By: |
Toni Ahnert;
Kristin Forbes;
Christian Friedrich;
Dennis Reinhardt |
Abstract: |
Can macroprudential foreign exchange (FX) regulations on banks reduce the
financial and macroeconomic vulnerabilities created by borrowing in foreign
currency? To evaluate the effectiveness and unintended consequences of
macroprudential FX regulations, we develop a parsimonious model of bank and
market lending in domestic and foreign currency and derive four predictions.
We confirm these predictions using a rich data set of macroprudential FX
regulations. These empirical tests show that FX regulations (1) are effective
in terms of reducing borrowing in foreign currency by banks; (2) have the
unintended consequence of simultaneously causing firms to increase FX debt
issuance; (3) reduce the sensitivity of banks to exchange rate movements; but
(4) are less effective at reducing the sensitivity of corporates and the
broader financial market to exchange rate movements. As a result, FX
regulations on banks appear to be successful in mitigating the vulnerability
of banks to exchange rate movements and the global financial cycle, but
partially shift the snowbank of FX vulnerability to other sectors. |
Keywords: |
Financial system regulation and policies, Exchange rates, Financial institutions, International financial markets |
JEL: |
F32 F34 G15 G21 G28 |
Date: |
2018 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:18-55&r=ifn |