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on Information and Communication Technologies |
| By: | Thomas A. Gresik; Kai A. Konrad |
| Abstract: | Tax havens differ in the specific tax planning arrangements multinational firms can use to reduce their tax liabilities. Given the complexity and cost associated with identifying the most effective tax haven to use, an accounting firm can act as an intermediary between tax havens and multinational corporations. We analyze a model with horizontally differentiated multinationals and tax havens to study the role accounting firm intermediation has on tax haven prices, multinational tax planning choices, accounting firm profits, and tax revenues. In equilibrium, uniform accounting firm fees generate higher accounting firm profit, less tax avoidance, and higher tax revenues than either full price discrimination or haven-specific fees. |
| Keywords: | tax haven, accounting firm, horizontal differentiation, double marginalization, fee-setting rules |
| JEL: | M41 H26 H73 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6774&r=ict |
| By: | Aslanidis, Nektarios; Herranz-Loncán, Alfonso; Nogues-Marco, Pilar |
| Abstract: | This article analyses the integration of the Spanish money market in the 19th century. We use a Band-TAR model of prices in Madrid of bills of exchange on 9 Spanish cities to measure convergence and efficiency in the market between 1825 and 1875. While price gaps between cities were significantly reduced during the period, no progress took place in efficiency. We suggest that increasing convergence was associated to the reduction in transaction costs, which started before the railways through improvements in roads and postal services. By contrast, increases in efficiency were prevented by a very restrictive regulation of arbitrage. |
| Keywords: | Bills of Exchange; Financial Development; Legal Systems; Money Market Convergence; Money Market Efficiency; Money Market Integration; Real Bills Doctrine; Spanish National Currency; Specie-Point Mechanism; transaction costs |
| JEL: | E02 E42 F02 F15 F31 F36 K00 L10 N13 N73 R40 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12453&r=ict |
| By: | Cecchetti, Stephen G; Schoenholtz, Kermit |
| Abstract: | The financial crisis of 2007-09 revealed many deficiencies in the financial system. In response, authorities have implemented a wide range of regulatory reforms. We survey the reforms and offer our views on where there could be further improvements. While capital requirements and levels are far higher, they are not high enough. New liquidity requirements are useful, but need simplification. Shifting derivatives transactions to central counterparties has improved resilience, but also created indispensable financial market utilities that lack credible resolution and recovery regimes. And systemic (macroprudential) regulation lacks the metrics, policy tools, governance structure, and international cooperation needed to be effective. |
| Keywords: | Capital requirements; Central clearing; financial regulation; liquidity requirements; macro-financial linkages; macroprudential policy; Prudential regulation; recovery and resolution planing |
| JEL: | E58 G01 G18 G28 G38 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12465&r=ict |