nep-ind New Economics Papers
on Industrial Organization
Issue of 2005‒04‒09
three papers chosen by
Kwang Soo Cheong
Johns Hopkins University

  1. Anti-Limit Pricing By Byoung Heon Jun; In-Uck Park
  2. Supermarkets as a Natural Oligopoly By Ellickson, Paul
  3. The open-loop linear quadratic differential game revisited By Engwerda,Jacob

  1. By: Byoung Heon Jun; In-Uck Park
    Date: 2005–03–28
  2. By: Ellickson, Paul
    Abstract: This paper uses a model of endogenous sunk cost (ESC) competition to explain the industrial structure of the supermarket industry, where a few powerful chains provide high quality products at low prices. The predictions of this model accord well with the features of the supermarket industry documented here. Using a novel dataset of store level observations, I demonstrate that 1) the same number of high quality firms enter markets of varying sizes and compete side by side for the same consumers and 2) quality increases with the size of the market. In addition to documenting a local structure of competition consistent with the ESC framework, I demonstrate that the choice of quality by rival firms behaves as a strategic complement. This key finding, which is consistent with an ESC model of quality enhancing sunk outlays, eliminates several alternative explanations of concentration in the supermarket industry, including most standard models of cost-reducing investment and product proliferation. These results suggest that the competitive mechanisms sustaining high levels of concentration in the supermarket industry are inherently rivalrous and unlikely to lead to the emergence of a single dominant firm.
    Keywords: endogenous sunk costs, vertical product differentiation, oligopoly, retail, supermarkets, market concentration, dartboard, complementarity
    JEL: L13 L22 L81
    Date: 2005
  3. By: Engwerda,Jacob (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In this note we reconsider the indefinite open-loop Nash linear quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon. In particular we derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which the game will have a unique equilibrium.
    JEL: C61 C72 C73
    Date: 2005

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