By: |
Friberg, Richard (Stockholm School of Economics);
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN));
Persson, Lars (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
Abstract: |
We propose a model of investments prior to corporate ownership changes. We
derive conditions under which the selling of a firm triggers overinvestment by
both the seller and the buyer prior to the asset transfer. In a setting with
Cournot competition, we show that these incentives can drive the consumer
prices in a post-acquisition duopoly below those of an ongoing triopoly. Our
analysis warns against a mechanical use of pre-merger benchmarks in ex post
merger evaluations. |
Keywords: |
Mergers & Acquisitions; Ownership; Auctions; Strategic Investments; Merger Evaluations |
JEL: |
L13 L40 L66 |
Date: |
2008–11–13 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0777&r=ind |