nep-ict New Economics Papers
on Information and Communication Technologies
Issue of 2018‒02‒19
six papers chosen by
Walter Frisch
Universität Wien

  1. ICT, Conflicts in Financial Intermediation and Financial Access: Evidence of Synergy and Threshold Effects By Asongu, Simplice; Acha-Anyi, Paul
  2. Mobile Phone Innovation and Technology-driven Exports in Sub-Saharan Africa By Asongu, Simplice
  3. Hunting the Big Five: Twenty-first Century Antitrust in Historical Perspective By Richard N. Langlois
  4. Incentivizing Efficiency in Local Public Good Games and Applications to the Quantification of Personal Data in Networks By Michela Chessa; Patrick Loiseau
  5. Mobile applications and access to private data: The supply side of the Android ecosystem By Kesler, Reinhold; Kummer, Michael E.; Schulte, Patrick
  6. Digital Identity: the current state of affairs By Alvaro Martin; Ana Isabel Segovia

  1. By: Asongu, Simplice; Acha-Anyi, Paul
    Abstract: In this study we investigate the role of information and communication technology (ICT) in conflicts of financial intermediation for financial access. The empirical evidence is based on contemporary (or current values) and non-contemporary (or lagged by a year) quantile regressions in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. The main findings are: First, the net effect of ICT in formalization for financial activity in the banking system is consistently beneficial with positive thresholds. The fact that corresponding, unconditional and conditional effects are persistently positive is evidence of synergy or complementary effects. Second, the net effect of ICT in financial informalization for financial activity in the financial system is negative with a consistent negative threshold. Hence, the positive (negative) complementarity of ICT and financial formalization (informalization) is an increasing (decreasing) function of financial activity. Policy measures on how to leverage the synergy or complementarity between ICT and financial formalization in order to enhance financial access are discussed.
    Keywords: Allocation efficiency; financial sector development; ICT
    JEL: G20 G29 L96 O40 O55
    Date: 2017–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:84047&r=ict
  2. By: Asongu, Simplice
    Abstract: The study investigates how education, scientific output and the internet complement mobile phone penetration to affect technology commodity exports in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2000-2012. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments. The following main findings are established. First, the internet complements the mobile phone to boost technology goods exports. Second, the internet also complements the mobile phone to boost technology service exports. Third, positive marginal effects are apparent in the roles of educational quality and scientific output on technology goods exports and technology service exports respectively while negative marginal impacts are apparent in the roles of scientific output and educational quality on technology goods exports and technology service exports respectively. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.
    Keywords: Technology exports; Knowledge Economy; Development; Africa
    JEL: L59 L98 O10 O38 O55
    Date: 2017–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:84040&r=ict
  3. By: Richard N. Langlois (University of Connecticut)
    Abstract: Voices along the whole of the political spectrum are calling for heightened scrutiny of American information-technology companies, especially the Big Five of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. One of the principal themes of this uprising is that present-day antitrust policy, forged in the rusty era of steel, oil, and cars, is now obsolete. We are in the age of information, which ipso facto calls for new rules. A second animating theme is that the antitrust thinking of the Chicago School, which came to prominence in the last quarter of the last century, must be completely overthrown. Proponents of this new antitrust ground their arguments by returning to the historical roots of American antitrust policy. My contention, however, is that the new antitrust gets this history wrong. It both misconceives the nature of the competitive process and deliberately refuses to confront the political economy of antitrust. In so doing, it adopts some of the worst traits of the Chicago School it criticizes while manifesting few of that school’s many virtues.
    Keywords: antitrust, platforms, telecommunications, broadcasting, net neutrality
    JEL: L10 L40 L50 L96 N72 N82
    Date: 2018–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2018-01&r=ict
  4. By: Michela Chessa (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS); Patrick Loiseau (Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Inria, Grenoble INP, LIG; Max Planck Institute for Software Systems (MPI-SWS))
    Abstract: A well established principle arms that the privacy of individuals is respected whenever they are entitled to control the dissemination of their personal data and they are fairly compensated. From this perspective, quantifying the value of personal data is a crucial task in the Internet economics. This task is dicult, however, as the privacy attitude of the users is often characterized by a contradictory behavior, known as the privacy paradox, in which they declare to be sensitive to privacy losses but also often release large amounts of data to enjoy free services. In this paper, we model this trade-off as a local public good game and propose some quantifications of the users' personal data depending on their position in the social network, based on enhancing an efficient solution of the local public good model. In a first part, we present some non-cooperative approaches, based on an internalization of the local externalities. In a second part, we extend the model to a cooperative game and we apply some well-known solutions from cooperative game theory to suggest fair ways to compensate the users and to perform a network analysis.
    Keywords: Personal Data, Social Network, Local Public Good Game, Cooperative Game Theory, Core, Shapley value
    JEL: C71 C72 D62 D85 H41
    Date: 2018–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2018-02&r=ict
  5. By: Kesler, Reinhold; Kummer, Michael E.; Schulte, Patrick
    Abstract: We analyze the data collection strategies of 65,000 developers in the market for mobile applications and track 300,000 applications over four years. Many apps belong to developers with multiple apps. This fact generates variation in the privacy behaviors of the same developer for our analysis. We uncover three stylized facts: First, developers "learn" to use increasingly intrusive data strategies as they become more experienced. Second, intrusive data collection is most likely in apps that target the 13+, and 16+ age category, which raises concerns for the protection of young app consumers. Third, even within developers, critical and atypical permissions predict problematic usage of private user data most successfully. Our findings inform both regulators and scientists who wish to model supply in the market for mobile apps.
    Keywords: Mobile Applications,Developers,Learning,Data Collection,Privacy
    JEL: O3 L1 D62 D85 D29
    Date: 2017
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:17075&r=ict
  6. By: Alvaro Martin; Ana Isabel Segovia
    Abstract: In a world where the rise in the use of the Internet is increasing exponentially, the ability to prove your identity is crucial for the economic, financial and social development. Individuals and companies need identity solutions valid across different services, markets, standards and technologies.
    Keywords: Working Paper , Digital economy , Banks , Global
    JEL: O33 D18
    Date: 2018–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bbv:wpaper:1801&r=ict

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