nep-ict New Economics Papers
on Information and Communication Technologies
Issue of 2014‒02‒08
four papers chosen by
Walter Frisch
University Vienna

  1. Will Facebook save or destroy social capital? An empirical investigation into the effect of online interactions on trust and networks By Sabatini, Fabio; Sarracino, Francesco
  2. "Graduated Response Policy and the Behavior of Digital Pirates: Evidence from the French Three-Strike (Hadopi) Law" By MICHAEL ARNOLD; ERIC DARMON; SYLVAIN DEJEAN; THIERRY PENARD
  3. How the Value of Information Shapes the Value of Commitment Or: Why the Value of Commitment Does Not Vanish By Tanja Hörtnagl; Rudolf Kerschbamer
  4. Effects of Taxation on Software Piracy Across the European Union By Nicolas Dias Gomes; Pedro André Cerqueira; Luís Alçada Almeida

  1. By: Sabatini, Fabio; Sarracino, Francesco
    Abstract: Studies in the social capital literature have documented two stylised facts: first, a decline in measures of social participation has occurred in many OECD countries. Second, and more recently, the success of social networking sites (SNSs) has resulted in a steep rise in online social participation. Our study adds to this body of research by conducting the first empirical assessment of how online networking affects two economically relevant aspects of social capital, i.e. trust and sociability. We find that participation in SNSs such as Facebook and Twitter has a positive effect on face-to-face interactions. However, social trust decreases with online interactions. Several interpretations of these findings are discussed.
    Keywords: social participation; online networks; Facebook; Internet-mediated communication; social capital; broadband; digital divide
    JEL: C36 D85 O33 Z1
    Date: 2014–01–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:53325&r=ict
  2. By: MICHAEL ARNOLD (Department of Economics,University of Delaware); ERIC DARMON (CREM, University of Rennes); SYLVAIN DEJEAN (CREM, LR-MOS, University of La Rochelle); THIERRY PENARD (CREM, University of Rennes 1 & University of Delaware)
    Abstract: Most developed countries have tried to restrain digital piracy by strength- ening laws against copyright infringement. In 2009, France implemented the Hadopi law. Under this law individuals receive a warning the first two times they are detected illegally sharing content through peer to peer (P2P) networks. Legal action is only taken when a third violation is detected. We analyze the impact of this law on individual behavior. Our theoretical model of illegal be- havior under a graduated response law predicts that the perceived probability of detection has no impact on the decision to initially engage in digital piracy, but may reduce the intensity of illegal file sharing by those who do pirate. We test the theory using survey data from French Internet users. Our econometric results indicate that the law has no substantial deterrent effect. In addition, we find evidence that individuals who are better informed about the law and piracy alternatives substitute away from monitored P2P networks and illegally access content through unmonitored channels.
    Keywords: Digital Piracy, digital media, Hadopi, three-strikes law, property rights
    JEL: L82 O34 K42 D11
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dlw:wpaper:14-07.&r=ict
  3. By: Tanja Hörtnagl; Rudolf Kerschbamer
    Abstract: This paper challenges recent results on the fragility of the value of commitment. It introduces a specific notion of the ’value of information’ for a later-moving player about the action choice of a previously-moving player, gives conditions under which this value is positive and shows that a positive value of information for the latermoving player is sufficient for a positive value of commitment for the previouslymoving player. It then argues that the value of information for a later-moving player is unlikely to vanish in real-world applications, implying that the value of commitment for the previously-moving player does not vanish either.
    Keywords: Value of Information, Value of Commitment, Sequential Move Game, Imperfect Observability, Stackelberg Duopoly, First-Mover Advantage
    JEL: C72 D82 D83 L13
    Date: 2014–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2014-03&r=ict
  4. By: Nicolas Dias Gomes (Faculty opf Economics, University of Coimbra and INESC-Coimbra, Portugal); Pedro André Cerqueira (Faculty opf Economics, University of Coimbra and GEMF, Portugal); Luís Alçada Almeida (Faculty opf Economics, University of Coimbra and INESC-Coimbra, Portugal)
    Abstract: This paper explores the relation between levels of taxation among different types of households in the European Union and the levels of software piracy from 1996 to 2010. It extends previous works introducing a large panel data set for the European Union and it´s different regions. We estimate our model using the fixed effect, comparing results from the Euro Area and the Countries that joined EU in 2004 and 2007. Results show that levels of taxation increase the levels of software piracy losses; moreover these results depend on marital status and number of children. The weight of taxation on GDP, namely the taxes on consumption, have a positive effect on piracy losses while the impact of inflation is negative and marginal. Additional to this we also found that the relative importance of these taxes in relation to total taxation can affect this phenomenon. An increase in the weight of capital taxation would decrease software piracy while this effect was opposite when considering the relative importance of consumption taxes.
    Keywords: Panel data, personal taxation, software piracy.
    JEL: C23 H20 O52
    Date: 2014–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gmf:wpaper:2014-03.&r=ict

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