|
on International Finance |
By: | Ahnert, Toni (Bank of Canada); Forbes, Kristin (MIT-Sloan School, NBER and CEPR); Friedrich, Christian (Bank of Canada); Reinhardt, Dennis (Bank of England) |
Abstract: | Can macroprudential foreign exchange (FX) regulations on banks reduce the financial and macroeconomic vulnerabilities created by borrowing in foreign currency? To evaluate the effectiveness and unintended consequences of macroprudential FX regulations, we develop a parsimonious model of bank and market lending in domestic and foreign currency and derive four predictions. We confirm these predictions using a rich dataset of macroprudential FX regulations. These empirical tests show that FX regulations: (1) are effective in terms of reducing borrowing in foreign currency by banks; (2) have the unintended consequence of simultaneously causing firms to increase FX debt issuance; (3) reduce the sensitivity of banks to exchange rate movements, but (4) are less effective at reducing the sensitivity of corporates and the broader financial market to exchange rate movements. As a result, FX regulations on banks appear to be successful in mitigating the vulnerability of banks to exchange rate movements and the global financial cycle, but partially shift the snowbank of FX vulnerability to other sectors. |
Keywords: | Macroprudential policies; FX regulations; banking flows; international debt issuance |
JEL: | F32 F34 G15 G21 G28 |
Date: | 2018–10–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:0758&r=ifn |
By: | Toni Ahnert; Kristin Forbes; Christian Friedrich; Dennis Reinhardt |
Abstract: | Can macroprudential foreign exchange (FX) regulations on banks reduce the financial and macroeconomic vulnerabilities created by borrowing in foreign currency? To evaluate the effectiveness and unintended consequences of macroprudential FX regulations, we develop a parsimonious model of bank and market lending in domestic and foreign currency and derive four predictions. We confirm these predictions using a rich dataset of macroprudential FX regulations. These empirical tests show that FX regulations: (1) are effective in terms of reducing borrowing in foreign currency by banks; (2) have the unintended consequence of simultaneously causing firms to increase FX debt issuance; (3) reduce the sensitivity of banks to exchange rate movements, but (4) are less effective at reducing the sensitivity of corporates and the broader financial market to exchange rate movements. As a result, FX regulations on banks appear to be successful in mitigating the vulnerability of banks to exchange rate movements and the global financial cycle, but partially shift the snowbank of FX vulnerability to other sectors. |
JEL: | F32 F34 G15 G21 G28 |
Date: | 2018–09 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25083&r=ifn |
By: | Atsushi Inoue; Barbara Rossi |
Abstract: | What are the effects of monetary policy on exchange rates? And have unconventional monetary policies changed the way monetary policy is transmitted to international financial markets? According to conventional wisdom, expansionary monetary policy shocks in a country lead to that country's currency depreciation. We revisit the conventional wisdom during both conventional and unconventional monetary policy periods in the US by using a novel identification procedure that defines monetary policy shocks as changes in the whole yield curve due to unanticipated monetary policy moves and allows monetary policy shocks to differ depending on how they affect agents' expectations about the future path of interest rates as well as their perceived effects on the riskiness/uncertainty in the economy. Our empirical results show that: (i) a monetary policy easing leads to a depreciation of the country's spot nominal exchange rate in both conventional and unconventional periods; (ii) however, there is substantial heterogeneity in monetary policy shocks over time and their effects depend on the way they affect agents' expectations; (iii) we find favorable evidence to Dornbusch's (1976) overshooting hypothesis. |
JEL: | C22 C53 F31 F37 |
Date: | 2018–09 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25021&r=ifn |