nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2006‒06‒03
eight papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment By Tomaso Duso; Klaus Gugler; Burcin Yurtoglu
  2. Mergers and Innovation: The Case of the Pharmaceutical Industry By Ornaghi, Carmine
  3. Company R&D and University R&D - How Are They Related? By Charlie Karlsson; Martin Andersson
  4. The Effect of Reputation on Selling Prices in Auctions By Oliver Gürtler; Christian Grund
  5. Prices, Spatial Competition, and Heterogeneous Producers: An Empirical Test By Chad Syverson
  6. Firm Entry and Exit in the U.S. Retail Sector, 1977-1997 By Javier Miranda; Shawn Klimek; Ron Jarmin
  7. Product Choice and Product Switching By Stephen Redding; Andrew Bernard; Peter Schott
  8. Open Source Development in a Differentiated Duopoly By Stephane Verani

  1. By: Tomaso Duso; Klaus Gugler; Burcin Yurtoglu
    Abstract: Mergers that substantially lessen competition are challenged by antitrust authorities. Instead of blocking anticompetitive transitions straight away, authorities might choose to negotiate with the merging parties and allow the transactions to proceed with modifications that restore or preserve the competition in the involved markets. We study a sample of 167 mergers that were under the European Commission’s scrutiny from 1990 to 2002. We use an event study methodology to identify the potential anticompetitive effects of mergers as well as the remedial provisions on these transactions. Stock market reactions around the day of the merger’s announcement provide information on the first question, whereas the stock market reactions around the commission’s final decision day convey information about the outcome of the bargaining process between the authority and the merging parties. We first classify mergers according to their effects on competition and then we develop hypotheses on the effects that remedies are supposed to achieve depending on the merger’s competitive outcome. We isolate several stylized facts. First, we find that remedies were not always appropriately imposed. Second, the market seems to be able to predict remedies’ effectiveness when applied in phase I. Third, the market also seems able to produce a good prior to phase II’s clearances and prohibitions, but not to remedies. This can be due either to a measurement problem or related to the increased merging firms’ bargaining power during the second phase of the merger review. <br> <br> <i>ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Auflagen im Fusionskontrollverfahren der EU: Eine erste empirische Bewertung) <br> Fusionen, die den Wettbewerb auf einem Markt vermindern oder verhindern, werden von Antitrustbehörden angefochten. Anstatt wettbewerbswidrige Zusammenschlüsse direkt zu blockieren, können die Behörden beschließen, mit den Parteien zu verhandeln und die Fusion mit Auflagen zu genehmigen, durch die der Wettbewerb in den entsprechenden Märkten wieder hergestellt oder aufrechterhalten wird. Wir analysieren eine Stichprobe von 167 Fusionen, die von der Europäischen Kommission zwischen 1990 und 2002 überprüft worden sind. Wir verwenden eine "event study" - Methodologie, um sowohl die möglichen wettbewerbswidrigen Wirkungen von Fusionen als auch die Wirkung der von der Behörde beschlossenen Auflagen zu untersuchen. Die Reaktion der Aktienpreise der beteiligten Unternehmen - sowohl der fusionierenden als auch der Wettbewerber - um den Tag der Fusionsankündigung liefert Informationen für die erste Frage, während die Reaktionen von Aktienpreisen um den Tag der EU-Kommissionsentscheidung Informationen über das Ergebnis der geheimen Verhandlungen zwischen der Behörde und den involvierten Parteien geben. Zuerst klassifizieren wir Fusionen entsprechend ihrer Effekte auf den Wettbewerb und dann entwickeln wir Hypothesen auf die Wirkung, welche die Auflagen in Abhängigkeit von den Wettbewerbseffekten der Fusion erzielen soll. Unsere Analyse ergibt einige stilisierte Fakten. Zuerst finden wir, dass die Auflagen von der EU-Kommission nicht immer adäquat angewandt wurden. Auflagen scheinen jedoch eine Wirkung auf die fusionierenden Unternehmen zu haben. Sie sind besonders effektiv, wenn sie bereits in Phase I des Fusionskontrollverfahrens eingesetzt werden. Jedoch scheint der Markt unfähig zu sein, eine gute Vorhersage für die Wirkung von Auflagen in Phase II zu produzieren. Dieses Ergebnis kann entweder auf einem Meßproblem beruhen oder es wird durch eine erhöhte Verhandlungsstärke der fusionierenden Unternehmen während der zweiten Phase der Fusionskontrolle verursacht.</i>
    Keywords: Merger Control, Remedies, European Commission, Event Studies.
    JEL: L4 K21 C12 C13
    Date: 2005–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2005-16&r=ind
  2. By: Ornaghi, Carmine
    Abstract: This paper takes a new look at the effects of mergers on innovation by analysing the relationship between ex-ante technological (and product) relatedness of acquirers and targets and post-merger performances. The analysis is conducted using data on consolidations in the pharmaceutical industry for the period 1988-2004. Empirical results show that merger deals are more likely to be signed between firms with related technologies and drug portfolio. I .find that merged companies have on average, worst performances than the group of non-merging firms and that, contrary to what may be the common wisdom, higher levels of technological relatedness are associated with poorer performances. Finally, consolidations between large pharmaceutical companies seem to have a detrimental impact on the incentives of competitors to undertake research in those therapeutic areas where both acquirer and target are active players.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stn:sotoec:0605&r=ind
  3. By: Charlie Karlsson; Martin Andersson
    Abstract: At the same time as we can observe strong tendencies of a globalisation of R&D, we also can observe a strong spatial clustering of R&D and related innovative activities. The standard explanation in the literature of the clustering of innovative activities is that such clusters offer external knowledge economies to innovative companies, since they are dependent upon knowledge flows and that knowledge flows are spatially bounded. Obviously, location is crucial in understanding knowledge flows and knowledge production, since knowledge sources have been found to be geographically concentrated. There are two major performers of R&D: industry and universities. It seems rather straight-forward to assume that industrial R&D might be attracted to locate near research universities doing R&D in fields relevant to industry. Already as far back as in the 1960s a number of case studies confirmed the important roles played by Stanford University and MIT for commercial innovation and entrepreneurship. During the years a large number of formal studies have presented evidences of a positive impact of university R&D on firm performance. The question is, does it also work the other way around? Does industrial R&D function as an attractor for university R&D? We may actually think of several reasons why university R&D may grow close to industry R&D. First of all political decision-makers may decide to start or expand university R&D at locations where industry already is doing R&D. Secondly, we can imagine that industry doing R&D in a region might use part of their R&D funds to finance university R&D. Thirdly, universities in regions with industrial R&D might find it easier to attract R&D funds from national and international sources due to co-operation with industry. Obviously, not all types of university R&D attract industrial R&D. There are reasons to believe that, in particular, university R&D in natural, technical and medical sciences attracts industrial R&D but that there are also strong reasons to believe that there are variations between different sectors of industry regarding how dependent their R&D is to be located close to university R&D. The above implies that there are behavioural relationships between industrial R&D and university R&D and vice versa. However, the litrature contains few studies dealing with this problem. Most studies have concentrated on the one-directional effect from university R&D to industrial R&D and the outputs of industrial R&D in most cases measured in terms of the number of patents and neglected the possible mutual interaction. However, if there is a mutual interaction between university and industry R&D, and if there are knowledge externalities involved, then we can develop a dynamic explanation to the clustering of innovative activities based on positive feedback loops. This would imply strong tendencies to path dependency and that policy initiatives to transfer non-innovative regions to innovative regions would have small chances to succeed. The fact that knowledge flows seem to be spatially bounded implies that proximity matters. Most contributions analysing spatial knowledge flows have used very crude measures of proximity. However, there are some authors that have argued that proximity could be measured using accessibility measures. Accessibility measures can be used to model interaction opportunities at different spatial scales: local, intra-regional and inter-regional. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the locational relationship between industry R&D and university R&D in Sweden using a simultaneous equation approach and to analyse existing differences between different science areas and different industry sectors.
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa05p305&r=ind
  4. By: Oliver Gürtler (Department of Economics, BWL II, University of Bonn, Adenauer-allee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany. Tel.:+49-228-739214, Fax:+49-228-739210 E-mail:oliver.guertler@uni-bonn.de); Christian Grund (Department of Economics and Business RWTH Aachen University Templergraben 59 D-52056 Aachen Germany Tel.:+49-241-8096381 christian.grund@wiwi.rwth-aachen.de)
    Abstract: In economic approaches it is often argued that reputation considerations influence the behavior of individuals or firms and that reputation influences the outcome of markets. Empirical evidence is rare though. In this contribution we argue that a positive reputation of sellers should have an effect on selling prices. Analyzing auctions of popular DVDs at eBay we, indeed, find support for this hypothesis. Secondary, we unmask the myth that it is promising for eBay sellers to let their auction end at the evening, when many potential buyers may be online.
    Keywords: Reputation, eBay feedback system, auction
    JEL: D44 D82 K12 L81
    Date: 2006–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:114&r=ind
  5. By: Chad Syverson
    Abstract: In markets where spatial competition is important, many models predict that average prices are lower in denser markets (i.e., those with more producers per unit area). Homogeneous-producer models attribute this effect solely to lower optimal markups. However, when producers instead differ in their production costs, a second mechanism also acts to lower equilibrium prices: competition-driven selection on costs. Consumers’ greater substitution possibilities in denser markets make it more difficult for high-cost firms to profitably operate, truncating the equilibrium cost (and price) distributions from above. This selection process can be empirically distinguished from the homogenous-producer case because it implies that not only do average prices fall as density rises, but that upper-bound prices and price dispersion should also decline as well. I find empirical support for this process using a rich set of price data from U.S. ready-mixed concrete plants. Features of the industry offer an arguably exogenous source of producer density variation with which to identify these effects. I also show that the findings do not simply result from lower factor prices in dense markets, but rather because dense-market producers are low-cost because they are more efficient.
    Date: 2004–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:04-16&r=ind
  6. By: Javier Miranda; Shawn Klimek; Ron Jarmin
    Abstract: The development of longitudinal micro datasets in recent years has helped economists develop a number of stylized facts about producer dynamics. However, most of the widely cited studies use only manufacturing data. This paper uses the newly constructed Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) to examine producer dynamics in the U.S. the retail sector. The LBD is constructed by linking twenty-six years (1975-2000) of the U.S. Census Bureau's Business Register at the establishment level. The result is a dataset on the universe of employer establishments in the U.S. on an annual basis with detailed geographic, industry, firm ownership, and employment information. We use the LBD to examine patterns of firm entry and exit in the U.S. retail sector. We find that many of the patterns observed by Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) are also observed within the retail sector, but interesting and important differences do exist.
    Keywords: retail sector, entry-exit, longitudinal establishment data
    JEL: L11
    Date: 2004–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:04-17&r=ind
  7. By: Stephen Redding; Andrew Bernard; Peter Schott
    Abstract: This paper develops a model of endogenous product selection within industries by firms. The model is motivated by new evidence we present on the prevalence and importance of product changing activity by U.S. manufacturers. Three-fifths of continuing firms alter their product mix within an industry every five years, and added and dropped products account for a substantial portion of firm output. In the model, firms make decisions about both industry entry and product choice. Product choice is shaped by the interaction of heterogeneous firm characteristics and diverse product attributes. Changes in market conditions within an industry result in simultaneous adjustment along a number of margins, including both entry/exit and product choice.
    Keywords: Product selection, heterogeneous firms, product differentiation, sunk entry costs
    JEL: L11 D21 L60
    Date: 2005–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:05-22&r=ind
  8. By: Stephane Verani (Department of Economics, The University of Western Australia)
    Abstract: Open source software is released under an open source licence giving individuals the right to use, modify, and redistribute freely the programs. This paper proposes a model of differentiated duopoly in which firms invest in the development of proprietary or open source software. The main findings are: (i) firms invest more when the products are substitutes; (ii) for substitute products, firms' investment in software development is greatest when the software is open source; (iii) for close to perfect complements, firms' investment in software development is greatest when the software is proprietary; and (iv) for substitute products, investment in open source software yields higher profits than investment in proprietary software.
    Keywords: Open Source Software, Differentiated Duopoly, Two-Stage Game, Bertrand Competition
    JEL: C72 D21 D43 L11 L13
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uwa:wpaper:06-05&r=ind

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