: | Remedies,Divestiture,Merger Control,Oligopoly,Synergies |
| JEL: | L13 L41 K21 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:81&r=ind |
| By: | Haucap, Justus; Heimeshoff, Ulrich |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses the general characteristics of online markets from a competition theory perspective and the implications for competition policy. Three important Internet markets are analyzed in more detail: search engines, online auction platforms, and social networks. Given the high level of market concentration and the development of competition over time, we use our theoretical insights to examine whether leading Internet platforms have non-temporary market power. Based on this analysis we answer the question whether any specific market regulation beyond general competition law rules is warranted in these three online markets. -- |
| Keywords: | two-sided markets,online markets,digital economy,antitrust,e-commerce |
| JEL: | L12 L41 L81 L82 L86 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:83&r=ind |
| By: | Klumpp, Tilman (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Su, Xuejuan (University of Alberta, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We examine the incentives of access-regulated firms to invest in infrastructure facilities they must share with competitors. The non-strategic incentives imply that investment depends positively on the market size. The strategic incentives imply that investment also depends on market composition, namely, the market shares of the facility owner and its competitors. Using a dataset of regulated electric utilities in the United States, we find evidence that transmission investments are indeed made strategically. Ceteris paribus, utilities are less likely to invest, and investment levels are lower, when competitors occupy a larger share of the market. |
| Keywords: | infrastructure investment; network industries; open access; access regulation; electricity wholesale market |
| JEL: | D21 D22 D43 K23 L43 L94 |
| Date: | 2013–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2013_002&r=ind |
| By: | Eric Bond (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University); Kamal Saggi (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University) |
| Abstract: | Motivated by existing multilateral rules regarding intellectual property, we develop a North-South model to highlight the dual roles price controls and compulsory licensing play in determining Southern access to a patented Northern product. The Northern patent-holder chooses whether and how to work its patent in the South (either via entry or voluntarily licensing) while the South determines the price control and whether to issue a compulsory license. The threat of compulsory licensing benefits the South and also increases global welfare when the North-South technology gap is significant. The price control and compulsory licensing are complementary instruments from the Southern perspective. |
| Keywords: | Patented Goods, Compulsory Licensing, Price Controls, Quality, Welfare |
| JEL: | F0 |
| Date: | 2012–12–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:van:wpaper:vuecon-12-00006&r=ind |
| By: | Aurelio Volpe (CSIL Centre for Industrial Studies); Stefania Pelizzari (CSIL Centre for Industrial Studies); Gelsomina Catalano |
| Abstract: | This market research aims to provide an overview of the Eco Building (or Green) activity in the European market. Energy efficiency is today at the top of the European political agenda, as from the analysis of chapter one (Legal Framework). It is part of the triple goal of the '20-20-20' initiative adopted by the European Union in 2008, which aims to achieve by 2020 a saving of 20% in primary energy consumption, a reduction of 20% in greenhouse gas emissions and an increase of 20% in renewable resources of energy. The CSIL multiclient report The European Market for Eco building products is the result of: analysis of the legislative frame network at the EU level (first chapter); analysis of the existing stock of available statistics on the building activity in Europe (most of it is reported in the second chapter of the Report); a number of simplified simulations of cost/benefit analyses for specific actions on energy saving, for residential and commercial buildings; desk research and field research (this last on the Italian market);data mining (turnover, employees, web address) for a wide number of industrial companies involved in Eco-building. Countries covered from the statistical analysis (building and economic indicators): Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. The attached Excel spreadsheet is useful for the qualitative calculation of both the energy and the economic savings of the main actions that can be taken, making some assumptions. Chapter 5 shows the last available turnover, employment, web address for over 1000 players in this field, according to different categories: architectural and engineering companies, builders and developers, manufacturer of prefabricated buildings, water management, photovoltaic systems, renewable energy, building automation, industrial controls. |
| JEL: | L11 L15 L22 L25 L68 L73 L81 Q51 Q55 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mst:csilre:eu23&r=ind |