nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2009‒05‒30
two papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. Optimal pre-merger notification mechanisms - incentives and efficiency of mandatory and voluntary schemes By Gonzalez, Aldo; Benitez, Daniel
  2. (No)competition in the Spanish retailing gasoline market: a variance filter approach By Juan Luís Jiménez; Jordi Perdiguero

  1. By: Gonzalez, Aldo; Benitez, Daniel
    Abstract: The authors compare the two merger control systems currently employed worldwide: a mandatory system based on merger size threshold and a voluntary system with ex-post monitoring and fines. The voluntary system possesses two informational advantages: (i) the enforcement agency employs more information -verifiable and non verifiable parameters- to decide the set of mergers to investigate, and (ii) the first move of merging firms reveals useful information to the agency about the competitive risk of a merger. If fines for undue omission to notify are upward limited, then a mixed mechanism is optimal, where small transactions are under a voluntary regime while the big mergers are obliged to report. Remedies for fixing anticompetitive mergers act as an instrument that induces firms to notify the operation, improving further the advantage of the voluntary mechanism.
    Keywords: Microfinance,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress,Corporate Law,Economic Theory&Research,Small Scale Enterprise
    Date: 2009–05–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4936&r=ind
  2. By: Juan Luís Jiménez (Departamento de Análisis Económico Aplicado. Grupo de Economía de las Infraestructuras y el Transporte. Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria); Jordi Perdiguero (PPRE-IREA, Universitat de Barcelona)
    Abstract: Various methodologies in economic literature have been used to analyse the international hydrocarbon retail sector. Nevertheless at a Spanish level these studies are much more recent and most conclude that generally there is no effective competition present in this market, regardless of the approach used. In this paper, in order to analyse the price levels in the Spanish petrol market, our starting hypothesis is that in uncompetitive markets the prices are higher and the standard deviation is lower. We use weekly retail petrol price data from the ten biggest Spanish cities, and apply Markov chains to fill the missing values for petrol 95 and diesel, and we also employ a variance filter. We conclude that this market demonstrates reduced price dispersion, regardless of brand or city.
    Keywords: Competition, Petrol, Variance filter analysis, Gibbs sampling, Markov chain Monte Carlo.
    JEL: L13 L59 L71
    Date: 2009–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:xrp:wpaper:xreap2009-5&r=ind

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