By: |
Ganslandt, Mattias (University of Colorado);
Maskus, Keith E. (University of Colorado) |
Abstract: |
We develop a model of vertical pricing in which an original manufacturer sets
wholesale prices in two markets integrated at the distributor level by
parallel imports (PI). In this context we show that if competition policy
requires uniform wholesale prices across locations it would push retail prices
toward convergence as transportation costs fall. However, these retail prices
could be higher than those induced without restrictions on prices charged to
distributors. Thus, the competition policy may not be optimal for consumer
welfare. |
Keywords: |
Vertical Restraints; Parallel Imports; Market Integration; Price Discrimination; Competition Policy |
JEL: |
F15 K21 L14 |
Date: |
2007–04–13 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0702&r=ind |