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on Industrial Organization |
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Issue of 2006‒07‒21
two papers chosen by |
| By: | Frédéric Deroian (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - [Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II][Université de droit, d'économie et des sciences - Aix-Marseille III] - [Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales]); Frédéric Gannon (EconomiX - [CNRS : UMR7166] - [Université de Paris X - Nanterre]) |
| Abstract: | Abstract: We study rival firms' incentives in quality-improving Research and Development (R&D) networks. The analysis stresses the role of free riding associated to collaboration and three major consequences emerge: R&D efforts decrease with the number of partners, networks of alliances are over-connected as compared to the social optimum and the profitmaximizing number of alliances is possibly non monotonic (decreasing then increasing) with respect to inverse measure of product differentiation. |
| Keywords: | and horizontally Differentiated Oligopoly, Product Innovation, R&D, Alliance |
| Date: | 2006–07–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00084891_v1&r=ind |
| By: | Langinier, Corinne |
| Abstract: | Basic innovations are often fundamental to the development of applications that may be developed by other innovators. In this setting, we investigate whether patent pools can rectify the lack of incentives for developers to invest in applications. Following Green and Scotchmer (1995), we also wonder whether broad basic patents are necessary to provide enough incentives for basic innovators. We show that patent pools are more likely to be formed with patents of very different breadth, or patents of similarly wide breadth. Further, even though patent pools rectify the problem of developers’ incentives, they may reduce the incentive for doing basic research. |
| Keywords: | Patent pool, innovation, breadth |
| JEL: | L2 |
| Date: | 2006–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12647&r=ind |