By: |
Banerji, A (Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi);
Dutta, Bhaskar (Department of Economics, University of Warwick,) |
Abstract: |
This paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph
where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral
interaction. It departs from the standard Katz-Shapiro framework by assuming
that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents. It
shows that even if rival firms engage in Bertrand competition, this form of
network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide
up the market and earn positive profits. The analysis also shows that some
graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation, while for
others, there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation
obtains in equilibrium |
Keywords: |
network structure ; network externalities ; price competition ; market segmentation |
JEL: |
D7 |
Date: |
2005 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:725&r=ind |