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on Industrial Organization |
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Issue of 2005‒07‒25
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Felix Höffler (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany) |
| Abstract: | Ramsey-Boiteux prices and monopoly prices are frequently regarded as being similar. This might suggest that, in particular in network industries with large fixed costs, sometimes monopoly pricing is close to the Ramsey-Boiteux second best and welfare superior to imperfectly regulated prices. This paper tries to specify what is meant by "being similar", and it analyzes the welfare implications that can be drawn from comparing both sets of prices. Interdependence of demand and the impact of competition are discussed. We reinforce the view that monopoly prices are usually not "similar", and even if they are, this implies no positive welfare judgments on monopoly pricing. |
| Keywords: | Ramsey Pricing, Regulation, Access Pricing, Termination |
| JEL: | L33 L50 L94 |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_7&r=ind |
| By: | Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (Faculty of Economics and Business, Witten/Herdecke University) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this article is to provide an alternative antitrust model to the mainstream model that is used in competition policy. I call it the Institutional-Evolutionary Antitrust Model. In order to construct an antitrust model one needs both empirical knowledge and considerations of how to adequately deal with norms. The analysis of competition as an evolutionary process that unfolds within legal rules provides the empirical foundation for the model. The development of the normative dimension involves the elaboration of a comparative approach. Building on those foundations the main features of the Institutional-Evolutionary Model are sketched out and it is shown that its use leads to systematically different outcomes and conclusions than the dominant antitrust ideals. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust, Competition, Competition Policy, Evolutionary Process, Institutions |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_1a&r=ind |
| By: | Haufler, Andreas; Nielsen, Soren Bo |
| Abstract: | We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we derive the properties of the endogenous merger equilibrium. |
| JEL: | H77 F13 L41 |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:666&r=ind |