New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2005‒09‒02
two papers chosen by
  1. Tying and entry deterrence in vertically differentiated markets By Eugen Kovac
  2. Perfectly Competitive Innovation By Michele Boldrin; David K Levine
  1. By: Eugen Kovac
    Abstract: This paper analyzes tying and bundling as an entry deterrence tool. It shows that a multi-product firm can defend its monopoly position in one market via tying even when it does not have market power in another market. This is shown on a model with two complementary goods, each of which is vertically differentiated and in which consumers’ preferences for the goods are positively correlated. Some possible ways of defending against entry deterrence, and implications for competition policy, are discussed.
    Keywords: Industrial organization, vertical differentiation, anti-trust policy, entry deterrence, foreclosure, tying, bundling.
    JEL: L11 L12 L13 L41
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp266&r=ind
  2. By: Michele Boldrin; David K Levine
    Date: 2005–08–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000954&r=ind
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