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on Information and Communication Technologies |
| By: | Grzybowski, Lukasz; Verboven, Frank |
| Abstract: | We study substitution from fixed-line to mobile voice access, and the role of various complementarities that may influence this process.We use rich survey data on 160,363 households from 27 EU countries during 2005-2012. We estimate a discrete choice model where households may choose one or both technologies, possibly in combination with internet access. We obtain the following main findings. First, there is significant fixed-to mobile substitution, especially in recent years: without mobile telephony, fixed-line penetration would have been 14% higher in 2012. But there is substantial heterogeneity across households and EU regions, with a stronger substitution in Central and Eastern European countries. Second, the decline in fixed telephony has been slowed down because of a significant complementarity between fixed-line and mobile connections offered by the fixed-line incumbent operator. This gives the incumbent a possibility to maintain to some extent its position in the fixed-line market, and to leverage it into the mobile market. Third, the decline in fixed telephony has been slowed down because of the complementarity with broadband internet: the introduction of DSL avoided an additional decline in fixed-line penetration of almost 9% in 2012. The emergence of fixed broadband has thus been the main source through which incumbents maintain their strong position in the fixed-line network. |
| Keywords: | broadband access; fixed-to-mobile substitution; incumbency advantage |
| JEL: | L13 L43 L96 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10045&r=ict |
| By: | Boneu, Franco; Giuliodori, David; Maffioli, Alessandro; Rodríguez, Alejandro; Stucchi, Rodolfo |
| Abstract: | This paper presents evidence on the spillover effect associated with the support received by firms located in a City of Argentina, between 2003 and 2007. The rationale for the cluster development program was the presence of agglomeration economies and coordination failures that generated spillovers and therefore to a suboptimal allocation of resources. We use a panel of firms in the ICT sector for the period 2003-2011 that allowed us to control for the dynamics of firms’ sales and fixed-effect applying the System GMM estimator. We find that one additional participant in the program increases the sales of non-participants in the City of Córdoba by 0.7%. |
| Keywords: | Cluster Development Program, Information and Communication Technologies, Spillovers, System GMM. |
| JEL: | D2 L8 O25 O29 |
| Date: | 2014–11–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:60307&r=ict |
| By: | Wennberg, Karl (Ratio); Stadin, Evelina (Ratio); Bergström, Andreas (FORES) |
| Abstract: | While the brave new world of digital technology is delivering intensive growth to some companies and individuals, the question remains whether that growth ‘trickles down’ or ‘spills over’ to other sectors of the economy rapidly enough to avoid the massive social disruptions seen in earlier historical periods of economic transformation. In this short paper we discuss the potential labour market consequences of automation based on digital technology. |
| Keywords: | Digitization; Labour Markets; Active Labour Market Policy |
| JEL: | J24 J68 O38 |
| Date: | 2014–12–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0237&r=ict |
| By: | Paola Gritti; Riccardo Leoni |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of competencies, psychological capital, new work practices and digital technologies on private sector wages in the Italian economy. It demonstrates ? also considering industry collective bargaining that tends to fix wage levels according to job complexity, moreover giving rise to employment relations governed by incomplete contracts ? that firms pay extra wage premia to workers who: i) use digital technologies, provided they are versatile in the use of these new tools, ii) activate a bundle of distinctive ‘generic’ competencies, iii) possess personal traits considered by the firm as productive in carrying out work, and iv) occupy positions to which the organizational design attributes greater autonomy and more responsibilities. The wage equation used controls for several detailed factors (firm characteristics, occupations, worker characteristics, working and contract conditions, industrial relations) and was estimated with weighted OLS, also controlling for heteroskedasticity. Endogeneity was tested with GMM estimators. |
| Keywords: | wages; competencies; technologies |
| JEL: | J24 J31 O33 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:brg:newwpa:1301&r=ict |
| By: | Bourguignon, Hélène; Gomes, Renato; Tirole, Jean |
| Abstract: | The proliferation of new payment methods on the Internet rekindles the old and unsettled debate about merchants’ incentive and ability to differentiate price according to payment choice. This paper develops an imperfect-information framework for the analysis of platform and social regulation of card surcharging and cash discounting. It makes three main contributions. First, it identifies the conditions under which concerns about missed sales induce merchants to perceive that they must take the card. Second, it derives a set of predictions about cash discounts, card surcharges and platform fees that match, and shed light on existing evidence. Finally, it shows that the optimal regulation of surcharging is related to public policy toward merchant fees and substantially differs from current practice. |
| Keywords: | card surcharges; cash discounts; hold-ups in two-sided markets; missed sales; payment cards |
| JEL: | D83 L10 L41 |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10171&r=ict |
| By: | Gandal, Neil; Halaburda, Hanna |
| Abstract: | We analyze how network effects affect competition in the nascent cryptocurrency market. We do so by examining the changes over time in exchange rate data among cryptocurrencies. Specifically, we look at two aspects: (1) competition among different currencies, and (2) competition among exchanges where those currencies are traded. Our data suggest that the winner-take-all effect is dominant early in the market. During this period, when Bitcoin becomes more valuable against the U.S. dollar, it also becomes more valuable against other cryptocurrencies. This trend is reversed in the later period. The data in the later period are consistent with the use of cryptocurrencies as financial assets (popularized by Bitcoin), and not consistent with "winner-take-all" dynamics. |
| Keywords: | Bitcoin; cryptocurrency; network effects |
| JEL: | L17 L86 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10157&r=ict |
| By: | Husslage, B.G.M. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Borm, P.E.M. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Burg, T.; Hamers, H.J.M. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Lindelauf, R. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | All over the world intelligence services are collecting data concerning possible terrorist threats. This information is usually transformed into network structures in which the nodes represent the individuals in the data set and the links possible connections between these individuals. Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to keep track of all individuals in the resulting complex network. Therefore, Lindelauf et al. (2013) introduced a methodology that ranks terrorists in a network. The rankings that result from this methodology can be used as a decision support system to efficiently allocate the scarce surveillance means of intelligence agencies. Moreover, usage of these rankings can improve the quality of surveillance which can in turn lead to prevention of attacks or destabilization of the networks under surveillance. The methodology introduced by Lindelauf et al. (2013) is based on a game theoretic centrality measure, which is innovative in the sense that it takes into account not only the structure of the network but also individual and coalitional characteristics of the members of the network. In this paper we elaborate on this methodology by introducing a new game theoretic centrality measure that better takes into account the operational strength of connected subnetworks. Moreover, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the rankings derived from this new centrality measure for the case of Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attack. In this sensitivity analysis we consider firstly the possible additional information available about members of the network, secondly, variations in relational strength and, finally, the absence or presence of a small percentage of links in the network. We also introduce a case specific method to compare the different rankings that result from the sensitivity analysis and show that the new centrality measure is robust to small changes in the data. |
| Keywords: | terrorism; Network Analysis; Centrality measures; Cooperative game theory |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:191548ed-34ba-4aba-abbf-948ce9088809&r=ict |