nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2009‒06‒03
three papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. On the Problem of Network Monopoly By Jolian McHardy; Michael Reynolds; Stephen Trotter
  2. Optimal Collusion with Limited Severity Constraint By DE VILLEMEUR, Etienne; FLOCHEL, Laurent; VERSAEVEL, Bruno
  3. The BCS, Antitrust and Public Policy By Andrew Zimbalist

  1. By: Jolian McHardy (Department of Economics, The University of Sheffield); Michael Reynolds; Stephen Trotter
    Abstract: We introduce a new regulatory concept: the independent profit-maximising agent, as a model for regulating a network monopoly. The agent sets prices on cross-network goods taking either a complete, or arbitrarily small, share of the associated profit. We examine welfare and profits with and without each agent type under both network monopoly and network duopoly. We show that splitting up the network monopoly (creating network duopoly) may be inferior for both firm(s) and society compared with a network monopoly "regulated" by an agent and that society always prefers any of the four agent regimes over network monopoly and network duopoly.
    Keywords: Network, Monopoly, Agent
    JEL: D43 L13 R48
    Date: 2009–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:shf:wpaper:2009003&r=ind
  2. By: DE VILLEMEUR, Etienne; FLOCHEL, Laurent; VERSAEVEL, Bruno
    JEL: C72 D43 L13
    Date: 2009–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:11169&r=ind
  3. By: Andrew Zimbalist (Department of Economics, Smith College)
    Abstract: This paper examines the history and the economics of the Bowl Championship Series, in the context of all college bowl games. The evidence suggests that the BCS restricts entry to the FBS conferences that are outside the BCS cartel and that the revenue distribution from the bowl games is highly skewed in favor of the six BCS conferences. The resulting revenue advantage enables the BCS conferences to perpetuate their historical predominance. The BCS selection process is based on a conceptually confused and biased system. The paper discusses the rationale proffered by the BCS for its system and then considers the antitrust arguments against the BCS. It concludes that the outcome of any antitrust claim would be uncertain, which together with the involved expense and time render problematic any antitrust strategy to break up the BCS cartel. Instead, the paper concludes with a call for a legislative solution that would open up the national championship to all FBS conferences, increase output, redistribute revenues more evenly throughout Division I and the rest of the NCAA, and provide more opportunities to college athletes.
    JEL: K21 L11 L12 L44 L83
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smt:wpaper:2009-01&r=ind

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