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on Information and Communication Technologies |
| By: | Klein, Thilo |
| Abstract: | I examine the role of intermediaries on the world's largest peer-to-peer online lending platform. This marketplace as well as other recently opened lending websites allow people to auction microcredit over the internet and are in line with the disintermediation in financial transactions through the power of enabling technologies. On the online market, the screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. I find that, despite superior private information, these financial intermediaries perform worse than the average lender with respect to borrower selection. I attribute this to deliberately sending wrong signals. Bivariate probit estimates of the effect of group membership on loan default indicate positive self selection into group loans. That is borrowers with worse observed and unobserved characteristics select into this contract form. I provide evidence that this is due to a missleading group reputation system that is driven by a short term incentive design, which was introduced by the platform to expand the market and has been discontinued. I further find that, after controlling for this group growth driven selection effect, group affliation per se significantly reduces the probability of loan default. |
| Keywords: | peer-to-peer,finance,market design,matching,auctions |
| JEL: | D02 D82 G21 O16 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:17073&r=ict |
| By: | Christian Longhi (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur) |
| Abstract: | The paper aims to identify the forms and dynamics of the organizational structures of high-tech clusters overtime. Since Markusen (1996), it is well acknowledged that diversity is an emergent property of clusters, but the interactions between local and non-local actors of the clusters are difficult to trace because of lack of relevant data. The cluster policies developed to fix the network failures between the heterogeneous actors – large and small firms, universities, research institutes – of the current processes of innovation provide new information opportunities. In France, Competitiveness Clusters work as a “factories of project”; the information they produce on collective R&D projects applying for subsidies provides a proxy of local and non-local relations of the clusters. Social network analysis is used to infer the organizational structure of the collective learning networks and trace their dynamics. The case studies considered are Sophia-Antipolis and Rousset, two high tech clusters which belong to the same Competitiveness Cluster, ‘Secure Communicating Solutions’ in the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur Region. The paper highlights the decoupling of the two clusters overtime as a consequence of distinctive organizational structures. The diversity of the dynamics of the collective learning networks which emerges through the analysis of the collective R&D projects in the two high tech clusters shows that knowledge creation and innovation can follow different paths and questions the public policies implemented. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, Collective Learning Networks, Competitiveness Cluster, Social Network Analysis, Rousset,Cluster Policy, Sophia Antipolis |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01675684&r=ict |
| By: | Hunold, Matthias; Kesler, Reinhold; Laitenberger, Ulrich; Schlütter, Frank |
| Abstract: | We analyze the best price clauses (BPCs) of online travel agents (OTAs) using meta-search price data of nearly 30,000 hotels in different countries. We find that BPCs influence the pricing and availability of hotel rooms across online sales channels. In particular, hotels publish their offers more often at Booking.com when it does not use the narrow BPC, and also tend to promote the direct online channel more actively. Moreover, the abolition of Booking.com's narrow BPC is associated with the direct channel of chain hotels having the strictly lowest price more often. |
| Keywords: | best price clauses,hotel booking,MFN,OTA,vertical restraints |
| JEL: | D40 L42 L81 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:278&r=ict |
| By: | Ottorino Chillemi (University of Padova); Stefano Galavotti (University of Padova); Benefetto Gui (Unviersity of Padova) |
| Abstract: | We study a contractual design problem between a seller and a buyer where some information correlated with the buyer's valuation is publicly observed ex-post and the allocation, but not payments, can be made contingent on it. Our analysis shows that, to maximize her profit, the seller should offer one contract in which the good is transferred to the buyer only if the ex-post signal turns out to be bad; this generates inefficient rationing: some buyers with low valuation are assigned the good more often than others with higher valuation. We show that, in contrast with previous results, the optimal contract may decrease social welfare relative to the case in which no signal is available (or it is not used). We apply our model to interpret two real-world situations: internet plans with bandwidth caps for mobile phones and promotion schemes in organizations with exogenously fixed wages. |
| Keywords: | rationing, ex-post information, mechanism design. |
| JEL: | D82 D86 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0214&r=ict |