nep-ict New Economics Papers
on Information and Communication Technologies
Issue of 2014‒08‒09
six papers chosen by
Walter Frisch
Universität Wien

  1. Informationen sind anders: Was bei einer ökonomischen Analyse von Wissenschaft und Internet zu beachten ist By Dilger, Alexander
  2. ICT and R&D as inputs or efficiency determinants? Analysing the manufacturing Italian firms over the 2007-2009 By Bonanno, Graziella
  3. ICT and Non-ICT investments: short and long run macro dynamics By F. Bacchini; M. E. Bontempi; R. Golinelli; C. Jona Lasinio
  4. Can Electronic Procurement Improve Infrastructure Provision? Evidence From Public Works in India and Indonesia By Sean Lewis-Faupel; Yusuf Neggers; Benjamin A. Olken; Rohini Pande
  5. Who should pay for two-way interconnection? By Sjaak Hurkens; Angel L. López
  6. Taxation trends in the European Union: 2014 edition By European Commission

  1. By: Dilger, Alexander
    Abstract: Informationen sind anders als normale, insbesondere private Güter, was bei der ökonomischen Analyse zu berücksichtigen ist. An den Beispielen Wissenschaft und Internet werden einige Besonderheiten von Informationen vorgestellt und Folgerungen daraus gezogen. -- Information are different from normal, especially private goods. This has to be considered in an economic analysis. Using science and the internet as examples, some specific characteristics of information are presented and implications are derived.
    JEL: A10 B31 D2 D62 D80 H81 I23 L86 O34 P14
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:umiodp:62014&r=ict
  2. By: Bonanno, Graziella
    Abstract: Are Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and Research & Development (R&D) inputs or efficiency determinants? This is the topic of the paper which is developed by analysing a sample of 2691 Italian manufacturing firms over the period 2007-2009. The empirical setting is based on a production function estimated through the Stochastic Frontier (SF) approach. ICT and R&D are used once as inputs, once as efficiency determinants (Coelli et al., 1999). Results show that the rates of return of ICT and R&D investments are high (0.08 for ICT and 0.04 for R&D) when they enter into the model only as inputs. We also documented that ICT and R&D contribute positively to explain the efficiency scores.
    Keywords: ICT, R&D, Stochastic Frontier Approach, efficiency
    JEL: D22 D24 L69 O39
    Date: 2014–07–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:57640&r=ict
  3. By: F. Bacchini; M. E. Bontempi; R. Golinelli; C. Jona Lasinio
    Abstract: In this paper, we model business investment distinguishing between ICT (communication equipment, hardware and software) and Non-ICT (machinery and equipment, and nonresidential buildings) components and taking into account asset specific characteristics potentially affecting the reactivity of capital accumulation over the business cycle. Business investment and ICT and Non-ICT assets are estimated within a VECM model to test, in a unique framework, the assumptions of the flexible accelerator model (Clark, 1944, and Koyck, 1954) and of the neoclassical model of Hall and Jorgenson (1967), as well as how financial constraints and uncertainty influence investment behaviour (Hall and Lerner, 2010, and Bloom, 2007). Our findings suggest that the long-run relationship with standard macro determinants (output and user cost) is verified for aggregate business capital stock as well as for individual Non-ICT assets but not for ICT. In the short run, liquidity is a key determinant of investment behaviour independently of the asset type. In the long-run, uncertainty significantly affects ICT. Finally, the results of the counterfactual exercises over the latest Italian recession support the idea that ICT is a key policy variable to foster the economic recovery.
    JEL: C52 C53 E22 E50
    Date: 2014–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp956&r=ict
  4. By: Sean Lewis-Faupel; Yusuf Neggers; Benjamin A. Olken; Rohini Pande
    Abstract: Poorly functioning, and often corrupt, public procurement procedures are widely faulted for the low quality of infrastructure provision in developing countries. Can electronic procurement (e-procurement), which reduces both the cost of acquiring tender information and personal interaction between bidders and procurement officials, ameliorate these problems? In this paper we develop a unique micro-dataset on public works procurement from two fast-growing economies, India and Indonesia, and use regional and time variation in the adoption of e-procurement across both countries to examine its impact. We find no evidence that e-procurement reduces prices paid by the government, but do find that it is associated with quality improvements. In India, where we observe an independent measure of construction quality, e-procurement improves the average road quality, and in Indonesia, e-procurement reduces delays in completion of public works projects. Bidding data suggests that an important channel of influence is selection -- regions with e-procurement have a broader distribution of winners, with (better) winning bidders more likely to come from outside the region where the work takes place. On net, the results suggest that e-procurement facilitates entry from higher quality contractors.
    JEL: H57 O12 O53
    Date: 2014–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20344&r=ict
  5. By: Sjaak Hurkens; Angel L. López
    Abstract: European and the US mobile communication services markets have developed in rather different ways. There are striking differences in termination regulation and retail pricing models and one may wonder why this occurred and whether either of the markets outperforms the other in terms of efficiency and/or profitability. We address these issues by analyzing a symmetric oligopoly model in which firms are able, but not obliged, to charge subscribers for receiving and placing calls, may discriminate between on- and off-net calls and may request a monthly subscription fee. We show that a continuum of equilibria exist for any reciprocal termination rate, some of which resemble the European business model (with zero charges for reception) while others resemble the US business model (with equal prices for placing and receiving calls). We show that under neither of these business models full efficiency can be achieved. Comparing the European business model with termination regulated at cost to the US business model with voluntary Bill and Keep arrangements we show that the European scenario is more efficient when call externality is modest, and more profitable when either call externality is modest and call demand elasticity high or call externality high and call demand elasticity low. Our predictions are consistent both with observed network operators’ opposition to lowering termination rates in Europe and with voluntary agreements to Bill and Keep arrangements in the US.
    Keywords: access pricing, interconnection, regulation, telecommunications, networks, rational expectations
    JEL: D43 L13 L51 L96
    Date: 2014–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:774&r=ict
  6. By: European Commission
    Abstract: This report contains a detailed statistical and economic analysis of the tax systems of the Member States of the European Union, plus Iceland and Norway, which are Members of the European Economic Area. The data are presented within a unified statistical framework (the ESA95 harmonised system of national and regional accounts), which makes it possible to assess the heterogeneous national tax systems on a fully comparable basis.
    Keywords: European Union, taxation
    JEL: H23 H24 H25 H27 H71
    Date: 2014–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tax:taxtre:2014&r=ict

This nep-ict issue is ©2014 by Walter Frisch. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.