nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2007‒02‒10
six papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. Antitrust By Louis Kaplow; Carl Shapiro
  2. Economics of the Internet By Nicholas Economides
  3. Competitive in successive markets : entry and mergers By Jean J. GABSWEWICZ, Skerkilajda ZANAJ; Skerdilajda, ZANAJ
  4. Vertical sub-contracting relationships strategy, the Airbus First-tier suppliers\' coordination By Frédéric MAZAUD (LEREPS-GRES); Marie LAGASSE (AIRBUS-FRANCE)
  5. Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks: Some Comments and Considerations By Lawrence White
  6. Price adjustment in German manufacturing: evidence from two merged survey By Stahl, Harald

  1. By: Louis Kaplow; Carl Shapiro
    Abstract: This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of current economic knowledge and use that knowledge to critically assess central features of antitrust policy. Our objective is to foster the improvement of legal regimes and also to identify topics where further analytical and empirical exploration would be useful.
    JEL: K21 L12 L13 L40 L41 L42
    Date: 2007–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12867&r=ind
  2. By: Nicholas Economides
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:07-1&r=ind
  3. By: Jean J. GABSWEWICZ, Skerkilajda ZANAJ (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Department of Economics); Skerdilajda, ZANAJ
    Abstract: This paper analyses successive markets where the intra-market linkage depends on the technology used to produce the final output. We investigate entry of new firms, when entry obtains by expanding the economy as well as collusive agreements between firms. We highlight the differentiated effects of entry corresponding to a constant or decreasing returns, free entry in both markets does not entail the usual tendency for the input price to adjust to its marginal cost while it does under constant returns. Then, we analyse collusive agreements by stressing the role of upstream linkage on the profitability of horizontal mergers ˆ la Salant, Switzer and Reynolds
    Keywords: Oligopoly, entry, horizontal collusion, foreclosure
    JEL: D43 L1 L22 L42
    Date: 2006–10–17
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006055&r=ind
  4. By: Frédéric MAZAUD (LEREPS-GRES); Marie LAGASSE (AIRBUS-FRANCE)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the transformations of industrial vertical relationships, and more particularly the duality of the coordination modes within new industrial architectures. The paper aims to characterize relationship between the architect and the first-tier suppliers according to the strategic degree of their competence. Two models of coordination arm\'s length and systems integration coexist within the same industrial architecture. The recourse to one or the other varies according to the policy of purchase and the strategic degree of the sub-contracted subsystems. Thus we will analyze the system of subcontracting of Airbus by focusing to the importance of the purchasing policy. The argumentation articulates in two parts. The first one considers the vertical subcontracting relationships in the framework of complex productions, by insisting on organizational aspects. The second one analyses the transformation of the \"Airbus\" productive system by focusing on purchasing process and the emergence of new First-tier supplier’s coordination modes.
    Keywords: NAModularity – Systems Integration – Strategic competences – Purchasing Strategy – First Tier Suppliers – Airbus
    JEL: L2 L23 L62
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grs:wpegrs:2007-02&r=ind
  5. By: Lawrence White
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:06-03&r=ind
  6. By: Stahl, Harald
    Abstract: This paper presents new evidence on the formation of producer prices. The database combines a one-time survey that was conducted in June 2004 on a sample of 1,200 firms in manufacturing and time-series information on price adjustment of the same firms from a business-tendency survey. The share of time-dependent price setters amounts to 20 per cent. Neither Taylor nor Calvo type price setting describes their price adjustment well. Only a few firms are forward-looking, the majority relies on contemporaneous and past information.
    Keywords: Price rigidity, sticky information, survey data
    JEL: D40 E30
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:5195&r=ind

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