nep-ict New Economics Papers
on Information and Communication Technologies
Issue of 2016‒04‒16
three papers chosen by
Walter Frisch
Universität Wien

  1. Does the Nature of Piracy and Competition Matter? By Yuanzhu Lu; Sougata Poddar
  2. Localization of Collaborations in Knowledge Creation By Inoue, Hiroyasu; Nakajima, Kentaro; Saito, Yukiko Umeno
  3. Forms of Government Decentralization and Institutional Quality: Evidence from a Large Sample of Nation By Goel, Rajeev K.; Saunoris, James W.

  1. By: Yuanzhu Lu (China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China); Sougata Poddar (Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Law, Auckland University of Technology)
    Abstract: We explore whether the nature of piracy or the counterfeiting activity and the competition between the copyright holder and the pirate(s) matter in a given regime of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) protection. Generally, the nature of piracy can be of two types, commercial and end-user; and the nature of competition between copyright holder and if the pirate is commercial can be either in price or quantity depending on the pirated good. We find irrespective of the nature of piracy or competition, when the consumers’ tastes are sufficiently diverse and IPR protection is weak, it is profitable for the copyright holder to accommodate the pirate(s), while deter the pirate(s) in all other situations. The relationship between the quality of pirated good and piracy rate can be monotonic or non-monotonic. Piracy is more likely to survive under commercial piracy than under end-user piracy. The relationship between private and public anti-piracy measures is non-monotonic.
    Keywords: IPR protection, private copyright protection, piracy rate, product quality, commercial piracy, end-user piracy
    JEL: D23 D43 L13 L86 O3
    Date: 2015–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aut:wpaper:201504&r=ict
  2. By: Inoue, Hiroyasu; Nakajima, Kentaro; Saito, Yukiko Umeno
    Abstract: This study investigates the localization of collaboration in knowledge creation by using the data on Japanese patent applications. Applying distance-based methods, we obtained the following results. First, collaborations are significantly localized at the 5% level with a localization range of approximately 100 km. Second, the localization of collaboration is observed in most technologies. Third, the extent of localization was stable from 1986–2005 despite extensive developments in information and communications technology that facilitate communication between remote organizations. Fourth, the extent of localization is substantially greater in inter-firm collaborations than in intra-firm collaborations. Furthermore, in inter-firm collaborations, the extent of localization is greater in collaborations with small firms. This result suggests that geographic proximity mitigates the firm-border effects in collaborations, especially for small firms.
    Keywords: Knowledge creation, Collaboration, Geographic frictions, Firm-border effects
    JEL: R12 O31
    Date: 2016–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:remfce:58&r=ict
  3. By: Goel, Rajeev K. (Asian Development Bank Institute); Saunoris, James W. (Asian Development Bank Institute)
    Abstract: This paper studies the effects of various forms of government decentralization on institutional quality across countries. Using corruption and the shadow economy to proxy for institutional quality, as well as three forms of government decentralization (i.e., virtual, physical, and fiscal), the econometric results show virtual decentralization to be the most effective in improving institutional quality. The effects on transition and countries in Asia are also considered.
    Keywords: government decentralization; shadow economy; institutional quality; virtual decentralization
    JEL: H11 H73 K42
    Date: 2016–03–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:adbiwp:0562&r=ict

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