nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2006‒10‒07
one paper chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. On R&D Information Sharing and Merger By Uday Bhanu Sinha

  1. By: Uday Bhanu Sinha (Delhi School of Economics)
    Abstract: The paper deals with the issue of information sharing in a Cournot duopoly by an innovating firm in the face of a merger with its rival. The innovating firm would share information about the cost realization with its rival provided the market size is relatively small or, the R&D technology is relatively more efficient in a medium market size. However, in a large market, or in a medium market size with less efficient R&D technology, the innovating firm does not share information with its rival. We also show that the social welfare may be higher under incomplete information regime.
    Keywords: Information sharing, market size, R&D, merger and welfare.
    JEL: L13 O32
    Date: 2006–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cde:cdewps:145&r=ind

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