New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2006‒03‒25
two papers chosen by



  1. A Note on Expanding Networks and Monopoly Pricing By Jean J., GABSZEWICZ; Filomena, GARCIA
  2. Incentives to innovate in oligopolies By Paul, BELLEFLAMME; Cecilia, VERGARI

  1. By: Jean J., GABSZEWICZ (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)); Filomena, GARCIA
    Abstract: We obtain explicitly the optimal path of prices for a monopolist operating in a network industry during a finite number of periods. We describe this optimal path as a function of network intensity and horizon length and show that the prices are increasing in time and that, for very low network intensity, or very high horizon length, the monopolist will offer the good at zero price in the initial period.
    Date: 2005–12–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005063&r=ind
  2. By: Paul, BELLEFLAMME; Cecilia, VERGARI (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))
    Abstract: In the spirit of Arrow (1962), we examine, in an oligopoly model with horizontally differentiated products, how much a firm is willing to pay for a process innovation that it would be the only one to use. We show that different measures of competition (number of firms, degree of product differentiation, Cournot vs Bertrand) affect incentives to innovate in non-monotoic, different, and potentially ways.
    Keywords: innovation; profit incentive; oligopoly; product differentiation
    JEL: L13 O31
    Date: 2006–02–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006008&r=ind

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