nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2005‒07‒11
three papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. A Closer Look at the Comparative Statics in Competitive Markets By José Ramón Ruiz-Tamarit; Manuel Sánchez-Moreno
  2. Non Cooperatives Stackelberg Networks By Juan M.C. Larrosa
  3. Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence By Fonseca,Miguel A.; Mueller,Wieland; Normann,Hans-Theo

  1. By: José Ramón Ruiz-Tamarit; Manuel Sánchez-Moreno
    Abstract: In this paper we revisit the dual approach to comparative statics in competitive markets, allowing for the essential results to arise from a comprehensive and unified framework. We study, for both the long-run and the short-run, the response of all the endogenous variables to price factor changes in a way that captures the outputprice effects arising from market-firm interactions. We show that it is necessary a richer characterization of the nature of factors with respect to output, connected with marginal cost and output demand elasticities, for completely determining such responses.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2005-13&r=ind
  2. By: Juan M.C. Larrosa (CONICET-Universidad Nacional del Sur)
    Abstract: Noncooperative network-formation games in oligopolies analyze optimal connection structures that emerge when linking represent the appropriation of cost-reducing one-way externalities. These models reflect situations where one firm access to another firm’s (public or private) information and this last cannot refuse it. What would happen if decisions are sequential? A model of exogenous Stackelberg leadership is developed and first-mover advantages are observed and commented.
    Keywords: non cooperative games, network formation strategies, Stackelberg equilibrium.
    JEL: C70 D43 L13
    Date: 2005–07–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0507003&r=ind
  3. By: Fonseca,Miguel A.; Mueller,Wieland; Normann,Hans-Theo (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ. Beh., 1990). Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in period one but we find that a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period.
    JEL: C72 C92 D43
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200577&r=ind

This nep-ind issue is ©2005 by Kwang Soo Cheong. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.