nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2006‒05‒13
six papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. Deregulation as a Means to Increase Competition and Productivity By Laura Valkonen
  2. Competitive Mixed Bundling and Consumer Surplus By John Thanassoulis
  3. Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Competition By Ralph-C Bayer
  4. The Impact of Entry and Competition by Open Source Software on Innovation By Bitzer, Jürgen; Schröder, Philipp J.H.
  5. The Private Value of Software Patents By Bronwyn H. Hall; Megan MacGarvie
  6. Product Differentiation or Spatial Monopoly? The Market Areas of Austrian Universities in Business Education By Gunther Maier

  1. By: Laura Valkonen
    Keywords: deregulation, competition, productivity, entry
    JEL: L51 D21 O30 K23 L80
    Date: 2006–05–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:dpaper:1014&r=ind
  2. By: John Thanassoulis
    Abstract: Mixed bundling in imperfectly competitive industries causes some prices to rise and others to fall. This paper studies under what conditions mixed bundling works for or against the consumer interest. We find that if buyers incur firm specific costs or have shop specific tastes then competitive mixed bundling lowers consumer surplus overall and raises profits - the same is true of competitive volume discounts. Competition without these discounts causes all prices to be kept low as larger customers are targeted; with discounts the prices for heavy users drop, but more is extracted from small users. The consumer surplus result is reversed if the differentiation between components as opposed to firms is key.
    Keywords: Bundling, Loyalty Rebates, Volume Discounts, Competitive Price Discrimination
    JEL: L11 L41
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:263&r=ind
  3. By: Ralph-C Bayer (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)
    Abstract: In this study we investigate the impact of competition on markets for non-durable goods where intertemporal price discrimination is possible. We develop a simple model of different potential scenarios for intertemporal price discrimination and implement it in a laboratory experiment. We compare the outcomes in monopolies and duopolies. Surprisingly, we find that competition does not necessarily prevent intertemporal price discrimination, as our model predicts. However, competition generally reduces sales prices, but by far less than theory predicts. As expected, competition increases efficiency.
    Keywords: Price Discrimination, Oligopoly, Market Experiments.
    JEL: L12 L13 C91
    Date: 2006–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adl:wpaper:2006-06&r=ind
  4. By: Bitzer, Jürgen (Free University, Berlin); Schröder, Philipp J.H. (Department of Organisation and Management, Aarhus School of Business)
    Abstract: No abstract
    Keywords: No keywords;
    Date: 2005–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhb:aardom:2005_012&r=ind
  5. By: Bronwyn H. Hall; Megan MacGarvie
    Abstract: We investigate the value creation or destruction associated with the introduction of software patents in the United States in two ways. The first looks at the cumulative abnormal returns to ICT firms around the time of important court decisions impacting software patents, and the second analyzes the relationship between firms' stock market value, the sector in which they operate, and their holdings of software patents cross-sectionally. We find that the extension of patentability to software was initially negative for software firms, especially for those producing application software or services. We also find that software patents are positively and significantly associated with Tobin's Q, and that the market's valuation of software patents increased following changes in the USPTO's treatment of software patents in 1995.
    JEL: O34 L63 L86
    Date: 2006–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12195&r=ind
  6. By: Gunther Maier
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwsre:sre-disc-2006_03&r=ind

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