nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2009‒10‒17
four papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. Bundling and Competition for Slots: On the Portfolio Effects of Bundling By JEON, Doh-Shin; MENICUCCI, Dominico
  2. Bundling and Competition for Slots: Sequential Pricing By JEON, Doh-Shin; MENICUCCI, Dominico
  3. Mom-and-Pop Meet Big-Box: Complements or Substitutes? By John Haltiwanger; Ron Jarmin; C.J. Krizan
  4. Competition and Cooperation between Professional Sports Franchises: The Impact on Ticket Prices By Pelnar, Gregory

  1. By: JEON, Doh-Shin; MENICUCCI, Dominico
    Date: 2009–07–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:21219&r=ind
  2. By: JEON, Doh-Shin; MENICUCCI, Dominico
    Abstract: In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon- Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous pricing. First, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that under simultaneous individual pricing, equilibrium often does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. By contrast, equilibrium always exists under sequential individual pricing and we characterize it in this paper. We find that each seller faces a trade-off between the number of slots he occupies and surplus extraction per product, and there is no particular reason that this leads to an efficient allocation of slots. Second, Jeon Menicucci (2009) find that when bundling is allowed, there always exists an efficient equilibrium but inefficient equilibria can also exist due to pure bundling (for physical products) or slotting contracts. Under sequential pricing, we find that all equilibria are efficient regardless of whether firms can use slotting contracts, and both for digital goods and for physical goods. Therefore, sequential pricing presents an even stronger case for laissez-faire in the matter of bundling than simultaneous pricing.
    JEL: D4 K21 L13 L41 L82
    Date: 2009–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:21221&r=ind
  3. By: John Haltiwanger; Ron Jarmin; C.J. Krizan
    Abstract: In part due to the popular perception that Big-Boxes displace smaller, often family owned (a.k.a. Mom-and-Pop) retail establishments, several empirical studies have examined the evidence on how Big-Boxes’ impact local retail employment but no clear consensus has emerged. To help shed light on this debate, we exploit establishment-level data with detailed location information from a single metropolitan area to quantify the impact of Big-Box store entry and growth on nearby single unit and local chain stores. We incorporate a rich set of controls for local retail market conditions as well as whether or not the Big-Boxes are in the same sector as the smaller stores. We find a substantial negative impact of Big-Box entry and growth on the employment growth at both single unit and especially smaller chain stores – but only when the Big-Box activity is both in the immediate area and in the same detailed industry.
    Keywords: Big-Boxes, Small Business, Retail Trade, Firm Location, Structural Change
    JEL: R30 L16
    Date: 2009–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:09-34&r=ind
  4. By: Pelnar, Gregory
    Abstract: An important issue in many antitrust lawsuits involving professional sports leagues and their member teams is the extent to which franchises within the same, and across different, professional sports leagues compete with one another for fans and advertisers. Complicating the issue is the fact that some sports franchises also cooperate with other franchises in the same or different leagues by, for example, participating in a joint venture to build and operate the stadium in which they will play their games or a regional sports network joint venture to televise their games. An extreme form of cooperation is common ownership: some franchises in different sports leagues have common ownership. This study investigates the impact of competition and cooperation among the franchises of the four major professional sports leagues (i.e., the National Football League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball) on ticket prices for the 2008 season. The regression results suggest that the existence of one or more rival sports franchises in the same metropolitan area does not have a statistically significant impact on ticket prices. On the other hand, there is at best weak evidence that cooperation between sports franchises impacts ticket prices. These findings are consistent with a number of alternative hypotheses.
    Keywords: sports leagues; antitrust; National Football League; National Basketball Association; National Hockey League; Major League Baseball
    JEL: L11 L83 L40
    Date: 2009–10–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:17787&r=ind

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