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on Industrial Organization |
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Issue of 2008‒05‒17
three papers chosen by |
| By: | De Francesco, Massimo A.; Salvadori, Neri |
| Abstract: | The paper extends the analysis of price competition among capacity-constrained sellers beyond the cases of duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. We first provide some general results for the oligopoly and then focus on the triopoly, providing a complete characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium of the price game. The region of the capacity space where the equilibrium is mixed is partitioned according to the features of the mixed strategy equilibrium arising in each subregion. Then computing the mixed strategy equilibrium becomes a quite simple task. The analysis reveals features of the mixed strategy equilibrium which do not arise in the duopoly (some of them have also been discovered by Hirata (2008)). |
| Keywords: | Bertrand-Edgeworth; Price game; Oligopoly; Triopoly; Mixed strategy equilibrium |
| JEL: | L13 D43 C72 |
| Date: | 2008–05–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:8634&r=ind |
| By: | Yang, Zhenlin; Gan Loo Geok, Lydia; Tang, Fang-fang |
| Abstract: | We examine the pricing trends in the online toy markets by using panel data regression models with error components and serial correlation. Our results indicate that both online branch of multi-channel retailers (OBMCRS) and dotcoms charge similar prices on average, and that over time their prices move in tandem. Although the OBMCR retailers charge significantly different prices, the dotcoms do charge similar prices. Moreover, both retailer types demonstrate different magnitudes of price dispersion that move at different rates over time. Although the price dispersion of OBMCRS is higher than that of the dotcoms at the beginning, the gap narrows over time. |
| Keywords: | E-commerce, online pricing strategies, online toy market, price dispersion, pricing trends |
| JEL: | L11 L81 L86 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7264&r=ind |
| By: | Carsten Burhop (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Thorsten Luebbers (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we evaluate the impact of cartelisation and managerial incentives on the productive efficiency of German coal mining corporations. We focus on coal mining in the Ruhr district, Germany’s main mining area. We use stochastic frontier analysis and an unbalanced dynamic panel data set for up to 28 firms for the years 1881-1913 to measure productive efficiency. We show that coal was mined with decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, it turns out that cartelisation did not affect productive efficiency. Controlling for corporate governance variables shows that stronger managerial incentives were significantly correlated with productive efficiency, whereas the debt-equity ratio did not influence it. |
| Keywords: | Economic history; Germany pre-1913; Cartel; Productive efficiency; Corporate Governance |
| JEL: | N53 L41 L71 |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_13&r=ind |