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on Industrial Organization |
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Issue of 2008‒01‒05
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Basaluzzo, Gabriel; Miravete, Eugenio J |
| Abstract: | We present a flexible model of monopoly nonlinear pricing with endogenous participation decisions of heterogeneous consumers. We make use of the moments that define the few self-selecting tariff options that are commonly used to implement the optimal nonlinear tariff to estimate how demand and cost variables affect the pricing strategies offered by incumbent monopolists in several early U.S. local cellular telephone markets through the different elements of the theoretical model: marginal costs, average price sensitivity of demand, indexing parameters governing the distribution of the two-dimensional type components, support of the distribution of types, and costs associated to the commercialization of tariff options. The sources of identification are the position and shape of each tariff offered by monopolists, the actual number and features of the tariff options used to implement them, as well as a measure of market penetration in each cellular market during the first and last quarter of monopoly regime. We use our model and the structural estimates to provide a performance comparison (profit+welfare) of nonlinear tariffs relative to linear (uniform), optimal two-part, Coasian marginal cost-plus fixed fee, and flat tariffs. We furthermore evaluate the potential welfare gains of implementing universal service requirements. |
| Keywords: | Nonlinear vs. Linear Pricing; Random Participation; Universal Service |
| JEL: | C63 D43 D82 L96 |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6620&r=ind |
| By: | Jean J., GABSZEWICZ; Skerdilajda, ZANAJ |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze how the technology used by downstream firms can influence input and output market prices. We show via an example that both these prices increase under a decreasing returns technology while the countrary holds when the technology is constant. |
| Keywords: | successive oligopolies, vertical integration, technology, foreclosure |
| JEL: | D43 L1 L22 L42 |
| Date: | 2007–12–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvec:2007036&r=ind |
| By: | Marcel Boyer |
| Abstract: | The Copyright Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42) includes several exceptions to the exclusive right of copyright holders, including the provisions concerning “fair dealing”, which state that fair dealing in respect of a literary or artistic work for the purposes of private study, research, criticism or review, or news reporting does not constitute a violation of copyright. Our objective in this paper is to characterize the role and nature of this exception from the standpoint of contemporary economic theory and analysis and in the light of the recent Supreme Court of Canada on this subject (CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13). <P>La Loi sur le droit d’auteur (L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-42) comporte plusieurs exceptions au droit exclusif des titulaires de droit d'auteur, parmi lesquelles se trouvent les dispositions sur « l'utilisation équitable » qui stipulent que l'utilisation équitable d'une œuvre littéraire ou artistique aux fins d'étude privée, de recherche, de critique et de compte rendu, de communications de nouvelles ne constitue pas une violation du droit d’auteur. Notre objectif ici est de caractériser le rôle et la nature de cette exception du point de vue de la théorie et de l’analyse économiques contemporaines et à la lumière de la récente décision de la Cour suprême du Canada en la matière (CCH Canadienne Ltée c. Barreau du Haut Canada, 2004 CSC 13, [2004] 1 R.C.S. 339). |
| Keywords: | copyright, fair dealing, Supreme Court, droit d’auteur, utilisation équitable, Cour suprême |
| Date: | 2007–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2007s-32&r=ind |
| By: | Xu, Jin |
| Abstract: | We consider a Stackelberg model under demand slope uncertainty in an environment where the follower owns information advantage. Specifically, we show that the second mover obtains higher expected profit than the first mover when the leader only knows the prior beliefs and the follower gains the posterior probabilities. This result tells us that the leadership advantage is dominated by the information advantage when demand fluctuation is important. |
| JEL: | L13 L15 D43 |
| Date: | 2007–12–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:6408&r=ind |