New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2010‒05‒08
three papers chosen by



  1. Economics of the Super Bowl By Victor Matheson
  2. US market entry by Spanish pharmaceutical firms By Fabrizio Cesaroni; Marco S. Giarratana; Ester Martínez-Ros
  3. Indian Takeover Regulation - Under Reformed and Over Modified By Parekh Sandeep

  1. By: Victor Matheson
    Abstract: The Super Bowl is America’s premier sporting event. This paper details basic economic facts about the game as examines the controversy surrounding the purported economic impact of the game on host communities. While the league and sports boosters claim that the game brings up to a $500 million economic impact to host cities, a review of the literature suggests that the true economic impact is a fraction of this amount.
    Keywords: sports, stadiums, Super Bowl, impact analysis, football
    JEL: L83
    Date: 2009–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hcx:wpaper:0914&r=ind
  2. By: Fabrizio Cesaroni; Marco S. Giarratana; Ester Martínez-Ros
    Abstract: This work explores the factors that spur firms’ propensity to enter in international markets. Among the whole population of Spanish firms active in the pharmaceutical sector (over the period 1995-2004), we identify those firms that have entered the US market by assessing whether they have filed at least a trademark in the US Patents and Trademarks Office. By means of a hazard model, we empirically estimate which firm’s characteristics affect the probability of entry in the US market in a given year. Results show that technological capabilities (breadth and depth of firms’ patent base), and the firm’s cost structure explain the entry in the US market with a branded product. Moreover, our evidence shows that entry strategies based on differentiation advantage (technological diversification) and strategies based on cost advantage (scale economies) are exclusive and do not mix well each other
    Keywords: Foreign market entry, Internationalization strategies, Firm-Specific advantages, Competitive advantage, Innovation and R&D, Patents, Trademarks
    JEL: F23
    Date: 2010–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we101103&r=ind
  3. By: Parekh Sandeep
    Abstract: The takeover of substantial number of shares, voting rights or control in a listed Indian company attracts the provision of SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations 1997. The regulations have been amended nearly 20 times since inception, though the amendments have mainly concentrated on areas which needed no amendment. At the same time a vast number of obvious problems have not been rectified in the regulations. The large number of amendments have also created requirement of a compulsory tender offer of such unnecessary complexity as to make it virtually unintelligible to even a well qualified professional. This paper argues that the complexity in the trigger points for disclosure and tender offer introduced over the years lacks a philosophy, and most of the amendments can not only be deleted but a very simple structure can be introduced making compliance of the regulations straight forward and easy to understand by management of listed companies. Certain other areas which need amendments have also been discussed. Chief amongst these are the provisions relating to consolidation of holdings, conditional tender offers, hostility to hostile acquisitions, definitional oddities, payment of control premium in the guise of non compete fees, treatment of differential voting rights, treatment of Global Depository Receipts and disclosure enhancements. This paper does not try to portray a particular combination of numbers as the best possible set of trigger points and compulsory acquisition numbers but advocates that whatever numbers are adopted should not be changed for several decades. Arguments that state that the changing economic condition requires constant changes with these numbers, it is argued is wrong.
    Date: 2009–11–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp2009-11-06&r=ind

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