| By: |
Briglauer, Wolfgang;
Cambini, Carlo;
Grajek, Michał |
| Abstract: |
In this paper, we study how the coexistence of access regulations for legacy
(copper) and fiber networks shapes the incentives to invest in network
infrastructure. To this end, we develop a theoretical model explaining
investment incentives by incumbent telecom operators and heterogeneous
entrants and test its main predictions using panel data from 27 EU member
states over the last decade. Our theoretical model extends the existing
literature by, among other things, allowing for heterogeneous entrants in
internet access markets, as we consider both other telecom and cable TV
operators as entrants. In the empirical part, we use a novel data set
including information on physical fiber network investments, legacy network
access regulation and recently imposed fiber access regulations. Our main
finding is that more stringent access regulations for both the legacy and the
fiber networks have, in line with our theoretical model, an asymmetric effect
on incumbent telecom and cable TV operators; both harm investments by the
former, but do not affect the latter. |
| Keywords: |
Internet access market,Access regulation,Investment,Infrastructure,Next Generation Networks,Broadband,Telecoms,Cable operators and Europe |
| JEL: |
L96 L51 |
| Date: |
2017 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse17:169451&r=ict |