nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2009‒02‒14
three papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. Ex Post Regulation Facilitates Collusion By Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst
  2. Price setting and competition with search frictions By Kudoh, Noritaka
  3. The Size and Scope of the Sports Industry in the United States By Brad Humphreys; Jane Ruseski

  1. By: Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst
    Abstract: Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned.
    Keywords: entry deterrence, access regulation, network infrastructure, vertical differentiation
    JEL: K21 K23 L42 L51
    Date: 2008
  2. By: Kudoh, Noritaka
    Abstract: This paper investigates price determination in a decentralized economy in which buyers' valuations are stochastic and unobservable. In such a market, each buyer's reservation utility depends both on the prevailing price and on the price he actually encounters. The buyer's willingness to trade is shown to be decreasing in the price, and this creates the trade-off for the sellers' price setting. Even though the sellers have incentives to manipulate the buyer's willingness to trade, the economy is not fully competitive; it does not converge to the Walrasian outcome as search frictions disappear. The model is used to study various market structures to explore the nature of market power in search equilibrium. It is shown that price dispersion arises as a result of search frictions and oligopolistic price setting.
    Keywords: random search, price setting, competition, oligopoly,
    JEL: C78 D40
    Date: 2009–02
  3. By: Brad Humphreys (University of Alberta); Jane Ruseski (University of Alberta)
    Abstract: We estimate the economic scope of the sports industry in the United States. Drawing on a variety of data sources, we investigate the economic size of sport participation, sports viewing, and the supply and demand side of the sports market in the United States. Estimates of the size of the sports industry based on aggregate demand and aggregate supply range from $44 to $73 billion in 2005. In addition, participation in sports and the opportunity time cost of attending sporting events are important, but hard to value, components of the industry.
    Keywords: sports economics
    JEL: L83
    Date: 2008–06

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