|
on Industrial Organization |
|
Issue of 2006‒07‒15
nine papers chosen by |
| By: | Tomaso Duso (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, D10785 Berlin, Germany. Tel: +49 30 25491 403, Fax: +49 30 25491 444, duso@wz-berlin.de); Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna, klaus.gugler@univie.ac.at); Burcin Yurtoglu (University of Vienna, burcin.yurtoglu@univie.ac.at) |
| Abstract: | This paper applies a novel methodology to a unique dataset of large concentrations during the period 1990-2002 to assess merger control’s effectiveness. By using data gathered from several sources and employing different evaluation techniques, we analyze the economic effects of the European Commission’s (EC) merger control decisions and distinguish between blockings, clearances with commitments (either behavioral or structural), and outright clearances. We run an event study on merging and rival firms’ stocks to quantify the profitability effects of mergers and merger control decisions. We back up our results and methodology by using alternative measures for the merger’s profitability effects based on balance sheet data and obtain consistent results. Our findings suggest that outright blockings solve the competitive problems generated by the merger. Remedies are not always effective in solving the market power concerns, at least not on average. Nevertheless, both structural (divestitures) and behavioral remedies do help restore effective competition when correctly applied to anticompetitive mergers during the first investigation phase. Yet, they are on the whole ineffective or even detrimental when applied after the second investigation phase. Finally, remedies - especially behavioral ones - seem to constitute a rent transfer from merging firms to rivals when mistakenly applied to pro-competitive mergers. |
| Keywords: | Mergers, Merger Control, Remedies, European Commission, Event Studies, Expost Evaluation |
| JEL: | L4 K21 G34 C2 L2 |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:153&r=ind |
| By: | Shiko Murayama |
| Abstract: | Should the government subsidize entry to promote competition? In theory, free entry does not guarantee the socially optimum number of entrants. In differentiated product markets, free entry can result either in excessive or insufficient entry. In this paper I propose an empirical framework to address this issue with a case study of the Medicare HMO market for 2003 and 2004. I perform counterfactual welfare simulations with different entry conditions and with different government payment rates to HMOs. The results indicate that uniformly raising the payment rate lowers national welfare, which supports the government's efforts to contain the payment rate in my sample years. A comparison of the cases with and without entry and/or market power indicates that this welfare loss does not come from additional entry, but instead the oligopolistic market structure and market distortion from the payment rate subsidy. The number of entrants is likely to be insufficient. |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hst:hstdps:d06-166&r=ind |
| By: | Boivin, Caroline; Langinier, Corinne |
| Abstract: | Licensing a new technology implies introducing competition into the market. This has a negative effect on the profit of the incumbent if the demand remains unchanged. However, because of the novel content of an innovation, consumers may have different perceptions of the value of a good depending on the market structure. Thus, the introduction of a competitor into the market may enhance demand, and consequently have a positive effect on the profit of the incumbent. In a simple setting, we show that the incumbent may decide to license her technology even in the absence of a royalty when the positive effect outweighs the negative one. |
| JEL: | L1 |
| Date: | 2005–09–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12414&r=ind |
| By: | Hendrik Hakenes (MPI for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany, hakenes@coll.mpg.de); Martin Peitz (International University in Germany, 76646 Bruchsal, Germany, martin.peitz@i-u.de) |
| Abstract: | Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability that low quality will be detected is in an intermediate range, the firm produces high quality under umbrella branding whereas it would sell low quality in the absence of umbrella branding. Hence, umbrella branding mitigates the moral hazard problem. We also find that umbrella branding survives in asymmetric markets and that even unprofitable products may be used to stabilize the umbrella brand. However, umbrella branding does not necessarily imply high quality; the firm may choose low-quality products with positive probability. |
| Keywords: | Umbrella branding, reputation transfer, signaling, experience goods. |
| JEL: | L14 L15 M37 D82 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:132&r=ind |
| By: | Lawrence M. Kahn (Cornell University, CESifo and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies intercollegiate athletics in the context of the theory of cartels. Some point to explicit attempts by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) to restrict output and payments for factors of production as evidence of cartel behavior. Others argue that such limits enhance product quality by preserving amateurism. I find that the NCAA’s compensation limits on athletes lead to high levels of rents from the entertainment revenues produced by the athletes. The athletes producing these rents are disproportionately African- American, while the beneficiaries are primarily white. The rents are typically spent on coaches’ salaries, facilities, and nonrevenue sports. Although athletic departments considered as businesses lose money on average, there is some evidence, although not unanimous, that they generate alumni contributions, state appropriations, and additional student applications. |
| Keywords: | cartel, monopsony, college athletics |
| JEL: | L12 L44 I21 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2186&r=ind |
| By: | Sumon Kumar Bhaumik; Shubhashis Gangopadhyay; Shagun Krishnan |
| Abstract: | It is now stylized that, while the impact of ownership on firm productivity is unclear, product market competition can be expected to have a positive impact on productivity, thereby making entry (or contestability of markets) desirable. Traditional research in the context of entry has explored the strategic reactions of incumbent firms when threatened by the possibility of entry. However, following De Soto (1989), there has been increasing emphasis on regulatory and institutional factors governing entry rates, especially in the context of developing countries. Using 3-digit industry level data from India, for the 1984-97 period, we examine the phenomenon of entry in the Indian context. Our empirical results suggest that during the 1980s industry level factors largely explained variations in entry rates, but that, following the economic federalism brought about by the post-1991 reforms, variations entry rates during the 1990s were explained largely by state level institutional and legacy factors. We also find evidence to suggest that, in India, entry rates were positively associated with growth in total factor productivity. |
| Keywords: | Entry, Productivity, Institutions, Regulations, India, Reforms |
| JEL: | L11 L52 L64 L67 O14 O17 |
| Date: | 2006–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wdi:papers:2006-822&r=ind |
| By: | John Bennett; Saul Estrin; |
| Abstract: | We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result in both greater entry by first movers and a higher steady-state number of firms. Delay also leads to speculation, with entrepreneurs taking out licences to obtain the option of immediate entry if they later observe the industry to be profitable enough. |
| Keywords: | Entry, Entry Barriers, Developing Economy. |
| JEL: | L15 O14 |
| Date: | 2006–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wdi:papers:2006-824&r=ind |
| By: | christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Traditionally, there have been two separate telecommunications networks, one based on switches, the other based on routers. The switched network basically carried voice. The packet switched network basically carried data. Now voice is about to go packet switched too. Ultimately, both networks might merge. If that were to happen, the governance structure of either of these networks would have to change fundamentally. Currently, a large amount of packet switched traffic goes over the public Internet. The Internet is organised as a club good. There is an access fee, but no further fee for its actual use. Volume metering is technically feasible, but typically only bandwidth is controlled. In the switched network, a split price is standard. There is an access fee, plus a separate fee for each call. In a club good, by definition each side pays for part of the traffic. On the Internet, the receiver pays principle is thus applied. In most countries, the switched network is governed by the caller pays principle. Under that principle, there are termination charges. Each operator has a local monopoly over its customers. There is thus the possibility that telephony will in the future be controlled by the same principles. Actually, in that case the only remaining property right would be access to the network. In the opposite case, data traffic might be contaminated by the principles currently governing switched telephony. This would presuppose that operators succeed in introducing artificial property rights for the relationship with their customers, maybe even for the individual instance of communication. Technically, there are two main opportunities for this. In switched telephony, for technical reasons it is natural to give out telephone numbers to operators, not to clients. Through these numbers, they control their customers. Voice over IP operators try to implement the same scheme for packet switched voice traffic, although here the domain name system would be natural. Domains are accorded to end users, not to operators. A second conduit for artificially introducing property rights is technical standards. They are needed for defining addressees, for the management of real-time interaction, and for the digital coding of voice signals. By way of proprietary standards, the operator gains full control. Competition policy should not only see at the establishment of these fundamental governance structures. It should also check the potential for distorting systems competition between switched and packet switched telephony. Incumbents are having a host of potential strategies for creating new barriers to entry, and for distorting actual competition. Most critical are bundling strategies. Diagonally integrated incumbents might offer their clients to carry their traffic over IP where possible, and through their traditional network otherwise. That way they could turn their customer base in the traditional networks into a barrier to entry. Currently, this strategy can fully work for mobile telephony. In fixed telephony it is more difficult to implement as long as IP addressees are not earmarked. |
| Keywords: | property right, club good, network externality, monopolistic competition, systems competition, packet switched telephony, network access, E. 164 numbers vs. IP addresses, caller pays principle vs. receiver pays principle, sip, codecs |
| JEL: | D D43 H41 K21 K23 L13 L15 L43 L86 |
| Date: | 2005–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_26&r=ind |
| By: | Richard Schmidtke (Department of Economics, University of Munich, Akademiestr. 1/III, 80799 Munich, Germany, Tel.: +49-89-2180 3957, Fax.: +49-89-2180 2767, Richard.Schmidtke@lrz.uni-muenchen.de) |
| Abstract: | For several years, an increasing number of firms are investing in Open Source Software (OSS). While improvements in such a non-excludable public good cannot be appropriated, companies can benefit indirectly in a complementary proprietary segment. We study this incentive for investment in OSS. In particular we ask how (1) market entry and (2) public investments in the public good affects the firms' production and profits. Surprisingly, we find that there exist cases where incumbents benefit from market entry. Moreover, we show the counter-intuitive result that public spending does not necessarily lead to a decreasing voluntary private contribution. |
| Keywords: | Open Source Software, Private Provision of Public Goods, Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, Complements, Market Entry |
| JEL: | C72 L13 L86 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:134&r=ind |